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RESEARCH PLAN AND OUTLINE 
OF THE BOOK
Gijsbert Vonk and Albertjan Tollenaar
1. BACKGROUND AND PURPOSE OF THIS STUDY
Th is book is written as a contribution to the Groningen research programme 
‘public governance and the welfare state’. Th is six year programme, 
accommodating two PhD and two post-doctoral researchers, aims at gaining a 
deeper understanding of the role of the state in privatized social security 
programmes. Th is topic has attracted much attention ever since successive 
governments shift ed the governance of social security from the public to the 
private domain. In the Netherlands for example, this has been done especially by 
strengthening the responsibility of the individual employers and allowing a 
larger role for private actors, such as insurance companies and private 
re-integration services. Th is shift  of governance has mostly aff ected the areas of 
health care, sickness and invalidity insurance and re-integration services.
Looking closer at the various measures that were introduced in diff erent 
countries, it appears that privatisation is never fully fl etched. Governments 
maintain a fi rm grip on privatized agencies, using various instruments such as 
legislation, supervision, contract management, programme evaluation, etc. Th is 
form of public control over private social security schemes is sometimes referred 
to as the ‘regulatory welfare state’. Th e central question of our research 
programme is to what extent the regulatory framework (in the wide sense of the 
word) contributes towards social security as a public interest.
While the project deals with the functioning of various regulatory instruments 
in social security, it also touches upon the underlying question of defi ning the 
public interest of social security itself. Why should the government want to 
maintain a grip on privatized social security schemes in the fi rst place and what 
elements of these schemes should be made subject to government control?
Th e latter question is a diffi  cult one to tackle. Not only is the subject likely to 
touch upon political and ideological preferences of the individual, but more 
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importantly from a point of view of academic discourse, it is perceived very 
diff erently by the various disciplines. Economists tend to approach it from the 
angle of market failure theory. In jargon: when transactions lead to negative 
external eff ects (such as free rider behaviour, cherry picking, adverse selection, 
etc.) the state must step in to regulate the problem. Social scientists are equally 
interested in the role of the state in the provision of welfare, but their 
understanding of this subject and the questions they raise may be very diff erent 
(also amongst themselves, depending on specifi c background or interest: political 
science, sociology, anthropology, etc). Historians will point out that the present 
day public programmes have private roots and that the contemporary leaning 
towards some privatization is only a relative change when seen from the 
perspective of the long and rich history of the welfare states. Lawyers (by the 
very nature of their subject) and also some philosophers (in their quest for 
understanding the meaning of justice) employ a normative approach when 
defi ning the role of the state in social security.
Th e confusion is exacerbated by the fact that each of the disciplines makes use of 
its own conceptual framework. Similar terms may have diff erent meanings. Th e 
Babylonian misunderstandings which surround our subject, led us to the 
conviction that it is dangerous to mix the various approaches. Better to respect 
the peculiarities and methods pertaining to each of the academic disciplines. 
Perhaps at later stages, it is possible to come to some overarching analysis as to 
why various disciplines come to diff erent (or preferably similar!) outcomes, but 
fi rst we should gain a deeper understanding of the way the disciplines approach 
the subject of social security as a public interest. Th e purpose of this study was to 
obtain such understanding.
2. CENTRAL RESEARCH QUESTIONS AND 
COMPOSITION OF THIS BOOK
Th e study was set up almost by means of a scientifi c experiment. Four disciplines 
have been selected to off er contributions: economy, public administration (being 
in itself an amalgam of various social sciences), law and philosophy. Th e reason 
for this selection is that in our previous discussion the fi rst three disciplines 
seemed to have strong views on the methods of identifying public interests. 
Philosophy was added at a later stage in order to obtain a better insight in the 
background of diff erent approaches to the public interest.
Part A of the book is entitled ‘Social security as a public interest’. We confronted 
four authors, each from a diff erent discipline, with a uniform instruction, based 
upon one simple question (although, admittedly, containing two elements): 
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is social security considered to be a public interest and how does the answer to this 
question refl ect on the role of the state in social security?
Part B is entitled ‘Th e instrumentalisation of the public interest’. A second group 
of writers was recruited to refl ect upon the question: how does your discipline 
perceive the instrumentalisation of the public interest in social security?
While it was very tempting to give further working defi nitions (for example of 
the term ‘public interest’) we refrained from doing so, as we were primarily 
interested in learning from the disciplinary framework of the authors themselves. 
It was assumed that their own approaches would refl ect pre-occupations which 
are typical for the disciplines involved. In this way the experiment would yield 
the clearest results.
3. SOME PRELIMINARY OBSERVATIONS
3.1. SOCIAL SECURITY AS A PUBLIC INTEREST: 
A TAUTOLOGY?
Social security is a collective aff air. It cannot be achieved by someone on his/her 
own. If an individual decides to save up money for him/herself, that is very nice 
for this individual but it is not social security. Social security always presupposes 
an element of sharing and solidarity. Th is being the case, one can wonder 
whether raising the question of the public interest is not a superfl uous exercise. 
Is it not so per defi nition?
We are aware of this dilemma. It is for this reason that the book is entitled ‘social 
security as a public interest’. Yet it must be borne in mind that the very fact that 
social security is a collective aff air, does not mean that we agree upon the 
interests that it serves and why these interest should be considered as ‘public’. 
Indeed, the various contributions to our study provide us with an impressive 
testimony of the diff erences of opinions that exist in this regard. Furthermore, 
one must take into account that disciplines provide diff erent explanations as to 
why social security as a collective instrument is necessary. So even when the 
raising of the question of social security as a public interest is an expression of 
tautology, it is still an interesting one.
Th e tautology problem lingers on when we have to defi ne the concept of social 
security used in this book. Very oft en reference is made to the defi nition 
employed in major international instruments, such as ILO Convention No. 102 
and Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004. Th is defi nition refers to a system of income 
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protection related to number specifi c social risks, such as unemployment, 
sickness, invalidity, old age, etc. While it is also possible for us to fall back upon 
this defi nition, there is one element that requires extra attention. Th e concept of 
social security is oft en identifi ed with public governance in the formal sense of 
the word. Th us, for example, ILO Convention No. 102 and Regulation (EC) No. 
883/2004 exclude contractual social security arrangements from their material 
scope of application.1 If we take a similar stance, raising the question of the 
public interest in social security is not possible as there would simply be no social 
security outside the public domain.
Th ere are two major problems with this public law bias of the concept of social 
security stricto sensu. In the fi rst place, it excludes non-governmental schemes, 
private and occupational, that contribute equally to the realization of the 
objectives of social security. In the second place, it does not take into account the 
diversity of the role of the state vis-à-vis social security at large. In reality the 
social security systems of most countries refl ect a mix of public, collective, or 
private approaches. Th ese approaches may exist side by side, or layer upon layer, 
or may even be mixed within single schemes; sometimes public schemes allow 
for private elements (e.g. opt outs, private administration), while private schemes 
are oft en publicly regulated and supervised. Th e role of the state in relation to 
social security varies from direct provider or regulator to mere facilitator and 
there exists an array of instruments in support of these roles: legislation, 
administration, supervision, contract management, fi scal steering mechanisms, 
benchmarking, public exposure, etc. Th e foregoing also infers that privatization 
of social security is not necessarily as extreme as the term suggests; it may merely 
involve a shift  in governance (more private and less public) or even less than that: 
just a diff erent form of public governance. Indeed it is the awareness of the 
alternative forms of government intervention that can be used that gives rise to 
the concept of a ‘regulatory welfare state’, a concept that is increasingly used to 
denote mixed private public approaches in social security.
So, for the purposes of this study it was not possible to restrict ourselves to public 
social security schemes in the formal legal sense of the word. All systems 
providing protection against the internationally recognized social risks must be 
taken into account, regardless of whether these are based upon formal state 
legislation, collective agreements or any other form of self-regulation or even 
individual contracts. Th ereby, we remain conscious of the fact that also schemes 
which are formally covered by private law may in fact come under some form of 
1 Unless included by separate decision (art. 1, sub l Regulation (EC) 883/2004) or supervised by 
public authorities and jointly administered by employers and workers (art. 6 ILO Convention 
No. 102).
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public governance. In that sense it is not so much the state responsibility which is 
challenged in this book, but much rather the public-private dichotomy.
3.2. CHOSEN ABSTRACTION
Th e general nature of this study also infers that social security is treated as a 
monolith. In reality social security is not. Th ere are diff erent systems for many 
diff erent risks. How to regulate the public interest probably depends very much 
on the system involved. For example, a private health care system gives rise to 
diff erent threats to the public interest than in the case of insurance against 
occupational injuries (the latter risk being primarily an employer’s liability). 
Likewise, it makes quite a diff erence whether we speak of basic minimum 
subsistence schemes or of more generous benefi t schemes (the former will 
invariably weigh heavier on the responsibility of the state than the latter). Th is 
book merely contains a preliminary theoretical reconnaissance. Further 
diff erentiation as to the risks or systems involved was not possible.
3.3. SOCIAL SECURITY VERSUS SOCIAL WELFARE
Th is study sometimes refers to the concept social welfare rather than social 
security. Th e fi rst term is wider, in the sense that it refers not only to the provision 
of income security in case of poverty or certain risks, such as unemployment and 
old age, but to the whole spectrum of government action intended to make sure 
that citizens meet their basic needs, such as education, housing and health. Also 
‘welfare’ does not only refer to cash benefi ts schemes, but also to various types of 
services and in-kind programmes which are sometimes considered to fall outside 
the social security domain, such as probation and parole, child protection 
services, socialization services, etc.2 Th e core object of this study is social security. 
Nonetheless, the wider term social welfare is also used. Th is can be explained by 
the fact that very oft en certain propositions are not only applicable to social 
security, but to the welfare state as a whole.
3.4. NATURE AND AMBIT OF THE STUDY
While the book has been written by mainly Dutch authors (in fact with two 
exceptions all authors are or were employed at the University of Groningen), it is 
not a book about the Netherlands’ social security system. We asked the authors 
to take into account international literature and to take their examples not only 
2 For the meaning of the term social welfare, see Popple & Leighninger 1993.
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from the Netherlands but also from other countries. Nonetheless, due to the 
background of most of the authors a certain Dutch bias could not be avoided.
Th e general nature of this study infers that we refrained from analysing the 
situation from the perspective of one country or a particular legal, political or 
economic system. Th us, for example, no specifi c attention has been paid to the 
framework of the European Union. Th is does not mean to say, of course, that 
some writers do not incidentally refer to some countries or to the EU by means 
of a single reference.
4. SHORT ANALYSIS OF THE CONTRIBUTIONS
On the basis of these preliminary remarks the contributions to our study can be 
compared. In this paragraph we aim to briefl y analyse the individual chapters, 
providing an opportunity to make comparisons. Th e conclusions will be drawn 
in the next paragraph.
4.1. PART A: SOCIAL SECURITY AS A PUBLIC INTEREST
Economy
Two colleagues, Andries Nentjes and Edwin Woerdman, both professors of law 
and economics at the University of Groningen were responsible for the economic 
analysis. Th e authors are as much interested in identifying and correcting market 
failures in the private provision of social security as in public sector failures. 
Th eir contribution immediately throws us off  balance. Our starting point was 
that privatization raises the question of safeguarding the public interest. 
However, the writers assume the reverse: privatization measures have been 
introduced in the pursuit of the public interest.
According to the authors, economics defi nes the public interest as maximizing 
the benefi ts of economic transactions for the society. Th is defi nition is (still) in 
line with the old utilitarian maxim according to which societies should aim at 
the greatest happiness for the largest majority, but it can also be formulated in 
more modern terms, such as transitions between work and care or transitions on 
the labour market (changing jobs). Th e next observation is that the ‘mixed 
economy’ is based upon the tacit assumption that the free market serves the 
public interest the best, as this leads to an optimal allocation of resources. 
Th erefore, there is only a need for the government to step in when markets fail 
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because of the occurrence of negative external eff ects, such as cherry picking, 
creaming, free rider behaviour, etc.
Th e rise of the public social security system can to a large degree be explained 
with reference to market failure theory. Th e major market failure is situated in 
the private organisation of solidarity amongst citizens. If vertical solidarity was 
to be left  to charitable institutions, the system would be underfunded. Free rider 
behaviour would induce many to remain idle while only some contribute. Th e 
case is somewhat diff erent for horizontal solidarity. Here the authors assume that 
the masses were too poor to pay private insurance contributions. But they allege 
that there were also paternalistic motives involved in introducing mandatory 
social insurance, or at least that the argument that mandatory social insurance 
only serves to correct failures in the insurance market is economically 
unconvincing.
Th e authors also set out the drawbacks of the public system. Economic science is 
not only interested in market failure, but also in public sector failure. Th is comes 
under the umbrella of other terms, such as overproduction, overconsumption, 
X-ineffi  ciency and lack of choice. In social security these advantages accumulated 
in benefi t dependency, a spectre which continues to haunt public social security 
systems to date.
When the sum of advantages of a public system is outweighed by the 
disadvantages a partial privatization is required, as this will give room to 
behavioural incentives which increase effi  ciency and stimulate individual 
responsibility. In all, not only the rise of the public social security system but 
also the (re)introduction of private elements follows the economic rationale of 
the public interest
Public administration
One of the post-doctoral fellows in the programme, Mirjam Plantinga, analysed 
the public interest from the perspective of public administration. She refers to 
the defi nition of the public interest used by Bozeman (2007, p. 12) as outcomes 
best serving the long-run survival and well-being of a social collective construed 
as a ‘public’. Th is defi nition would coincide with the way sociologists tend to 
perceive social security, i.e. as something which is instrumental to the well-being 
of the society as a whole, either formulated negatively (e.g. avoiding social 
disorder)3 or positively (e.g. in terms of social cohesion).4 Nonetheless, Plantinga 
observes that in social sciences a unifying defi nition of the public interest does 
3 Cf. De Swaan 1989.
4 Cf. Berghman & Verhalla 2002, p. 11–20.
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not exist. She is therefore more interested in contemporary methods of 
identifying public values.
Th e public value approach was fi rst articulated by Moore (1995). According to 
Moore, the idea of managerial work in the public sector is to create public values 
just as the aim of managerial work in the private sector is to create private values 
(profi ts). Public values cannot be derived from the aggregation of individual 
preferences but are expressed by citizens when they make collective choices. Th us, 
the underlying values of our system can be traced by studying various sources 
such as constitutional texts, court cases, political debates, journal articles etc.
In the public value approach, the concept of ‘public value failure’ plays an 
important role. If a system no longer upholds underlying values, then that system 
can be said to have failed. Th is concept of public value failure is deemed to be 
diff erent from the economic concept of market value failure.
Is social security a public value? Clearly so. Again and again research provides 
evidence for broad underlying support for the welfare, particularly vis-à-vis the 
elderly, the handicapped and children. However, when dealing with support 
systems for the poor and the unemployed Plantinga points out an interesting 
anomaly. In countries with weak social security systems, public support for these 
systems is low. In more developed systems, this is less so. Citizens either see 
themselves as net benefi ciaries of the system, or support washes away.
Plantinga’s analysis of public support for welfare states uncovers some general 
notions as to what should be considered as the core of the welfare state for which 
governments should take responsibility. A public interest to protect vulnerable 
groups can clearly be identifi ed. Which groups are believed to deserve protection 
and which level of protection is believed to be necessary does, however, depend 
on the institutional context. As a result, the question of allocating responsibilities 
for social security between the public and the private sector is also relevant; it 
may diff er from country to country and over time.
Law
Th e legal analysis of the public interest was provided by George Katrougalos, 
Professor of Public Law at Demokritos University of Th race, and by Gijsbert 
Vonk. Th ey pointed out that although the concept of the public interest does play 
a role in law, it is an open norm whose meaning is variable. Th ey therefore set 
aside any legal public interest doctrine and instead rely upon the relevance of 
socio-economic fundamental rights, adopted in national constitutions and 
international human rights instruments. Social security is recognised as one of 
these rights.
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Th e recognition of social security as a fundamental right did not appear out of 
the blue. It is refl ected in the various ways European states gradually attempted 
to solve the ‘social question’ in the 19th century. Th e constitutional recognition of 
social rights implied a change in the functions of the state: instead of regulating 
the market only on the basis of norms that were derived from the private law of 
contract, property and tort, states actively intervened in the operation of the 
economic system in order to achieve results that the economic system would not 
achieve on its own. In nearly all countries in Europe − the exception being the 
United Kingdom5 − this change was given explicit constitutional recognition, 
either by explicit ‘Social State’ clauses or by analytical enumeration of social 
rights, or by both.
While there is much diff erence in opinion as to the legal nature of socio-
economic rights, the recognition of social security as a fundamental right brings 
the subject of social security into the public domain. Social security is a public 
concern and when it fails to deliver, it is the state that must be held accountable.
Which obligations arise for the state from the existence of a right to social 
security? In answer to this question, Katrougalos and Vonk refer to the logical 
structure set out in the recent General Comment No. 19 of the UN Commission 
of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR). In short, the state may not 
negatively interfere in private social security (duty to respect) but must ensure the 
proper functioning of private social security, making sure, for example, that funds 
are not abused (duty to protect). Furthermore the state must actively develop a 
policy on the welfare state and create − as a minimum − a safety net in the form of 
a social assistance scheme (duty to fulfi l). Th e conclusion is that under the 
doctrine of state responsibility, any division of power is feasible as long as it 
realises the objectives of social security. At the same time it must be realised that a 
heavier responsibility lies on the shoulders of the state when it comes to providing 
minimum protection. Th e state must provide at least a minimum subsistence 
level. Furthermore, a system of basic social insurance will not suffi  ce without a 
strong element of state interference, as the necessary solidarity amongst the 
insured population will not arise spontaneously. When dealing with additional 
benefi ts, the state can more easily fall back upon a regulatory or facilitating role.
Katrougalos and Vonk accept that the above categorisation of state obligations is 
merely a framework within the formal sense of the word. It does not make clear 
what social security is, or which substantial rights must be respected, protected 
or fulfi lled. Th ey put forward seven basic principles in order to fi nd out the extent 
to which rights to social security are actually supported by concrete legal 
standards, adopted amongst others in conventions of the ILO and the Council of 
5 Th is is because the UK does not have a written constitution.
Gijsbert Vonk and Albertjan Tollenaar
10 Intersentia
Europe. Th e principles come under the headings of protection, universality, 
inclusion, reliability, solidarity, equality and good governance. It appears most of 
these principles are supported by concrete legal norms, albeit some more than 
others, and in diff ering degrees of concreteness.
Philosophy
Th e philosophical dimension was added to obtain an overarching understanding 
of the public interest in social security. For Onno Brinkman, Senior Policy Advisor 
International Aff airs in the Ministry of Social Aff airs and Employment, it was not 
an easy task to bring the wealth of philosophical thought to bear on the question 
of why we perceive social security as a public interest. Th e question is never posed 
in these terms and there are few fi xed points of reference as philosophers – by their 
nature – tend to disagree about almost everything. Th e controversy starts with the 
very question of how the concept of the public interest should be conceived. Is it 
merely an aggregation of individual needs or is it more than that, as Rousseau 
argued when he introduced the concept of the general will (volonté générale)?
Brinkman avoids such questions by expressing his personal point of view. He 
takes the post-war consensus around Keynesian economic theory as a starting 
point for his analysis. According to him, this consensus led to a watering down 
of the diff erences between the public and the private interest. What was good for 
the public interest was equally good for the private interest, and vice versa. But 
when the validity of Keynes’ economic theory had run its course, it became 
necessary to reformulate the relationship between the public and the private 
interest. Brinkman described the major movements in political philosophy that 
have endeavoured to respond to this situation.
Th e distinction between liberalism and communitarianism is a theme running 
through his account. Liberals are united in their opinion regarding the autonomy 
of the individual and the neutrality of the state. Egalitarian liberalism formulates 
the public interest as a ‘joint venture’ for the benefi t of individual participants. It 
puts a strong emphasis on reciprocity because the cooperation of all is needed to 
make the joint venture a success. Th rough this, the concept of distributive justice, 
including social security, acquires instrumental characteristics: it is considered 
by these liberals as a means for ensuring the cooperation of all. Although 
libertarians acknowledge a common fate, this goes no further than providing 
mutual protection in the face of external threats. Th e public interest is principally 
revealed in the protection of the inalienable rights of the individual, in particular 
the right of ownership. Th ey believe that private interests can best be realised 
through the operation of the market or through the exercise of charity.
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Communitarians oppose both these notions. From their perspective, the 
individual can only be understood as part of the community in which he lives: as 
a result the individual is not autonomous and neither is the state neutral. By its 
nature communitarianism is committed to the principle of reciprocity. Aft er all, 
the very core of communitarianism is that the individual can only develop in 
interaction with the community.
Th is contrast between liberals and communitarians is perhaps the most revealing 
element in Brinkman’s contribution. Either the fi nal objective of social security 
is the liberation of the individual who must be able to fully develop his natural 
capacities, or it is the quality of society as a whole. Fortunately it is not necessary 
to make a principle choice between these two extremes. Th ey balance each other 
out. Only when one extreme is given too much priority over the other do we 
enter a danger zone. For example, a system that only focuses on individual rights 
runs the risk that it benefi ts consumerism, while a system that is immersed in 
community obligations (workfare!) runs the risk of crushing the individual.
4.2. PART B: THE INSTRUMENTALISATION OF THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST: TOWARDS THE REGULATORY WELFARE 
STATE
Economy
For the analysis of their second contribution dealing with the instrumentalisation 
of the public interest, it is helpful to recall the mindset of the authors Andries 
Nentjes and Edwin Woerdman. Th ey consider the introduction of private elements 
into the system as medicine to fi ght of the symptoms of a public welfare disease, 
consisting of overconsumption, overproduction and X-ineffi  ciency. From a study 
of various ‘rationalisation measures’ introduced by the Dutch government over de 
last three decades, they conclude the evidence they collected does not support the 
hypothesis that the government has let down the public interest in social security. 
In their view the government focused on what it had to do: safeguarding the public 
interest in social security by trying to make it sustainable.
From an economic point of view rationalisation measures in the fi eld of social 
security are instruments that serve the public interest. Such measures can come 
under various umbrellas. Governments can resort to ‘negative measures’ 
consisting of lowering benefi ts, restricting eligibility and, introducing more 
obligations for the claimant. Also positive changes can be considered, involving 
for example the introduction of voucher schemes which allow citizens to buy in 
services themselves. Many governments have introduced semi-markets, by 
making private actors (profi t or non-profi t) and/or other public authorities 
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compete for government contracts. In the Netherlands, for example, such 
markets have been created in the re-integration sector and for the care services 
for the handicapped and the elderly.
Nentjes and Woerdman analyse the problems of these semi-markets from an 
economic point of view. On the supply side services must be delivered. Th is 
means that oft en the market is not open to all potential suppliers; they have to 
meet certain standards before they can enter the market. For example it is 
undesirable for a supplier to go bankrupt, leaving the clients (citizens) without 
public services. Here the public responsibility for continuity of the public services 
calls for strict regulation of market parties. On the demand side the problem 
arises that the social services are oft en ‘trust goods’, making it diffi  cult to 
formulate the exact conditions of these goods. Th erefore the contracts relating to 
social services will oft en contain vague terms, which need further interpretation. 
Th e conclusion is that a perfect market for social services is far away and perhaps 
impossible to achieve. Th e Dutch semi-market of re-integration services serves as 
an example; in some cases the public ‘principle’, unable and not expected to 
conclude detailed contracts with the private agent,6 was confronted with private 
parties that ran off  with the money, not fully investing in the education or doing 
whatever was needed to re-integrate the client. A most popular evasive technique 
was to give the client a short term employment contract: long enough to pretend 
success and to cash the premium that could be shared with the employer.7
So while Nentjens and Woerdman are fully convinced of the need for social 
security reform, they are less sure about the economic success of various types of 
public sector innovations in social security involving a public/private mix. Most 
of all they call for further research.
Public administration
Ko the Ridder, professor of Public Administration at the Groningen University, 
was responsible for the contribution on the intrumentalisation of the public 
interest from the perspective of public administration. He makes clear that there 
are factors other than strictly economic ones which determine the success of 
privatisation measures.
First of all, the behaviour of individual offi  cials must be taken into account. Th e 
classical assumption is that people working in a private environment focus 
mainly on increasing profi t. Th is infers that privatisation of services will only 
6 On the ‘principle-agent theory’ and the diffi  culties on contracting: Eisenhardt 1989, p. 57–74; 
Holmstrom 1979, p. 74–91.
7 Corrà, Plantinga & De Ridder 2009.
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lead to better quality when the system is designed in such a way that the client 
satisfaction will increase profi ts. Civil servants working in the public sector are 
diff erent. Traditionally their goal is to deliver justice, sine ira et studio; without 
prejudice, unequal treatment or other forms of arbitrary rule. Th eir oath of offi  ce 
leads them to the correct execution of the law. Discretion is applied on the basis 
of bureaucratic judgement, in two or three instances if so required. Th e mixture 
of public and private elements that is introduced in the wake of the regulatory 
welfare state, intermingles these two opposing value systems. For example, when 
it comes to infl uencing the values on the work fl oor the classical approach of staff  
training is no longer sacrosanct. More modern methods, based on a ‘private’ 
view of public organizations, use other methods inspired by the private sector. 
Under the umbrella of ‘New Public Management’ the traditional bureaucracy 
loses its traditional bureaucratic values, being steered on ‘output’ and ‘costs’. Th e 
negative eff ects of this trend in terms of loss of professionalism and motivation 
are not always fully appreciated
Secondly, the social relations between institutions must be taken into account. 
New Public Management is a method employed inside the public organization. 
Privatization goes a step further. It may involve, inter alia the contracting out of 
services to private parties. Th e behaviour of contractual partners is not only 
determined by hard core economic aspects. A contract is more than an expression 
of mutual economic advantages; its success also depends on the level of trust that 
exists between contractual partners. In shaping the contractual relationships this 
element of trust may not be overlooked.
Th irdly, the system itself is a relevant factor. An interesting insight from the 
public administration point of view is that the struggle for the perfect welfare 
system, with the perfect mixture of public and private elements, is not without 
consequences. Th e output of the system will cause a re-balancing of the social 
order itself. In this way the defi nition of public interests (the ‘what question’) is 
closely connected to the way these interests are organised (the ‘how question’). 
Th is point is particularly relevant in view of the public values failures, referred to 
by Plantinga in part A of this study: when welfare states do not live up to their 
promises public support for social security will wash away.
Law
Albertjan Tollenaar’s contribution focuses on the law as an instrument of the 
public interest. Th e key-mechanism of law revolves around individual rights and 
obligations. Th ese arise either from legislation or from contracts. When the 
source of individual social security entitlements can be traced back to legislation, 
then it can be said to be public; contractual entitlements belong to the realm of 
private social security.
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Th e regulatory welfare state constitutes a mixed legal sphere in the sense that 
contractual relationships are conditioned by the statute and by public 
institutional safeguards. In labour law this regulatory model has actually been 
the preferred ‘mode of governance’ ever since it came into being. An example of 
such mixed forms of legal governance can be found in the area of statutory sick 
pay. Many (national) systems of social security lay down an obligation for the 
employer to continue payment of wages during illness. If the employer and 
employee have a dispute regarding the question of whether or not the employee 
is actually ill, there is oft en a public provision to settle these disputes. Either by 
enabling the employer to call in the public medical advisor to re-assess the claim 
(as in the German system), or by obliging the employee to call in the public 
medical advisor before he institutes an action to recover back wages (as in the 
Dutch system).
Indirect public interference may also aff ect the institutional setting of social 
security. Th e obligatory works councils in the middle and larger companies and 
the clients’ participation councils in the semi-public institutions are two 
examples. Th e obligatory complaints procedure can also be regarded as an 
institutional provision. With these institutional provisions the legislator 
indirectly safeguards public interests, by enabling the clients, employees or 
citizens to protect their interests.
In Tollenaar’s view mixed structures are complicated because they blur 
competences of private parties and public agencies. Th ey also disturb the process 
of full judicial review which has come into being in the classical public domain. 
In the political process leading to forms of privatisation measures the 
consequences of these measures for the process of judicial review are oft en not 
fully considered, or are just taken for granted. Tollenaar regrets this because in 
the regulatory model the public interest relies very heavily on legal guarantees 
which are formulated by the legislature. Citizens should then be able to fall back 
upon an easy and transparent procedure to invoke these guarantees in individual 
cases.
Philosophy
Th e last contribution by Pauline Westerman, professor of Philosophy and Law in 
Groningen University can truly be considered the grand fi nale of this study. It 
contains an autonomous analysis of the problem of safeguarding the public 
interest in the welfare state.
Westerman’s fi rst line of reasoning deals with the characteristics of the public 
interests in general. In her view there are three normative elements to be taken 
into account: inclusiveness, explicitness and abstraction. Th e public space should 
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be inclusive, in the sense that diff erent opinions, rules, values and interests are 
taken into account. It should coordinate these diff erences on the basis of rules 
that are explicit, clear and precise and which can therefore serve as criteria for 
justifi cation as well as criticism. Finally, the categories used as well as the rights 
and duties attached to them should be abstract. Th ey should abstract from the 
particularities of the individual persons and circumstances in order to arrive at 
shared meanings.
Th e second strand in Westerman’s line of reasoning is that by its very nature the 
welfare state jeopardizes these three characteristics of the public sphere. Th e 
distribution of socio-economic burdens and benefi ts turns the state into an 
interested stake-holder, and, consequently, the distinction between rights and 
favours tends to be blurred. Benefi ciaries of the welfare state risk losing their 
abstract title of citizenship: they will be addressed and regulated as people with 
particular needs and interests. Finally, the need to draw fi ne distinctions 
according to diff erent needs and interests, leads to an ever-growing body of 
excessively detailed rules.
Westerman’s third point is that the introduction of the regulatory welfare state 
does little to solve the problem of the defence of the public sphere. Th e regulatory 
welfare state shift s this to a multitude of more or less ‘self-regulating’ bodies, 
boards and committees. One of the problems with this is that the virtue of 
abstraction cannot be attained in this fragmented landscape. Each of the 
institutions and bodies are organised around a single aim. Th ese functional 
regimes hardly interact and there is little room for coordination. Another 
problem with these specialized agencies is that they take into account only 
particular interests thereby not meeting the demands of inclusiveness.
Finally, Westerman comes up with a couple of solutions to solve this inherent 
problem of the (regulatory) welfare state. She argues for more transparency in 
the process of rule making by specialized agencies, more co-ordination between 
the various sections and actors involved in the welfare state and new 
constitutional guarantees for the separation of powers, for example ruling out 
the possibility that subsidies are used to enforce other policies. In between these 
lines there is some doubt whether these remedies will be strong enough to fi x the 
problem. Th e complexity of the matters regulated by the welfare state led to a 
situation in which explicitness can only be attained at the cost of abstraction, 
and inclusiveness can only be attained at the cost of explicitness, whereas all 
three are aff ected by the apparent inability of the offi  cial domain to retain its 
impartiality. According to Westerman we should not take this situation for 
granted. Where discretion comes in place of explicit rules, and where impersonal 
roles are particularized, rights sooner or later turn into privileges that can be 
suspended at will.
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5. CONCLUSIONS
5.1. SOCIAL SECURITY AS A PUBLIC INTEREST
So what conclusion can be drawn from this exercise? Let us go back to our central 
question: is social security a public interest and how does the answer to this 
question refl ect on the role of the state?
We can conclude with some confi dence that social security is a public interest, 
although diff erent disciplines give diff erent explanations and employ diff erent 
(but overlapping) notions of what the public interest is. Economists see social 
security as a neutral instrument (or perhaps one should say: a ‘necessary evil’) 
for bringing welfare to the masses. Public administration views it as an 
expression of underlying values within the community. Th e law just proclaims 
that social security is a public interest, by defi ning it as a responsibility of the 
state. Philosophers consider it as an expression of justice.
Th ere seems to be a basic consensus that the state cannot easily be disregarded. 
As to economic theory, it must be borne in mind that privatisation is argued for 
only as a correction of the public system, not as a substitute. It is not very likely 
that the big achievements in terms of solidarity between the rich and the poor, 
between the young and the old, etc. could have been realised without any direct 
government interference, e.g. without creating a social assistance scheme or 
introducing mandatory social insurance. Th is economic truth has implications 
for the legal sphere. When the state assumes responsibility for social security, it 
must see to it that an eff ective social security system is developed. Lawyers and 
economists agree: when markets fail, the state should step in. Furthermore, when 
public administration points at the interdependence between the strength of the 
welfare state and public support for it, this is not necessarily a neutral thing. Such 
interdependence can equally be interpreted as an imperative for the state to 
maintain a comprehensive welfare system. Finally, leaving aside the libertarian 
misgivings, most philosophers engaged in questions of distributive justice would 
consider some form of state interference necessary and legitimate. Even the 
Rerum Novarum (Pope Leo XIII 1891/1939) with its strong preference for 
corporatism, would accept the case.
5.2. SOCIAL SECURITY AND PRIVATE RESPONSIBILITY
While social security is thus considered to be a public interest, none of the 
disciplines argues that social security is exclusively a state aff air. Economists 
welcome privatisation measures in order to counterbalance public sector failure. 
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For public administration, the division of responsibility between the state and the 
individual depends on the underlying values that prevail in a particular society. 
Lawyers argue that formal state responsibility for social security does not rule out 
the involvement of private and collective arrangements. And fi nally, philosophical 
thought, both in its libertarian and its communitarian forms, provides arguments 
in favour of non-state solutions for realising social security. In other words, most 
observers agree that social security is neither fully public, nor fully private. Th is 
makes it easy to subject the system to mixed governance structures. Indeed, such 
structures have a long tradition in the social security systems in many countries, 
in particular those where employers and employees worked together in corporatist 
institutions. As Tollenaar points out in his contribution in part B of this study 
many of these corporatist institutions have private roots but operate within a 
public law framework. Mixed governance structures are not unique to social 
security. Many policy areas in which the state has to provide services share this 
characteristic. From public transport to environmental issues, from energy 
supply to working conditions, one can see the same situation: the state has to 
provide a certain level of services, and holds itself responsible for the provision 
of these services, but needs private mechanisms or private actors to fulfi l this 
responsibility. In social security there is an additional explanation. Th e roots of 
social security frequently stem from private relationships, e.g. in civil liability for 
industrial accidents, in the labour contract between the employer and the 
employee, in voluntary mutual funds for workers, or even in family relations. As 
a consequence, many arrangements for income protection are still somehow 
vested in these private relationships.
5.3. DIVISION OF RESPONSIBILITIES BETWEEN THE STATE 
AND OTHERS
When it comes to the question of how the role of the state must be defi ned vis-à-
vis private responsibilities, our consensus starts to falter. Th e exact division of 
responsibilities is a question of political preferences, of ideology and of vested 
interests. It cannot be determined by academics. On the other hand, in our eyes, 
one should try to move away from simplifi cations of the truth and stereotypes, as 
if any change in governance should be seen either as a neo-liberal conspiracy or 
as a capricious socialist move. Th e debate should take into account that a strict 
public/private divide corresponds less and less with reality. In between the 
extremes of fully public systems and fully private ones there are endless shades 
of nuance. Occupational social security schemes have been public/private hybrids 
from the outset, and nowadays, in all branches of social security, new forms of 
‘mixed governance’ have been introduced. As was mentioned earlier, the reality 
refl ects a mix of public, occupational and private approaches. Many measures 
which have been introduced under the umbrella of liberalisation and privatisation 
Gijsbert Vonk and Albertjan Tollenaar
18 Intersentia
have not resulted in less but rather in diff erent forms of governance. Th e 
challenge now is to understand how the new forms of ‘mixed governance’ work 
towards safeguarding the public interest.
5.4. CLOUDS ON THE HORIZON: THE 
INSTRUMENTALISATION OF THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Our contributions in part B dealing with the instrumentalisation of the public 
interest should cast some light to the latter question. It does so, but in a somewhat 
disconcerting way. All authors suggest that instruments which are based upon a 
public/private mix are problematic. For example, according to Nentjes & 
Woerdman it is diffi  cult to establish well functioning semi-markets in social 
security; they even allege that perfect semi-markets can probably never be 
realised. Ko de Ridder warns us of the many factors to be to be taken into account 
which determine the success of public/private solutions: the attitudes of offi  cials, 
the trust between organisation and the balance within the system itself. Tollenaar 
complains that public/private instruments blur competences and negatively 
aff ect the process of judicial review. And fi nally, Westerman argues that the 
inherent problem that the welfare state has with maintaining a strong public 
sphere is even more manifest in the regulatory state model. It makes one wonder 
whether the regulatory state is a viable concept for social security in the fi rst 
place.
5.5. THE REGULATORY WELFARE STATE: A VIABLE 
CONCEPT?
Th is question can also be posed in diff erent way. Are there any alternatives to the 
regulatory welfare state? Going back to an old fashioned all embracive public 
system hardly seems to be a desirable solution as this would give rise to the same 
public sector failures that prompted the move to the regulatory model in the fi rst 
place. An alternative could be that the state withdraws from the welfare state to 
such an extent that a solid and clearly recognizable minimum package of services 
remains: a public, basic social security system. Th is model presupposes that the 
citizen and private enterprise should take full care of the extra-minimal 
protection themselves. In this way the divide between the public and private 
domain would be restored automatically. In our eyes this second alternative is 
neither realistic, nor attractive. It bears resemblances to the minimal state 
ideology. Whether this approach is capable of meeting the high demands of the 
modern welfare state remains to be seen. And when the private sector fails, there 
will be immediate calls for more regulation and collective solutions which are 
characteristic of the new regulatory welfare state.
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So whether we like it or not, the regulatory welfare state is likely to stay. If this is 
true we had better do our best to make it work. What are the good practices and 
why were they successful? Our informants in part B of our study do not always 
touch on this question; their apprehensions are rather related to systematic and 
organisational diffi  culties which arise from mixing the two distinct traditional 
forms of governance, but not to empirical notion of ‘success’. Th is gives rise to 
the question whether the regulatory welfare state requires a new theoretical 
framework which is capable of transcending the public/private divide and which 
is consequently better equipped to study the hybrid reality. We will come back to 
this theme in the last chapter of this study where we make some recommendations 
for further research into the phenomenon of social markets.

PART A




THE PUBLIC INTEREST IN SOCIAL 
SECURITY: AN ECONOMIC 
PERSPECTIVE
Andries Nentjes and Edwin Woerdman
1. INTRODUCTION
In its publication on safeguarding the public interest, the Dutch Scientifi c 
Council for Government Policy (WRR) defi ned the public interest very broadly 
as any societal interest that has been made the objective of government policy.1 
Applying that defi nition, social security is one of the domains of societal interests 
for which the government has taken responsibility. From an economic point of 
view, the objective of social security policy is basically (a) to provide economic 
security for citizens against the mishaps in human life, including a basic level of 
income, (b) while avoiding unnecessary high costs to society. Although it perhaps 
takes an economist to explicitly mention the latter part, hardly any politician 
will deny that containment of societal costs is as much in the domain of the 
public interest as delivering services of good quality. Th e political challenge is to 
fi nd the balance between, on the one hand, the benefi ts of providing security 
where it is needed and, on the other hand, the sacrifi ce that is involved.
From an economic perspective, the broad defi nition the WRR has given to the 
concept of public interest is not really satisfactory. It does not give any clues as to 
when and where the government should act to further or restrict its provision of 
social security and when and where it should not act. Th e WWR fails to provide 
guidance for demarcating domains and seems to accept that political decision 
makers draw the dividing line between private and public sector wherever they 
see fi t. In this chapter we shall take a diff erent approach and start with proposing 
economic criteria for demarcating the public interest domain in social security. 
Our insights are applied by studying the development of social security in the 
Netherlands.
1 WRR 2000, p. 20–21.
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Th is chapter is organized as follows. Section 2 defi nes the concept of the public 
interest based on an economic approach. Section 3 identifi es a market failure that 
provides the economic argument as to where the government should be involved, 
and where it should not be involved, in providing income support and care 
fi nanced through social insurance or taxes. Section 4 discusses the economic-
political life cycle in social security. Section 5 focuses on public sector failures 
that hamper the effi  cient provision of social security. Conclusions are drawn in 
section 6.
2. AN ECONOMIC DEFINITION OF THE PUBLIC 
INTEREST
Before we defi ne the public interest from an economic perspective, we have to 
say a few words about what economics actually is and what an economic 
perspective on social security thus entails. To explain this, it is helpful to 
understand that the economic system of the Netherlands is of the ‘mixed 
economy’ type: basically a market economy with a government stepping in when 
and where the market fails to provide in the needs of citizens. Economic science 
teaches us that the market is the most appropriate mechanism to satisfy human 
needs for private goods; that is, goods that can be individually owned. Th e 
agreement to transfer the property of a private good is a matter solely between 
buyer and seller, who both expect to gain from the transaction. Others remain 
outsiders to the contract. Th ey have nothing to do with it and they are excluded 
from using the good.
In contrast, the use of collective or public goods has to be shared with others. Th e 
Dutch textbook example is a dike to protect a population and its properties 
against high water. Procurement and maintenance of such a good needs a 
common decision and an organisation to implement it: the prototype of a 
government. Th e basic public goods are the provision of ‘law and order’, including 
the rule of law. Without the provision of these essential public goods a thriving 
market economy could not even exist, since protection of property rights and 
compliance with contractual commitments are the fundaments on which the 
market is built. Although in real life the distinction between public and private 
goods is not a simple matter of black and white, the conceptual diff erence does 
provide criteria for delineating the public interest domain from the sphere where 
the government has no responsibility.
If one accepts that the market is the basic mechanism for providing the goods 
and services society demands, it follows that a government which intends to 
pursue the public interest faces a restriction on what can be the objective of 
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government policy. When and where the market functions properly in supplying 
the goods and services citizens need, the government should abstain. 
Safeguarding the public interest by providing security against the mishaps of life 
by way of public sector intervention is in place when and where the market fails 
in delivering security. Market failure can be due to the fact that a good is not 
purely private, but to some degree public. Another source of market failure is 
lack of competition. It will lead to prices that are too high relative to their quality. 
Th e market will also fail when consumers are ill-informed and incapable of 
assessing the value of the product.
To identify and assess market failures, economists investigate the impact of 
market arrangements on the welfare of society. Citizens have wants they aspire 
to satisfy. Th ey make sacrifi ces to get the goods and services they need and which 
are benefi cial to them. Economics brings the sacrifi ces and the satisfactions 
under the measuring rod of money. Satisfaction or benefi ts is expressed as the 
maximum amount of money a person is willing to pay for the object of desire. 
Th e eff orts and sacrifi ces or costs to bring the object forward are also measured 
in terms of money. What counts are the net benefi ts or surplus: the benefi ts 
obtained minus the costs made. A market failure is a failure because the market 
arrangement does not bring in the full net benefi ts. And a public sector 
arrangement to correct the market failure has to provide higher benefi ts than 
costs. Some will win, others may lose as a result of the intervention; but if the 
benefi ts exceed the costs, the losers can be fully compensated without depleting 
the benefi ts and net gains will remain some. In that case, economists say, the 
criteria of ‘potential Pareto effi  ciency’ is satisfi ed, meaning that the winners 
could, in principle, compensate the losers.2
From all this, it follows that the economist will defi ne the public interest as 
maximizing net benefi ts to society. Governments should focus on constellations 
and developments that threaten the maximization of net benefi ts and look for 
options to redress them. Government interventions with intentions other than 
increasing societal welfare cannot be defended from an economic perspective as 
being in the public interest. Applied to social security, the economic prescription 
is that the government should identify the market failures in providing security 
and create net benefi ts by designing and implementing a social security policy 
that corrects the market failures. In the next two sections we shall see whether 
the government has indeed followed the prescriptions of economic science and 
focused on intervening where the market failed to provide an adequate level and 
quality of social security.
2 E.g. Hochman & Rodgers 1969.
Andries Nentjes and Edwin Woerdman
26 Intersentia
Apart from the question whether or not the correction of market failures has 
been the major reason for drawing social security into the public interest domain, 
it is evident that the involvement of the national government of the Netherlands 
in social security insurance and in providing safety nets for the uninsured has 
expanded immensely. It expanded from next to nothing a hundred years ago to 
about 10% of net national income in 1960, to 27% in 1980 and 30% in 2008.3 
Unfortunately, not only markets can fail, but governments can fail too. Th e 
ambition is to build and maintain a high quality, effi  cient and balanced system of 
social security. However, in this process, ineffi  ciencies and imbalance between 
the benefi ts and the costs of social security may turn up. Instead of being the 
solution to market failure, the public sector then has become (part of) the 
problem. If this occurs, the public interest in social security has to be redefi ned 
as identifying the public sector failures and creating net benefi ts by redressing 
them. In the next sections we shall see whether actual developments in the 
Netherlands correspond with our economic prescription of the public interest. 
Has the view on what the public interest in social security is changed and have 
public sector failures been perceived and corrected?
In sum, the economist’s view on what the public interest in social security is, has 
been defi ned as (a) correcting the market failures in the private provision of 
security as well as (b) identifying and correcting the public sector failures in the 
public supply of social security. Our defi nition of the public interest corresponds 
with the approach of Teulings, Bovenberg & Van Dalen (2003), but rather than 
focusing on externalities and market failures in general, we introduce the concept 
of so-called ‘caring externalities’, as we will explain below, and perhaps lean even 
more heavily on identifying and remedying public sector failures. In other words: 
one could say that our economic approach is the same as that of Teulings, 
Bovenberg & Van Dalen (2003), but there are some diff erences as to how the 
economic view is worked out, basically since we focus on the development of one 
specifi c sector. Th e task in the next sections is to investigate how suitable this 
economic interpretation is in presenting and understanding actual developments 
in social security. Do the decisions taken by the government match the 
‘idealisation’ of economic theory? We shall give our verdict in the fi nal section of 
this chapter.
3 For 1960 and 1980 data see Nentjes 1989. For 2008 calculations are based on data from CBS 
(Statistics Netherlands): Sociale beschermingsuitkeringen as percentage of netto nationaal 
inkomen.
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3. MARKET FAILURE AND THE EMERGENCE OF 
SOCIAL SECURITY
In the previous section, the public interest has been defi ned as maximization of 
social-economic welfare. Th e government can pursue that goal by correcting 
market failure, where it emerges, as well as by avoiding and redressing public 
sector failure. In this section we shall apply those concepts to the domain of 
social security. We will argue that the market as well as other types of voluntary 
action fails in translating solidarity, which exists among citizens, into a provision 
of security for those who need it. Th e defects in the private organisation of 
solidarity lead to a loss of social-economic welfare and demand the government 
to step in. Subsection 3.1 focuses on the economic theory of solidarity and 
subsection 3.2 on applying the theory to Th e Netherlands. Subsection 3.3 
addresses the types of government involvement in social security that came into 
existence for reasons other than correcting market failure in the organisation of 
solidarity. Subsection 3.4 provides an interim summary.
3.1. CARING: AN ECONOMIC THEORY OF SOLIDARITY
In his Th eory of Moral Sentiments (1759), Adam Smith noted that normal human 
beings have the innate capacity of sympathizing, based on the ability to see oneself 
in the position of the other. As a result, a person is not indiff erent to another’s 
suff ering, which makes him willing to help and support others. In 20th century 
politics this notion has evolved to the idea of solidarity. Modern economics has 
conceptualized the phenomenon as a special type of externality. Positive 
externalities are the enjoyment of benefi ts created by others for which one pays 
less than the costs or for which one pays nothing at all. Negative externalities are 
the damage and suff ering one undergoes without being compensated by those 
who caused it. Applied to social security issues, the negative externality is, for 
example, the lamentable state of individual A that makes individual B feel less 
well. Spending money on help for A will raise the well-being of B. Th ere is a 
voluntary transfer either in money or in kind that raises the welfare of both 
receiver and donor. Th e ‘caring externality’, as it is called, is ‘internalized’.4 In 
the past care for orphans, poor elderly people, the sick and the invalidated came 
from private action as a result of the charity of the local aristocracy, churches, 
religious orders and civil organisations. Donations or provision in kind were 
voluntary. Only the ‘deserving poor’ were eligible for support and had to be 
distinguished from the undeserving, namely those deemed capable to earn their 
own income through work but being perceived as unwilling to do so.
4 See e.g. Collard 1978; Culyer 1980; Nentjes 1989; Barr 2004.
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One can view the interaction between caring citizens and people in need as a 
type of market. Th ere was a demand for solidarity or caring from the side of the 
needy met by supply from the side of the donors. History shows that the market 
for care did work, although it also provides ample proof that coordination was 
far from perfect. Caring citizens could observe that many people in distress 
remained without adequate help. Th e public debate in the second half of the 19th 
century shows an increasing dissatisfaction with the way charity was functioning, 
even in spite of earlier reforms. In other words: market failure was perceived.
Th e major problem undermining the private provision of charity is its public 
good property. When a public good is supplied, many enjoy the benefi ts: the 
persons that made sacrifi ces for its production, but also those who remained 
inactive. Th e same is true for charity. Free-riders are glad to see that needy 
persons are supported without sharing in the cost. It undermines the incentive 
to contribute voluntarily. Such disincentives may be weak in relatively small 
communities where potential donors know each other and where the reputation 
of taking one’s share of a common burden counts. However, the disincentives are 
stronger in large cities, and even more so at a national level, where free riders 
remain anonymous. Th erefore scaling up from diff erentiated local provision to a 
uniform national scheme increases the problem. Th e caring person is willing to 
pay, but his actual payment will suff er if he sees that the good is supplied anyway 
and that his personal sacrifi ce hardly makes a diff erence. Considering society at 
large, there is a willingness to pay, but only a part of it can be extracted from the 
potential donors. As a result, caring externalities are not fully internalised and 
the supply of care motivated by altruism falls short of the effi  cient level of full 
internalisation. From an economic perspective this means a loss of welfare (or: a 
loss in net benefi ts). A leakage, if you will, that should be repaired.
Fundamentally, the problem of a shortfall in the supply of charity is similar to 
the disincentive for the voluntary production of a classic public good, such as law 
and order. Th e solution that emerged in history is also similar. Where gaps in the 
provision of charity were visible, the public authority stepped in. To prevent the 
situation in which free-riding undermines social care, citizens accept that 
contributions to fi nance its provision are collected from those who are fi nancially 
able, if necessary by using force. Local governments were the fi rst to do this. 
Orphanages fi nanced by the local authorities have a history of centuries. In the 
Netherlands, the fi rst national legislation on poor relief dates from 1800,5 
although national schemes of social security with uniform eligibility criteria 
entitling individuals to uniform benefi ts, and fi nanced through income-
dependent insurance contributions or taxes, were built up much later, in the 
second half of the 20th century. Th e economic argument for public sector 
5 Postma 1995.
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involvement is a threat of market failure if the redistribution of income from rich 
to poor, based on caring, were left  to the market. Active government intervention 
is required to avoid market failure and to ensure adequate social care. In other 
words: voluntary redistribution of income meets the economic defi nition of the 
public interest.
Th e economic approach has oft en been criticized for its narrow perspective. 
Economists that are interested in how social security can contribute to maximum 
social-economic welfare seem to confi rm that reproach. Also the defi nition of 
caring as willingness to give seems to reduce solidarity to solely a set of 
preferences that might change in a whim. It is not our intention to deny that 
economics, as a mono-discipline, is narrow. However, this weakness is also an 
advantage when it comes to precision in argumentation. But what matters most 
here is the question whether this narrowness in scope is a barrier to, or even 
blocks the contributions from, other sciences to the study of social security. In 
our view, the various approaches are basically complementary to economics and 
not a substitute. Economics takes solidarity seriously, not purely as a battle cry, 
moral obligation or fundamental human right, but as a phenomenon that really 
exists and has to be organized. Economics does not analyze where solidarity or 
care comes, which is more the domain for other sciences. Th ose sciences may 
look at its religious and moral roots, its base either in natural law or in principles 
of social justice, which make solidarity a commandment of a higher order. Social 
conventions also play a role. In a uniform society, social cohesion including 
solidarity may be stronger than in a fragmented and heterogeneous population. 
Th e public debate on such issues aff ects the sentiments, the convictions and the 
role models that underlay solidarity. Th e willingness to give may be mixed with 
self-interest, because a person may see the well-conceived organization of 
solidarity as a form of self-insurance for himself and for his close relatives, just 
in case ill-fate should strike. Or one may either hail or condemn redistribution as 
an instrument to maintain the capitalist order of society. Th e biologist may study 
how solidarity evolved in the survival of the fi ttest. Psychologists could research 
whether altruism is basically a display of fi tness to impress the other sex. Some of 
these views and approaches may compete intensely with each other. Economics 
accepts the arguments as eff orts to underpin the phenomenon of solidarity, 
which the economist – in all his narrowness – sees as an existing scarce good in 
the public interest domain.
Even more relevant than the issue of whether the economic approach is too 
narrow is the question whether the economic theory described above is of any 
use in explaining the real world. It has a theoretical and an empirical component. 
Th e theoretical question is whether the transfers of income in society indeed are 
a refl ection of underlying solidarity and willingness to give. Instead of seeing 
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consensus the alternative theory views redistribution as a symptom of social 
confl ict.6 Redistribution is then supposed to be involuntary. In a democracy, the 
majority of voters, with incomes per person below a given level, have the political 
power to extract ‘surplus’ income from the minority earning higher personal 
incomes against their will: the Marxian notion of exploitation turned upside 
down.7 Although constraints such as ‘voting with the feet’ by emigration of the 
rich, capital fl ight and negative economic repercussions will mitigate the degree 
of exploitation of the ‘rich’ by the ‘poor’, involuntary redistribution is a possibility 
that cannot be excluded a priori. Considering the political economy of 
redistribution, one can also think of potential political coalitions. Middle 
incomes hold the key. In a two-party system the median voter makes the 
diff erence between winning or losing elections. In a multi-party system a 
coalition without participation of the middle is diffi  cult to form. Noting that the 
highest ‘rents’ can be extracted from the rich, Tullock (1971) predicts that low 
and middle incomes will collude to take from the rich, where middle incomes 
benefi t proportionally more thanks to their strategic position.
3.2. SOLIDARITY IN THE NETHERLANDS
A major empirical question is: what do we know about the actual redistribution 
in the domain of social care? Is it plausible that this redistribution is fully based 
on the caring and voluntariness of those who make the net contributions? To 
answer the fi rst part of the empirical question about actual redistribution, the 
most informative publication is, in our view, written by Ter Rele (2005). He 
shows which groups benefi t from and pay for diverse public arrangements in the 
Netherlands. Th e information in table 1 refers to the arrangements existing in 
2003 and 2004. Th ey encompass a broader category than narrowly defi ned social 
security and include the benefi ts from public housing arrangements and benefi ts 
in kind from private goods that are provided for free, such as education. Th e 
transfer column consists mainly of social security expenditure. As one can see, 
they are more or less evenly distributed over educational classes. Benefi ts in kind 
are dominated by the cost of education. It explains why higher education levels 
have the highest benefi ts. In housing arrangements, low incomes benefi t from 
rent subsidies and high incomes and even more from tax exemption for interest 
on mortgages. In total benefi ts there is no systematic diff erentiation between the 
educational levels. Th e group with only higher secondary education has the 
lowest benefi ts; 10% less than persons with basic education only and almost 30% 
less than those with university education, who have the highest benefi ts. Th e 
6 E.g. Nozick 1974.
7 Downs 1957.
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most striking fact is that overall the diff erences in total benefi ts between the 
educational categories are not big.
Table 1. Total lifelong benefi ts from collective arrangements (present values, in 
thousand euros)





Basic education 86.7 167.7 17.8 272.2
Lower secondary 85.1 158 0 14.6 258.5
Higher secondary 85.5 150.5 15.7 251.7
Intermediate vocational 85.6 171.2 14.6 271.4
Higher vocational 88.5 166.2 27.5 282.2
University 88.5 197.9 35.2 321.6
Source: Ter Rele 2005, table 4.4, p. 30
However, the picture changes if the payments for the public expenditures are 
included. Income taxes and value-added taxes (VAT) rise with educational level, 
as is shown in table 2. A relatively equal distribution of benefi ts in combination 
with a progressively increasing contribution to the costs of the arrangement leads 
to vertical redistribution.
Table 2. Lifelong income, benefi ts and taxes (present values, in thousand euros)
Net labour 
income
Total benefi ts Taxes Taxes as 
percentage of 
benefi ts
Basic education 294.1 272.2 155.6 57%
Lower secondary 384.5 258.5 204.5 79%
Higher secondary 554.0 251.7 302.0 120%
Intermediate vocational 569.9 271.4 304.0 112%
Higher vocational 769.6 282.2 421.3 149%
University 1043.7 321.6 569.4 177%
Based on: Ter Rele 2005, tables 3.1, 4.4 and 5.1.
Th e two lowest levels in education receive on average per person more in benefi ts 
over their lifetime than is paid in taxes. Th ey can be supporters of the caring 
state for selfi sh reasons. Th e call on solidarity starts at the level of the middle 
group: individuals with higher secondary and intermediate vocational education 
pay over their lifetime 10 to 20% more in taxes than they receive in benefi ts. 
From people with higher education considerably more is expected. Th ey have the 
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highest total benefi ts, but that is far surpassed by higher taxation. Th ere is a 
systematic and substantial redistribution from the ‘rich’ to the ‘poor’. Th e net 
lifelong payments for people with a university degree are 247.800 euro. On the 
contrary, the group with basic education has positive net lifelong benefi ts of 
116.600 euro.
Th e question, posed above, was whether all that redistribution is voluntary, based 
on the caring of the citizens who make the net contributions. If so, the result is a 
so-called ‘Pareto-effi  cient’ redistribution, since it leaves some better off  and 
no-one worse off .8 Th e fi gures of table 2 show that a substantial vertical 
redistribution indeed exists in the Netherlands. Still the question is whether it is 
an expression of solidarity or evidence of involuntary transfers and social 
confl ict.9 Remarkably, no empirical research has been done in the Netherlands 
to test the competing theories. However, by constructing table 3 we can give an 
indication. In the table the educational levels, which correspond with lifelong 
income levels, have been aggregated to three classes. Th e same has been done for 
taxes plus social premiums as a percentage of the lifelong benefi ts of various 
arrangements. In the third column we add our calculation of the percentage of 
voters in each class (based on CBS data).
Table 3. Tax-benefi t ratio per group of voters
Educational and income level Percentage of all voters Tax-benefi t ratio
Lower 38%  69%
Middle 38% 114%
Higher 24% 158%
Source: Ter Rele 2005 and CBS data for 2004.
From table 3 one can conclude that a simple political–economy model with a low 
income group exploiting a high income group is a democratic impossibility. 
Th ere is no majority of voters to support that option. A coalition is thus necessary. 
Neither is Tullock’s postulate supported by the evidence of table 3: middle 
incomes do not profi t excessively from a coalition with the low income group to 
exploit the rich. On the contrary, middle incomes turn out to be net contributors. 
Th e fi gures suggest that instead of exploiting their median voter position to 
extract high net benefi ts through redistribution, the middle income group shows 
solidarity or, in other words, ‘caring’ by co fi nancing the low income group’s 
consumption of welfare arrangements. It seems a plausible conclusion, since the 
degree of revealed caring of middle income receivers is a modest 14%. Th e call 
8 Hochman & Rodgers 1969.
9 E.g. Nozick 1974.
Th e public interest in social security: an economic perspective
Intersentia 33
on the high income group is considerably larger: 58%. On the one hand, one can 
have doubts as to whether such a high contribution would be off ered on a 
voluntary basis. On the other hand, it seems not unreasonable to presume that 
the high income’s degree of caring might exceed 14%. In conclusion, table 3 
inspires our reasoned guess of a mixed picture: a considerable part of vertical 
income redistribution is voluntary and another part, in particular a fraction of 
the net contributions of the high income group, is involuntary.
We have argued that voluntary redistribution, based on solidarity enhances 
social-economic welfare and for that reason satisfi es the economic defi nition of 
public interest. For involuntary redistribution it is diff erent. Involuntary 
redistribution has benefi ts for those who receive and costs for those who are 
forced to pay. Economic science off ers no criteria to judge whether the transfer in 
itself is a good or a bad thing. As a participant in the political arena, the 
economist may support such policies for social reasons. As a professional 
economist he will see that next to the direct benefi ts for those who receive and 
possibly the indirect positive economic impacts there is also reason to worry 
about the negative impacts on the economic incentives of those who are forced to 
pay and on the negative repercussions on national income.
In subsection 3.1 we have defi ned the public interest in social security as the 
organisation of solidarity by a public body. Th e fi gures presented in subsection 
3.2 can be interpreted as evidence of the existence of solidarity in Dutch society, 
although they do have the backdrop of including a wider set of transfers and 
domains of government intervention than social security alone. To get a more 
precise picture we shall try to identify the types of social security that meet the 
criteria of voluntary vertical redistribution, using Th e Netherlands as the test 
case. In subsection 3.3 we shall therefore turn to types of social insurance that 
do not meet the criteria to fi nd out what the motives have been for their coming 
into existence.
Social security in the strict sense of the public provision of security by way of 
vertical redistribution of income has its origins in poor relief provided by local 
governments. Orphanages fi nanced by the local authorities have a history going 
back centuries. In Th e Netherlands the poor law of 1800 was the fi rst eff ort to 
establish national rules for the implementation and oversight of poor relief.10 In 
practice, the support of the needy remained in the hands of local church 
foundations during the full length of the 19th century, despite complaints, mainly 
from the liberal bourgeoisie, about its ineff ectiveness. On the one hand, there 
was the failure to provide the necessary minimum due to lack of means in times 
of economic hardship. On the other hand, there was abuse of the system by 
10 Postma 1995.
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people receiving benefi ts from more than one church or private charity. As the 
19th century progressed, the involvement of local governments steadily increased, 
mainly because of the necessity to provide supplementary benefi ts. Yet it was not 
until 1912 that a new poor law brought a reorganization of the fi eld by 
establishing minimum benefi ts, while making local governments responsible for 
implementation. About fi ft y years later, in 1965, the General Assistance Law 
brought a national uniform arrangement that made poor relief an entitlement of 
Dutch citizens with an income below the poverty line. Th e level of benefi ts was 
related to the net minimum wage and the conditions for those receiving the 
benefi ts were lenient. Benefi ts were paid by local governments whose expenditures 
for poor relief were fi nanced by national tax revenue.
As we will describe more thoroughly in our chapter on the instrumentalisation 
of public interests, the year 2004 brought a new Act on Work and Assistance with 
eligibility criteria and obligations that are far less lenient, but the arrangement 
remains tax fi nanced. For other types of need, such as those arising from the 
high cost of health care and other care, or from lack of income due to old age or 
invalidity, another solution has been found. Th e arrangements were introduced 
in the period aft er the Second World War and all have the form of mandatory 
social insurance for every Dutch citizen. Entitlements to benefi ts are equal for 
all. Insurance contributions are proportional to taxable income up to a 
maximum. So transfer of income from people in the higher income brackets to 
lower income groups is an inseparable part of the schemes. Mandatory public 
insurance against loss of income due to old age dates from 1957, a similar 
insurance against high-cost medical risks (Act on Exceptional Medical Costs) 
came into force in 1968, and national insurance against the costs of health care 
(Care Act) in 2007. If our reasoned guess is right that vertical redistribution is 
largely supported by the caring motive or is accepted as collectively organised 
self-insurance, one can regard the social security arrangements as corrections of 
market failure, contributing to social-economic welfare and therefore as being in 
the public interest.
3.3. MANDATORY INSURANCE FOR WAGEDEPENDENT 
WORKERS
Th is section discusses the emergence and growth of social security in Th e 
Netherlands in support of wage-dependent workers. To detect the public interest 
dimension we have to investigate to what extent market failure in the 
coordination of solidarity or care played a role and which other considerations 
have motivated government intervention.
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Individually unpredictable incidents – loss of work, illness, invalidity and living 
long – that lead to loss of income or extremely high expenditures, are a fact of 
life. Th rough the ages the extended family and close knit local communities, 
with their social norm of mutual help, off ered informal insurance, protecting its 
members against the economic consequences of individual misfortune. Th e more 
successful and lucky ones had a capital buff er of their own, built up through 
saving or acquired through inheritance. People without fi nancial buff ers could 
try to take up private insurance against such risks as costs of health care and loss 
of income due to illness, invalidity and old age. As a last resort one could appeal 
to individual or organized charity. Due to the rise of factory labour and the 
growth of an urban proletariat – in the Netherlands from about 1870 onwards – 
the traditional private systems of support for people in economic diffi  culty were 
crumbling. Wage-dependent workers were too poor to create a fi nancial reserve 
and begging for charity was shameful. However, insurance was becoming an 
option for workers with a fi xed labour contract. Th is was provided by workers’ 
organisations in specifi c branches of industry, but also and increasingly by 
employers, for a mixture of motives, such as attracting and binding competent 
workers, disciplining employees through monitoring, and possibly also because 
of caring considerations. Next to that, commercial insurers began to appear on 
the market.
Th e intermittence of prosperity and depression in the industry brought new 
uncertainties for workers about the continuity of employment and income. In 
Europe the bourgeoisie became better informed about the oft en appalling 
conditions under which labourers and their families had to live, even if they had 
regular work. Th ere were great worries about the poor quality of the Dutch 
labour force compared to neighbouring countries. For those of the middle and 
higher classes who were willing to look, the suff erings of the incapacitated and ill 
unable to work, of capable workers unable to fi nd work, and of old people living 
in poverty were visible enough in cities. Th e ‘social question’ became a subject of 
public debate and appeared on the political agenda. By the end of the 19th 
century, it had become politically widely accepted that there were serious defects 
in the provision of security for the wage-dependent part of the population and 
that the government could not abstain. A substantial part of the organized 
workers brought their discontent to the fore as a political outcry against 
capitalism, that is, against the market economy: a potential political time bomb. 
Th e concentration of the labour proletariat in towns and cities had become a 
political force well before the extension of the political vote and it was even more 
so thereaft er when the circle of those allowed to vote and be elected was gradually 
widened.11 And not to forget, opinion leaders and politicians were well-informed 
11 Schwitters 1991 (see also his references to the literature); Woerdman 2009.
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on how in 1884 Germany had responded to similar problems with its ‘Bismarck’ 
scheme of social security legislation.
From the above story one can distil a range of reasons explaining why the 
government started to intervene in the labour market. But was this a reaction 
meant to correct market failure? Or were other considerations involved? For an 
answer, one has to look at the specifi c laws that successively came into being in 
the Netherlands. Th e very fi rst ‘social’ law of 1874, regulating labour by women 
and children, aimed to protect those deemed unable to protect themselves from 
abuse. Welfare economics is based on the premise that individuals can make 
their own choices – and they should have the freedom to do so as long as their 
choices don’t cause damage to others. Not being able or not being allowed to 
make one’s own deliberate choices can therefore be viewed as a market failure 
justifying corrective regulation. Th e second public interference – labour 
inspectors monitoring and reporting on working conditions in the industry – 
had its start in 1891. Th e view underlying the law clearly was that workers were 
lacking the power to obtain safe and healthy conditions of work from their 
employers. Th e employers’ dominant position on the labour market might be 
viewed as a market failure, providing an argument for government intervention. 
Th e labour inspectors were a light form of regulation, mainly taking eff ect by 
way of naming and shaming. Th e Workman’s Compensation Act of 1901, 
establishing the fi rst public insurance scheme, was of a more heavy calibre. 
Under private law the established legislation and jurisprudence on tort had been 
available to victims of labour accidents seeking compensation from their 
employer, but only if they were able to demonstrate fault. In practice very few 
cases came to court. However, voluntary insurance was on the way up and 
increasingly provided by employers. Th at makes it diffi  cult to perceive a case of 
market failure here, off ering an economic argument for governmental corrective 
action.
Yet at the time there was broad political support for public regulation. Th ere was 
a demand for insurance from the side of emerging trade unions and socialist 
parties. Employers that already did provide insurance also lobbied for mandatory 
insurance, hoping to strengthen their competitive position against non-
providers. Possibly the voluntary provision of insurance was rooted in employers’ 
caring about their workers. However, using the political arena to force the non-
caring employers to participate in the scheme hurts the Pareto-criterion that 
actions should be voluntary and for that reason it cannot be viewed as an 
appropriate correction of market failure, as we have seen. Th e Accident Law 
made it mandatory for employers to take up insurance against the fi nancial 
consequences of liability for the incapacity of their workers due to accidents 
during work. Th e political discussion focused on the issue whether its 
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implementation should be left  to employers and workers per fi rm or sector, or 
whether it should be centralized and entrusted to one public insurer. In the end 
the last option won. Th e next three social security laws – on Illness (1913), 
Incapacity (1913) and Old Age (1919) – also mandated the employer to take out 
insurance for his workers.
A common feature of the above mandatory insurance schemes is the equivalence 
between the insurance contribution paid and claims to benefi ts, similar to private 
insurance. Usually the contributions as well as the benefi ts were expressed as a 
percentage of the worker’s wage. In principle the arrangements did not 
redistribute income vertically between workers with diff erent wage levels. Th ere 
is no straightforward evidence that considerations of solidarity or caring were 
involved. Social insurance arrangements for wage earners that followed later in 
the course of the 20th century – mandatory insurance providing income during 
unemployment (1949) and the mandatory insurance against loss of income due 
to incapacity to work (1966) – showed the same equivalence. Th e two exceptions 
were insurance providing children’s allowances (1939) and insurance covering 
the costs of health care (1964): the insurance premium was income-dependent, 
while benefi ts for children were equal and for health care dependent on the 
medical bill. In the last mentioned arrangements solidarity considerations (either 
voluntarily accepted or imposed from above) evidently did play a role, although 
restricted to the group of eligible wage-dependent workers.12
Considering the features of total mandatory insurance for wage-dependent 
workers direct evidence is lacking that the arrangements were supported by 
considerations of care. However, we should not overlook the evidence of indirect 
support. From the last decades of the 19th century on there was political demand 
for this type of mandatory insurance, for various reasons as we have seen. 
Political supply followed. Economic theory teaches that the incidence of the 
insurance costs did befall on consumers (higher prices), on employers (lower 
profi ts) and on workers (lower net wages and lower employment). On introducing 
the new legislation that distribution of the burden appears to have been accepted. 
One can argue that employers and consumers, who did accept the outcome, 
exemplifi ed caring for wage-dependent workers. One can consider it as evidence 
that in an indirect way solidarity did contribute to the emergence and expansion 
of social security legislation in the Netherlands.13 Considering that wage earners 
themselves had to make sacrifi ces, and in the longer run perhaps had to bear the 
brunt of the economic costs, one may be tempted to suspect here caring mixed 
12 In 2007 mandatory insurance against costs of health care for all citizens replaced the 
mandatory insurance for employed persons.
13 We did not come across the concept of indirect caring in the literature and give it its fi rst try 
here.
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with a stiff  dose of paternalism: disciplining the spending pattern of labourers 
for their own good and for a good deal at their own cost. However, the social 
security legislation for wage-dependent workers was introduced with the support 
of the workers’ representatives. So one can argue that it refl ected workers’ 
preferences as well: a voluntarily accepted restraint on spending patterns, or 
otherwise, a restraint accepted in return for the benefi ts of care.
Apart from the evidence of indirect care we could not detect other types of 
market failure providing welfare-economic arguments for mandatory insurance 
for wage-dependent workers. To make a case for market failure, arguments 
against voluntary private insurance have to be brought in. A well-known 
bottleneck in insurance is moral hazard – the insured person takes less care to 
avoid risks covered by insurance. However, mandatory social insurance off ers no 
solution for that problem Th e second bottleneck is adverse selection, meaning 
that only ‘bad risks’ take out insurance. Commercial insurers counter the 
bottleneck by refusing to insure persons with high risks or charge them high 
contributions. However, the so-called ‘bad risks’ are usually the ones that are 
most vulnerable. Th at problem could have been solved by a targeted subsidy and 
by making acceptation mandatory for insurers: a much lighter form of 
government intervention than mandatory insurance with one public insurer. 
Suppose the government had chosen for such light regulation. Th en voluntary 
private insurance based on equivalence, either as an ingredient of collective 
labour contracts or as an individual initiative, would have developed further, 
following the rather steady increase in wage income. Th is is exactly what 
happened to the voluntary insurance of employees against loss of income due to 
unemployment, before it was made mandatory in 1945.14 With voluntary instead 
of mandatory insurance, coverage would of course have been lower and more 
workers would have taken recourse to the arrangements rooted in caring, 
discussed in section 4.1.
Th e conclusion is that social insurance for wage-dependent workers can at least 
in part be viewed as a government intervention coordinating indirect caring on 
the side of consumers and employers. If so, mandatory insurance safeguarded 
the public interest by correcting market failure in the care domain. Yet the costs 
of care for consumers and employers cannot have been high. We suspect that 
their solidarity was mixed with paternalism, and also presume that the 
representatives of the workers, perhaps the workers themselves as well, willingly 
accepted the discipline that forced workers to make provisions for the future and 
protected them against possible short-comings in caution. If one takes the view 
that, as a category, workers are adult persons, capable of making responsible 
14 Van Loo 1992, p. 90–91.
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choices, the alternative option of voluntary insurance emerges, complemented 
with light regulation to protect the most vulnerable workers.
3.4. SUMMARY
Th e question posed earlier with regard to the extent to which market failure has 
been a leading motive for the public interest in social security in the Netherlands 
has received a mixed answer. We have basically identifi ed three driving forces 
behind social security legislation: voluntary redistribution to internalize caring 
externalities possibly mixed with preferences for public self-insurance, politically 
forced involuntary redistribution through social security and paternalistic 
correction of perceived lack of prudence of wage-dependent workers. Only in so 
far as social security arrangements have been based on voluntary redistribution 
can they unequivocally be classifi ed as public intervention to correct market 
failure. And only insofar as social security services can be retraced to this motive, 
can welfare economics categorise the policy as safeguarding the public interest 
by increasing national welfare. As for the second and third motive, the judgement 
of whether public intervention has served the public interest depends on one’s 
political views. Our tentative conclusion is that the vertical redistribution in the 
schemes of social security for all citizens is largely voluntary, supported by 
solidarity. However, in the social insurance schemes for wage-dependent 
workers, vertical redistribution is absent or weak. Neither is it clear what the 
failure in the insurance market is that needs correction. We did not fi nd 
convincing economic arguments to classify social security for wage-dependent 
workers as being in the public interest.
4. THE ECONOMICPOLITICAL LIFE CYCLE IN 
SOCIAL SECURITY
Th e national system of social security in the Netherlands was built up between 
the year 1900 and the 1970s.15 In those years the gaps in existing social security 
supplied voluntarily through the market were one of the major political issues, 
hand in hand with the political urge to close those gaps through a form of 
government involvement.16 Political discussions framed the public interest 
mainly in terms of the benefi ts to be reaped from an encompassing framework of 
social security, replacing the earlier ramshackle private arrangements.17 
15 E.g. Nentjes 1989; Postma 1995; Roebroek & Hertogh 1998.
16 E.g. Woerdman 2009.
17 Th e notion of public interest in the political discussion should be distinguished from the 
defi nition based on economic theory.
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Although in the process of building up the national system of social security the 
cost side was not totally neglected it is evident from the public discussion that 
the cost burden and its negative repercussions on the economy were not perceived 
as a major bottleneck and hardly as a component of the public interest in need of 
surveillance.
Th at rosy view changed very soon aft er the completion of the social security 
structure in the 1970s. Within a few years the political discussion on social 
security made a U-turn. In the face of growing evidence that the post-war 
decades of strong economic growth and full employment were over, most 
politicians began to accept from the late 1970s onwards that the steady expansion 
of social security had been and still was a major driving force behind the rise in 
labour costs. It was also widely accepted that the negative impacts on employment 
and economic growth were quite dramatic and had to be brought to a halt. 
Implicitly the concept of the public interest was redefi ned: instead of expansion 
and deepening of social security arrangements, the containment of their costs in 
order to save employment made the political agenda. Th e global political trend of 
the 1980s is best caught in Reagan’s words on becoming president of the USA in 
1981: ‘Government is not the solution to our problem; government is the 
problem.’ In the Netherlands, social security provided by the public sector started 
to be viewed no longer as the solution (to market failure), but as a problem (of 
rising costs). Th e public interest was defi ned now as spotting the public sector 
failures in providing social security.
Th e public sector failure had two dimensions. Th e fi rst one was that many 
entitlements were seen as ‘over the top’ and no longer aff ordable. Curtailing the 
levels, for instance a lowering of employment benefi ts, was the remedy here: 
technically simple, but politically extremely diffi  cult. Th e largest contribution to 
the reduction of public expenditure did indeed come from this source. Th e 
second dimension of public sector failure was ineffi  ciency in the organisation of 
providing social security. In the eff ort to eliminate the waste of scarce resources, 
criteria for eligibility have been made more strict and other changes were 
enacted, among them the incorporation of market elements in the social security 
system. Most of the reforms and the motivations given refl ect mainstream 
economic thinking on incentives and other causes of regulatory and 
organisational ineffi  ciency. Section 5 gives a survey of the major types of public 
sector failure that may aff ect the public provision of social security. Illustrations 
will be taken from actual developments in the Netherlands over the past three 
decades.
In the fi rst decade of the 21st century the government has continued its eff orts to 
improve effi  ciency and to reassess the balance between the benefi ts and the costs 
of the various social security services. But one can also observe a reaction of 
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critical journalists, social and legal scientists as well as politicians who fear that 
cost containment actions have gone too far. Th e phrase ‘paradigm change’ has 
even been used: a switch from providing security and income protection to 
making social security subservient to economic interests, such as a well-
functioning labour market.18 Th e criticism oft en tallies with a distrust of – if not 
aversion against – the infusion of market elements in social security legislation. 
Th e critics tend to identify the public interest in social security with quality of 
service in supporting people in need and prevention of economic insecurity and 
anxiety. Th ey recommended a caring public sector not driven by profi t-making 
motives, and in particular not in health care, as the best approach to safeguard 
that public interest. Cost considerations do not seem to be much of an issue for 
them. Are these the fi rst signals of a new and third stage in the political life cycle 
of social security? Probably not in the near future. Th e huge government 
expenditure made to counter the fi nancial and economic crises from 2007 to 
2010 and the consequent increase in public debt will urge a critical review of 
government tasks. Social security will not escape unnoticed. Looking further 
ahead one can only say that time will tell which way we are going.
5. PUBLIC SECTOR FAILURES AND THE REFORM 
OF SOCIAL SECURITY
Whatever the precise motives of the government may have been in becoming 
involved in the provision of social security to its citizens, the fact is that in the 
20th century social security has developed as a public sector provision. 
Th roughout its lifetime of about two hundred fi ft y years, economic science has 
focused in particular on how markets work and how they may fail, but also on 
how governments work and how they may fail. Public fi nance is about as old as 
general economic theory and in the past four decades an even more specialised 
branch of economics has emerged, called public choice, or (new) political 
economy. Among the other issues investigated is how the public sector can fail in 
his task of serving the public interest. Th e public interest is conceived here as 
maximum net benefi ts for all citizens. Public sector failure is creating or letting 
in existence public arrangements of which the net benefi ts are either lower than 
what could be achieved or even negative.
Th e literature has come up with a list of potential failures for organisations in the 
public sector.19 In this section, the concept of public sector failures will be 
introduced and applied to social security to see how suitable they are for 
explaining the changes that have been made in social security aft er the U-turn of 
18 Asscher-Vonk 2005.
19 E.g. Hanush 1983; Recktenwald 1980; Recktenwald 1984.
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the 1980s when the focus of politics shift ed from expanding and raising the level 
of social security to revisiting and trimming the system. Th e public sector 
failures to be discussed are basically too much production, too much 
consumption, too little choice for clients, too high costs for the quality provided 
and too little innovation. We shall investigate whether actual changes made in 
social security arrangements, and the arguments for them, can be fi tted into the 
scheme of public sector failures or whether they have another origin.
5.1. OVERPRODUCTION
In the economic literature on public sector failures one can be sure to come 
across overproduction as a major problem Production is excessive if at the 
margin the value for its consumers is lower than the cost of providing the output. 
Net benefi ts of the redundant part of production are negative: valuable inputs are 
transformed into output of lower value.
Th e phenomenon of overproduction has been analyzed using diff erent 
approaches. Underlying all of them is the view of the public sector as a centrally 
planned system, suff ering from the same economic weaknesses that ultimately 
led to the collapse of the communist systems at the end of the 20th century. 
Applied to social security, one can point out that users of social security services 
do not directly pay for the service rendered. Th e fi nance comes from the 
government budget or from social insurance contributions. Consequently, which 
is essential from an economic point of view, consumer preferences are not 
revealed to the suppliers of the social service. Th e market’s function of signalling 
the demand for the service is taken over by a national bureaucracy planning the 
quantity and quality of the service provided as part of the social arrangement. 
Since market signals are lacking, the planner needs a diff erent clue with regard 
to how much to provide and of what quality. He has to gather and process 
relevant information on needs and costs and on the basis of this information he 
decides. But the capacity of the central organization has its limits. Imperfections 
in planning may lead to wrong choices. Mistakes alone can cause the planner to 
err on either side: quantity or quality can be either too much, or too little. 
However, other forces also have to play a role systematic overproduction.
Niskanen (1971) suggested the explanation that the bureaucratic administrator 
may not be the politician’s neutral agent as portrayed by Weber, but has its own 
objective of maximizing the budget. If true, the bureaucracy tends to produce 
more public output than the effi  cient level. Since Niskanen’s publication the focus 
of theoretical analyses has shift ed to the role of interest groups lobbying for 
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higher budgets. Th e theory of rent-seeking analyses the strategies of interest 
groups trying to extract public expenditures or regulation that serves their 
special interests.20 Political decision makers are an attractive target for rent-
seekers, since they can provide goods or services for free while the costs will be 
borne by someone else. Successful rent-seeking feeds overproduction. In social 
security trade unions are major interest groups, although their pressure is 
mitigated by having to take into account the negative impacts that rising costs of 
social security might have on employment. Employers’ organisations act rather 
as a countervailing power by demanding restraint from the politicians. In the 
past three decades trade unions and other interest groups have acted most 
manifestly in organizing resistance against government decisions to trim or 
reform arrangements in social security.
Bureaucrats and interest groups may push for more and better social security 
arrangements and resist cuts and restrictions, but in the end politicians decide. 
Ideologies and views on social security diff er between parties, yet what is most 
striking is the broad political consensus in bringing about social security 
legislation. Over time it resulted in a development characterised by De Swaan 
(1989) as ‘a long squib and late explosion’. Th e squib refers to the comparatively 
slow growth during the fi rst half of the 20th century. Th e explosion came in the 
period from 1950 to 1980: social security expenditure expanded from hardly 6% 
of the national income to more than 28%, following the introduction of the type 
2 social legislation.21 Th e new social arrangements coming into force in the 1950s 
and 1960s were carried by a broad political consensus. In those economically 
booming years there was little attention for the economic cost of maintaining 
such an all compassing system of collectively provided security. Only in the 
1970s, when the international economic tide turned did the full fi nancial and 
economic consequences become visible and start to become a political worry. 
Th e public choice theories of bureaucracy and rent seeking are of little help to 
explain that turn. We rather think that the story of unforeseen consequences of 
decisions taken earlier applies here. Part of the explanation is the tendency to 
extrapolate present favourable developments into the nearby future. However, 
the 1970s were very diff erent from the two foregoing decades. Once the new 
safety nets were in place, it turned out that not only did they function to support 
the victims of social accidents, but they were a potential invitation to make use 
of the available facilities. As a cause of the fast increase in the number of persons 
dependent on social security, it went hand in hand with the increase in 
unemployment due to the slowdown of economic growth and the subsequent 
deep depression from 1979 to 1983. Th e combination of social security 
expenditure going up (the nominator) and a stagnating national income (the 
20 Tullock 1980.
21 Postma 1995.
Andries Nentjes and Edwin Woerdman
44 Intersentia
denominator) led to a rapid rise in the relative costs of social security as well as a 
steadily increasing defi cit in the government budget. Th e train of events took the 
political body by surprise. One additional explanation for the late and hard 
awakening is that social security fi nanced by insurance contributions was not 
included in the government budget, but set apart in public social security funds, 
which were considered as a separate, closed system. Social contributions thus 
remained outside the norms draft ed for the size of the government budget until 
1976. In that year the so-called 1% norm was introduced, stipulating that the 
sum of taxes and social contributions as a percentage of national income should 
not grow faster than by 1% point per year.22 Th e evident lack of political control 
of social security expenditure during the 1970’s originated initially from a lack of 
political will, facilitated by the lack of unambiguous signals and norms for public 
social expenditure, and in the late 1970s the tide could not be turned due to a 
lack of suitable instruments.
5.2. OVERCONSUMPTION
From the point of view of the consumer, his use of social security is fi nanced 
externally, through the public budget or through a social insurance scheme. 
Having past the eligibility test, the service has no costs, so that an incentive to 
contain consumption is lacking. For an unemployed person the unemployment 
benefi t or income from poor relief is a subsidy on inactivity that tends to lengthen 
the period without a job. Wrong incentives for consumers tend to push the 
consumption of social security services to a level where at the margin the costs of 
provision exceed the benefi ts of those who consume it.
Where the service is provided for free, the introduction of a new social security 
arrangement creates a situation where supply literally generates its own demand. 
Consumers fi rst have to discover the new product and when it suits them there is 
an incentive to pass the eligibility test. Th e strength of the ‘supply generates its 
own demand’ eff ect of new arrangements is diffi  cult to predict, but easily 
underestimated. An outstanding example of this is the developments under the 
Invalidity Insurance Act. Th e level of benefi t depended on the diagnosed degree 
of labour incapacity and in case of full labour incapacity benefi ts were 80% of the 
former salary and for people with minimum wage 100% of the former net wage. 
Aft er the act came into force in 1967 a steadily increasing number of wage-
dependent workers applied for and was granted benefi ts. In 2002 no less than 
13.5% of the working population was receiving payments under the arrangement. 
By international standards an incredibly high level of full or partial labour 
incapacity.23
22 Postma 1995.
23 Calculation based on CBS data.
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An almost similar story can be told about the Social Assistance Act, which came 
into force in 1965 to replace the Poor Law of 1912. Individuals from the age of 18 
years without income of their own were eligible for income support, fi xed at 70% 
of the net minimum wage. Income support was a right and no longer a favour, as 
it had been under the old law. Again the infl ow was high and the number of 
people receiving support was increasing.
5.3. LACK OF CHOICE
As one can see in table 1, throughout the lifetime of a Dutch citizen an enormous 
amount of money is spent on social policy arrangements, principally social 
security services. For transfers only it amounts to roughly 6,000 euros per year 
(undiscounted value). From an economic perspective, this is money that cannot 
be spent freely according to a person’s or household’s own preferences, 
perceptions of risk and willingness to bear that risk. Instead the state decides on 
the destination of the tax payer’s primary income and regulates for what and 
under which circumstances the tax payer is eligible for consumption of social 
services and what criteria will be applied to assess his or her eligibility. Th e 
regulations are very much of the type ‘one size fi ts all’. Th e discrepancies between 
the diversity of private preferences, on the one hand, and on the other hand the 
uniform type of service and security provided by the arrangements imply a 
national welfare loss.
In social insurance the lack of choice shows up in the standards for eligibility, 
insurance coverage and level of benefi ts. Traditionally the client has no choice 
between insurers and between suppliers of the social services. Th ere are signs 
that recent governments have understood the economic lesson that uniformity is 
a real bottleneck. Politicians have started to search for solutions that allow choice 
and consequently more diversity.
5.4. XINEFFICIENCY
Public sector suppliers of social security traditionally have a monopoly in 
administrating and delivering the service. Th e relaxed existence of a monopolist, 
free from the pressure of competition, makes surveillance and containment of 
costs less urgent. Costs will tend to creep up to a level higher than necessary. Th e 
excess of costs above the necessary minimum has received the label 
X-ineffi  ciency.24 It can take many forms. Th e traditional jokes about the short 
working day and slow working pace of the civil servant reveal that a low work 
24 Leibenstein 1966; Leibenstein 1978.
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load is a long-standing and widely observed form in which X-ineffi  ciency has 
appeared. In social security, X-ineffi  ciency can take the form of relaxing the 
criteria for being admitted as eligible for a specifi c arrangement, by applying the 
criteria less strictly than is formally required. It was considered to be one more 
cause, next to the overconsumption incentive, of the fast increase in the number 
of people receiving benefi ts under the Invalidity Insurance Act.
A recent study on internal and external care for the elderly, mainly provided by 
non-profi t organizations gives a good illustration of X-ineffi  ciency.25 In 2008 
costs per client of internal care could diff er as much as (maximally) 25% between 
the most and least effi  cient provider. Examples of waste are unnecessary activities 
and overpriced purchases. A striking fi nding was that small establishments 
performed better than big ones.
A case, that has received much attention in the media, is the practice of non-
profi t fi rms supplying care-at-home to employ more highly qualifi ed personnel 
than is strictly necessary – and charge for it. Th e practice was facilitated by the 
commissions that decided on eligibility and type of care, but they had no 
responsibility for the public budget spent on home care. Many journalists were 
enthralled about such good care for the needy old and sick, but from the 
economic point of view, it is a clear-cut piece of X-ineffi  ciency.26
X-ineffi  ciency can thrive were competition is lacking. Monopolists in the private 
for-profi t sector are not free of it. However, the owners of stock that want to see 
profi ts are a countervailing power. Or the managers have to fear a take-over and 
shake out when their incapacity to show good profi ts is refl ected in a low price of 
equity. In public (including non-profi t) organisations such feed-back is lacking and 
consequently the scope for X-ineffi  ciency is larger. Since fi nancial (budget) 
surpluses cannot be paid out, the incumbents have an incentive to consume the 
potential surplus within the organisation under the guise of costs. From this 
perspective, X-ineffi  ciency is more than simple neglect; it is a well-considered 
choice to use revenues for objectives other than the effi  cient delivery of services, 
including high salaries and wages, low workloads and expenditure on ‘pet projects’.
For the Netherlands a striking illustration of pet projects is the merger wave 
between non-profi t providers of home care in the fi rst decade of the 21st century. 
A belief in the advantages of large scale in home care paired remarkably well 
with managers’ ambitions and their perspective of a higher salary. In many cases 
the mergers resulted in big losses. A report on the bankruptcy of the Meavita 
25 Gupta Strategists 2010.
26 See our chapter on instrumentalisation of the public interest for further discussion and 
references.
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conglomerate concluded that the managers and supervisory board had been 
totally absorbed by the merger frenzy and had seriously neglected the fi rm’s 
primary task of delivering home care services of good quality at a cost that is 
covered by revenue.27 An example of a type of pet project that is well-known in 
the literature was provided by Newhouse (1970). Drawing his inspiration from 
health care, he pointed out that organisations with a strong position 
of professionals have a predilection for using the newest technology, which will 
show up in excess costs.
5.5. LACK OF INNOVATION
Innovation is the mainspring of economic progress. In social security, new ways of 
doing things can improve quality of service, raise the productivity of workers in 
the sector and lower costs. However, a large bureaucratic organisation that has a 
monopoly in its fi eld is not a stimulating place for innovation. When life is easy the 
necessity to change is not felt. Moreover, most workers have no or hardly any space 
to diverge from the prescribed routines. When there is such space, the eff ort to 
innovate may fail, leaving the instigator with the blame; and if successful, what 
does he gain? A lack of incentives for innovation has the same background as 
X-ineffi  ciency, but in the long run the resulting stagnation is far more serious. 
When there is innovation in a bureaucratic environment, it may even have adverse 
eff ects on cost and quality as the failures of realizing economies of scale through 
mergers in home care seem to suggest.
In this section the public interest in social security has been defi ned in terms of 
redressing the identifi ed public sector failures. In the chapter on instruments we 
shall discuss the eff orts to contain overproduction and overconsumption as well 
as the reforms to counter X-ineffi  ciency, lack of choice for consumers and failure 
to innovate in social security.
6. CONCLUSION
Th e economist’s view on the public interest in social security is defi ned as (a) 
identifying and correcting the market failures in the private provision of social 
security as well as (b) identifying and correcting the public sector failures in the 
public supply of social security. Th e major market failure is situated in the private 
organisation of solidarity among citizens in a society in which traditional 
patterns of support are crumbling. Th ere are indications supporting the 
hypothesis that solidarity exists in the Netherlands and that the vertical 
27 Keijser 2009.
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redistribution of income through the social security system is voluntarily 
accepted. Th e types of social security that redistribute vertically are the age-old 
forms of poor relief provided by local governments, which were more and more 
nationally regulated and fi nanced out of national taxes during the 20th century. 
Next to that new types of social insurance covering the whole population were 
introduced aft er the Second World War. Insurance to guarantee a minimum 
level of income in old age, insurance to cover exceptionally high medical costs 
and insurance covering the personal expenditures on health care have been 
designed in such a way that the contributions paid by citizens in the higher 
income brackets co-fi nance the benefi ts of citizens with lower incomes.
In contrast, many existing types of social insurance that have been introduced 
during the 20th century for wage-dependent workers do not redistribute income 
vertically. Basically their feature is mandatory insurance, supported politically 
by organized labour. Th e argument that they serve to correct failures in the 
insurance markets is not convincing. Government intervention that does not 
correct market failure is not in the public interest. Economic theory thus provides 
no arguments why the government should be involved here.
In building up social security as a public sector activity, political decision makers 
had a broader conception of the public interest in social security than the more 
narrow defi nition of welfare economics allows. Clearly, more political objectives 
were involved than raising national welfare through a correction of market 
failures in coordinating solidarity among citizens. Mixed as the motives may 
have been, the fact is that in the 20th century social security has developed as a 
public sector provision. Whatever the reason for the existence of diff erent 
categories of social security, it is in the public interest that public sector failures 
in its provision are prevented and, if detected, that they are remedied. Th e 
build-up and completion of the welfare state in the 1950s and 1960s led to an 
unforeseen increase in the cost of social security when the international 
economic tide turned. Th e ongoing growth of unemployment in the 1970s and 
early 1980s convinced the government that social security had over-expanded to 
an economically unsustainable level. Th e decades that followed were clearly 
characterized by an ongoing struggle against the public sector failures of 
overproduction and overconsumption. It went hand in hand with the detection 
of other public sector failures: lack of choice for clients, too high costs for the 
quality provided (X-ineffi  ciency), and too little innovation. Eff orts have been 
undertaken to mend them. In doing so, political decision makers have indeed 
conceived the public interest in the way economic science suggests. And in their 
actions they have also followed the prescriptions derived from economic theory 
more closely than they did in the foregoing decades of building up the national 
system of social security.
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THE PUBLIC INTERESTS 
OF SOCIAL SECURITY: 
A SOCIAL SCIENCE PERSPECTIVE
Mirjam Plantinga
1. INTRODUCTION
Th e concept of public interests has received more and more attention lately. In 
the policy domain in particular public interests are a major point of concern.1 
Oft en government policies are justifi ed by arguing that they are in the public 
interest. Signifi cant factors explaining the current attention to the concept of 
public interest are the reforms the Western welfare states have been confronted 
with over the past decades. Important elements of the reforms are the 
introduction of market forces and a re-orientation of the role of the government. 
Where the responsibility for the welfare state used to be solely attributed to the 
public domain, in the reforms the advantages of the market, especially with 
regard to the possibilities of increasing effi  ciency, are brought to the fore. Shift ing 
responsibilities from the public to the private domain does, however, requires a 
defi nition of public interests in a more private welfare state. What should be 
considered as the inviolable part of the welfare state? Can public interests be 
safeguarded in the private domain or does the safeguarding of the public interest 
require government intervention? In order to be able to solve the issue of the 
safeguarding of public interests, fi rst, the question for which public interests the 
government should take responsibility needs answering.2 It is this question that 
is the object of this chapter. In defi ning public interests a social science approach 
will be used.




2. STATE OF THE ART
2.1. FROM PUBLIC INTERESTS TO PUBLIC VALUES
In this chapter the public administration or more broadly the social science 
approach to defi ning public interests is used. Th e reason for not restricting the 
approach to the public administration literature is that the public administration 
discipline traditionally has been a multidisciplinary fi eld based on theories and 
concepts from a range of related disciplines. Moreover, the approach towards 
defi ning public interests taken by public administration scholars and researchers 
stemming from related disciplines such as political science and sociology show 
great similarities. It is important to mention that the social science approach as 
presented here does not include the economic discipline. In fact, the social 
science approach to defi ning public interests is positioned opposite to the 
economic or New Public Management approach.3
Th e social science approach as used in this chapter focuses on the perception of 
citizens, being the clients of what the state can provide. From the perspective of 
social science public interests have to do with support: public interests are only 
public interests if citizens recognize them as public interests. Th is also implies 
that an attempt of the state to safeguard these interests will gain support of 
these citizens. An important proponent of the social science approach to 
defi ning public interests is Bozeman (2002; 2007; 2008). According to Bozeman 
(2007, p. 12) ‘public interest refers to the outcomes best serving the long-run 
survival and well-being of a social collective construed as a “public”.’ Th e 
defi nition of Bozeman resembles the view of the Netherlands Scientifi c Council 
for Government Policy (WRR). In their report ‘Het borgen van publiek belang’ 
(safeguarding public interests), the WRR (2000) defi nes public interests as those 
interests that have been labelled as such in a normative debate in a country and 
which results have been inscribed in law by the legislator. Important aspect of 
the defi nition of the WRR is, however, that the concept of public interest implies 
government intervention, while in the line of reasoning of Bozeman the concept 
of public interest does not necessarily imply government intervention. Bozeman 
(2007) argues that public interests may be realized in the private domain and 
that only in situations when public interests are not realized without 
government intervention, is the government required to take action. Whether 
or not governments should intervene therefore depends on the extent to which 
public interests are being realized. Since the defi nition of public interests, as 
brought forward by Bozeman, resembles the general view on defi ning public 
interests in social sciences, this defi nition of public interests will be used in this 
chapter.
3 Bozeman 2007; Stoker 2006; O’Flynn 2007.
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Th e social science approach to defi ning public interests, raises the question whether 
a unifying defi nition of public interests exist. Th e answer is that it does not. A 
unifying defi nition of public interests does not exist since public interests depend 
on what societies agree on at a certain point in time and ‘certain 18th-century self-
evident truths might be subject to very diff erent interpretations today’.4 Public 
interests are therefore ‘ubiquitous’,5 ‘emergent’,6 and ‘ambiguous’.7
If the social sciences cannot come up with a line of reasoning that leads to 
determining what public interests are, the question arises whether the social 
science approach can provide guidance to decisions about the allocation of 
responsibilities between public and private actors. Given the ambiguity of the 
defi nition of public interests, public interest theories provide little or no 
guidance in this respect. In the social sciences, over the years, the literature 
has therefore started to focus more and more on public values.8 Th e 
distinction between public interests and public values is that the former is 
regarded as an elusive ideal, whereas public values have specifi c identifi able 
content.9
2.2. IDENTIFYING PUBLIC VALUES
Th e public value approach was fi rst articulated by Moore (1995). According to 
Moore (1995, p. 28): ‘Th e idea of managerial work in the public sector is to create 
public value just as the aim of managerial work in the private sector is to create 
private value.’ An important aspect of public values is, however, that they are 
expressed by the citizenry and determinations of the citizenry inherently are 
collective choices.10 Public value can therefore not be derived from the 
aggregation of individual preferences such as done in the economic approach, 
but only from individual and public preferences resulting from public 
deliberation.11 Public values thus rely on ‘politically-mediated expression of 
collectively determined preferences’.12
Given the link between public interests and public values, in the social sciences 
the concepts are oft en used interchangeably.13 According to Bozeman (2007, p. 13)
4 Jørgensen & Bozeman 2002, p. 375.
5 Bozeman 2007, p. 143.
6 Stout 2007.




11 Kelly, Mulgan & Muers 2002.
12 O’Flynn 2007, p. 360.
13 Dicke & De Bruijn 2003.
Mirjam Plantinga
52 Intersentia
A society’s ‘public values’ are those providing normative consensus about a) the 
rights, benefi ts, and prerogatives to which citizens should (and should not) be 
entitled); b) the obligations of citizens to society, the state, and one another; and c) 
the principles on which governments and policies should be based.
Moreover, public values can be traced in many ways. Public values are, for example, 
refl ected in fundamental laws and constitutions. Public values oft en are also 
refl ected in policy and politics, public speeches, elections, and public policy. 
Furthermore, in countries with a strong judiciary, the high courts are regarded as 
an excellent viewing point for identifying public values.14 Without defi ning what 
public values actually are, Bozeman therefore does defi ne a set of core public values 
for which the government is responsible. Other authors follow the same line. De 
Bruijn & Dicke (2003), for example, distinguish between procedural and substantive 
values. Procedural public values refer to the way the public sector should act and to 
standards that the process of government action should meet, while substantive 
values are defi ned as those ‘values for which the state, either directly or indirectly, is 
responsible’. Th e content of such core or substantive values is, however, not specifi ed 
and may diff er from sector to sector, from country to country and even over time.15
Lately, in the social science literature, analyses of public values are conducted for 
many diff erent countries and diff erent sectors. As a result, diff erent lists of public 
values have been proposed.16 Jørgensen & Bozeman (2002) have, for example, 
examined leading public administration periodicals on writing on public 
values.17 On the basis of their analysis they come up with a list of 72 public values 
including, amongst others, social cohesion, legality, equity, and accountability. 
In the Netherlands, public values in utility sectors are intensively studied. In 
these sectors, public values such as aff ordability, safety, and the protection of the 
environment are important.18 In an analysis of the reorganizations in the Dutch 
social insurance schemes, public values such as social cohesion, eff ectiveness, 
and accountability are brought to the foreground.19 Th e public values that most 
oft en come up are: quality, accessibility, and effi  ciency.
Th e diff erent lists of public values show that in each context diff erent values are 
emphasized. An important aspect that the lists of public values bring forward is 
therefore that public values are a social construct. A weak aspect of the social 
science approach to identifying public values is, however, that it provides little 





18 De Bruijn & Dicke 2006; Stout 2007; Lijesen Kolkman & Halbesma2007.
19 Van Gestel 2003.
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between government and private parties. To some extent the identifi cation of a 
diff erent set or a change in public values may be helpful in deciding about which 
institutional setting is best suited for safeguarding these values, for diff erent 
public values may ask for diff erent safeguards. Th e analysis of Van Gestel (2003), 
for example, shows that a changing attitude towards the position of the social 
partners in the Dutch welfare state, has resulted in a handing over of 
responsibility for the safeguarding of public interests from the social partners as 
a collective to individual employers and employees. Also in the history of the 
Dutch welfare state, changes in the organization of the welfare state can be 
explained by a reorientation of public values.20 Given the interaction between 
public values and the context in which they operate it is, however, questionable 
whether an adequate measure of normative consensus about public values can be 
obtained. Moreover, such an analysis does not provide the government with a 
decision making tool with regard to the allocation of responsibilities.
2.3. IDENTIFYING PUBLIC VALUES FAILURES
In order to be able to make decisions about the allocation of responsibilities 
between public and private, Bozeman (2007) proposes a pragmatic approach to 
public interest theory. In this view it suffi  ces to pay attention to public values in 
decisions about the allocation of responsibilities. More specifi cally, one should 
focus on instances where public values fail. Th e public values failure approach is 
positioned opposite the economic approach. Where the economic approach 
starts with an ideal of a perfect market, and applies this ideal to concrete policy 
issues, the public value failure approach begins with the policy issue ‘and then 
works toward a limited ideal – a practical solution to a recognized public 
failure’.21 According to Bozeman, in decisions about the allocation of 
responsibilities between public and private actors, public value failure instead of 
market failure should be leading. Th is raises the question how to defi ne instances 
where public values fail.
According to Bozeman (2007, p. 16) ‘from one perspective it is not possible for 
public values to fail; they simply change. But if we consider a public value about 
which there is consensus and observe that the value is not being obtained, then 
perhaps it can be said to have failed.’ In line with market failure criteria, Bozeman 
poses eight criteria for identifying public value failures. Public values failures are 
likely to occur in the case of extended time horizons, cases of imperfect public 
information and in situations that threaten human dignity and subsistence. Th e 
criteria suggested are not meant to be exhaustive, but are debatable and are 
20 Plantinga & Tollenaar 2007.
21 Bozeman 2007, p. 100.
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meant to promote deliberation about public value. By focusing on public values 
failure criteria, one is expected to receive a better understanding of the 
relationship between public values and the system in which they operate, 
especially with regard to the type of contexts in which public values are likely to 
be pressured. Moreover, in instances where public values are not provided it is 
up to the government to take action.
Although questions regarding the allocation of responsibilities can be considered 
as an issue of safeguarding and therefore beyond the scope of defi ning or 
identifying public interests, the importance of defi ning public interests is given 
by the link between defi ning public interests and safeguarding them. In fact, if it 
is not possible to defi ne the public interests for which the government should 
take responsibility, it is also not possible to analyze to what extent the government 
fails or succeeds in doing so. If the social science approach wants to operate on 
an even playing fi eld with the economic approach to defi ning public interests, 
that is infl uencing decisions regarding the allocation of responsibilities between 
public and private, developing analytical tools for guiding such decisions can be 
argued for. Th e public value failure criteria Bozeman (2007) proposes forms a 
fi rst step in such a direction and can therefore be regarded as an important 
development in the social science approach to defi ning public interests.
3. APPLYING THE SOCIAL SCIENCE APPROACH
TO THE WELFARE STATE
3.1. IDENTIFYING PUBLIC VALUES IN WELFARE STATES
Without defi ning what public values actually are, by using the concept of public 
value failure as an argument for government intervention, Bozeman (2007) does 
imply that there is a set of core public values for which the government is 
responsible. Th e content of such a set of core or substantive public values is, 
however, not specifi ed since it may diff er from sector to sector, from country to 
country and even over time. Research, for example, shows that changing economic 
conditions go hand in hand with changes in public attitudes towards welfare state 
policies.22 Th e question therefore remains what presently should be considered as 
the inviolable part of Western welfare states. A social science approach to answering 
this question demands an analysis of the public values that are held within a given 
country, regarding a certain policy context, during a certain period of time.
22 Blekesaune 2007.
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In the history of the Dutch welfare state, public values are, for example, the 
redistribution of income through the provision of a minimum level of subsistence 
as well as the protection of income, legitimacy, solidarity, equality of rights, legal 
certainty, and the effi  ciency and eff ectiveness of the institutional design of the 
welfare state.23 Goodin et al. (1999) come up with a slightly diff erent list. 
According to them there is a broad consensus across all welfare regimes that 
welfare goals should include the following: promoting economic effi  ciency, 
reducing poverty, promoting social equality, promoting social integration and 
avoiding social exclusion, promoting social stability, and promoting autonomy. 
Social objectives of the European Union, linked to the concept of fundamental 
rights, for example, are freedoms such as the right to liberty and security, 
equality, solidarity, citizens’ rights, and justice.24 And according to Esping-
Andersen (1990), the essence of social policy can be captured in one policy goal: 
the extension of social rights, where social rights can be regarded in terms of 
their capacity for decommodifi cation.
Th e diff erent lists of public values show that in each context diff erent values are 
emphasized, although the lists are characterized by some overlap. As mentioned, 
the fact that something is perceived as a public value provides, however, little 
guidance in making decisions regarding the allocation of responsibilities 
between government and private parties. According to the social science 
literature, the responsibility for the government comes up only in instances 
where public values fail. In order to be able to make decisions about the allocation 
of responsibilities between public and private it is, therefore, important to focus 
on identifying public values failures in Western welfare states.
3.2. IDENTIFYING PUBLIC VALUES FAILURES IN WELFARE 
STATES
One way of identifying public values failures in welfare states is by investigating 
to what extent welfare states are publicly supported or democratically legitimized. 
As mentioned, a public values failure occurs when the public values about which 
there is consensus are not being obtained. A low level of public support for a 
welfare regime that does not safeguard the public values about which there is 
normative consensus, therefore forms an indication of a public values failure. As 
table 1 shows low public support may, however, also be explained by a low 
importance that is attached to the specifi c welfare state regime. In this case, a 
low level of public support does not indicate a public values failure but rather 
forms an indication that something is not considered as a public value. In order 




to be able to identify public values failures in welfare states it is therefore 
important not to focus on low levels of welfare support alone, but also investigate 
how low levels of public support can be explained.
Table 1. Identifying public values failures in welfare states
Importance attached to
welfare state regime
Public support for welfare regime
Low High
Low No public value No public value
High Public value failure Public value realization
In sociological explanations for the legitimacy or public support of welfare states, 
solidarity is oft en brought forward as an important explanatory factor. Recently, 
however, solidarity is said to be under pressure due to processes of 
individualization and globalization.25 According to Van Oorschot (2000), the 
question whether solidarity is under pressure depends heavily on the way the 
concept is operationalized. Van Oorschot argues that solidarity consists of 
several elements: solidarity out of perceived self-interest, solidarity out of moral 
conviction, and solidarity because of emotional ties. In the Netherlands, 
perceived self-interest is found to be the most important motivator for willingness 
to contribute to the welfare state. Of the Dutch population 82% regards perceived 
self-interest as an important motivator for contributing to welfare, 64% is 
motivated to pay for reasons of moral convictions, and 42% because they have 
compassion for the benefi ciaries. Van Oorschot argues that when the concept of 
perceived self-interest is taken into account, developments of processes of 
individualization are not found to be threatening for solidarity.26 In fact, 
according to him, in order to receive high public support the key is to make large 
parts of the population stakeholder of the welfare state. Crepaz (2008), however, 
argues that due to rising diversity as a result of increased immigration, solidarity 
out of perceived self-interest is not suffi  cient and attitudes of universal trust and 
a sense of social solidarity are of high importance for the willingness to support 
the welfare state.
Although there is disagreement with regard to the question which type of 
solidarity is most important when explaining the public support for the welfare 
state, the importance of solidarity for the legitimacy of the welfare states is clear. 
Th e importance of diff erent types of solidarity is also shown in the extent to 
which benefi ts for diff erent needy groups are publicly supported. Van Oorschot 
(2006a) has investigated European public perceptions with regard to the relative 
25 De Beer & Koster 2007.
26 Van Oorschot 2006b.
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deservingness of several needy groups. Over the past decades in Western welfare 
states, the public was found to be most in favour of social protection for old 
people, closely followed by sick and disabled people. Unemployed people were 
found to be a little less deserving and social assistance receives least support of 
all. Howard also fi nds that the rank order of priorities between diff erent needy 
groups is similar across diff erent nations, including the United States.27 
According to Van Oorschot (2006b, p. 25) the distinction in support for the 
various groups of needy people can therefore be regarded as a ‘truly universal 
element in the popular welfare culture of present Western welfare states’.
Van Oorschot (1998) explains the distinction in support for the various groups 
of needy people by fi ve deservingness criteria: control, need, identity, attitude, 
and reciprocity. Control refers to the control people have over their neediness. 
Th e less control, the more deserving people are found to be. Need refers to the 
level of need: the higher the level of need, the more deserving. Further, people 
who we can easily identify with and people with an attitude of gratefulness and 
willingness to conform to our standards are found to be more deserving. Finally, 
people who have contributed to our group before or who can be expected to 
contribute in the future are found to be more deserving. Empirical research 
based on a Dutch solidarity study stemming from the year 1995 shows that the 
most important deservingness criteria are control, identity, and reciprocity. 
Control has also found to be an important criterion in other European and 
American studies.28
To conclude, the sociological literature shows that support for the welfare state is 
infl uenced by the deservingness criteria control, need, identity, attitude, and 
reciprocity. Also diff erent forms of solidarity such as solidarity out of perceived 
self-interest, solidarity out of moral conviction, and solidarity because of 
emotional ties, are important. In the next section, we will investigate the public 
support Western welfare states receive and describe to what extent diff erences in 
welfare state support can be explained by deservingness criteria and diff erent 
forms of solidarity. In doing this, we hope to identify, in the case when low levels 
of public support are found, whether these low levels of support form an 
indication of public values failure.
27 Howard 2007.
28 Van Oorschot 1998.
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4. IDENTIFYING PUBLIC VALUES FAILURES IN 
WESTERN WELFARE STATES
4.1. WESTERN WELFARE STATES
Before addressing the public support for Western welfare states, it is important 
to pay attention to the concept welfare state. Since each country has its own 
welfare state with its own unique culture and institutional set-up, one cannot 
speak of ‘the’ welfare state. However, it is also not the case that the welfare states 
are totally diff erent from each other. Most Western welfare states share similar 
characteristics. In the literature, three types of welfare states or welfare regimes 
are distinguished: the liberal, corporatist/conservative, and social democratic 
regime.29 An overview of the diff erences between the three regime types is given 
in table 2.
Table 2. Overview of diff erences between the liberal, corporatist/conservative, and 
social democratic welfare regime
Welfare regime Liberal Conservative Social democratic
Underlying principle Need Reciprocity (equity) Universalism 
(equality)
General aim of regime Minimum level of 
subsistence
Income protection Promotion general 
well-being
Safeguarding instrument Social assistance Social insurance Universal benefi ts
Responsibility State responsibility Involvement of 
social partners
State responsibility
Source: Clasen & Van Oorschot 2002, p. 94.
Each regime type is characterized by diff erent underlying fundamental values or 
principles.30 Liberty forms an important value in the liberal welfare state. In 
relations of free exchange, people are able to make mutually benefi cial exchanges. 
Only when the market fails in the sense that some people are in danger of falling 
below a designated poverty line, is the government required to step in. On the 
basis of the principle of need resources are redistributed to only those who are 
worst off . Th e reduction of poverty as the provision of a minimum level of 
subsistence therefore is an important goal of the liberal welfare state. Social 
assistance forms an important instrument for attaining these goals and the 
provision of social assistance is considered a state responsibility.31
29 Esping-Andersen 1990.
30 Goodin et al. 1999; Clasen & Van Oorschot 2002.
31 Clasen & Van Oorschot 2002.
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In a conservative or sometimes also called ‘corporatist welfare state’ social 
cohesion is an important underlying value. In such a regime, cooperation and 
collaboration are important. People contribute to the group they belong to and, 
in case of problems, can fall back on this group. Th e principles of reciprocity and 
equity are also important: the entitlements depend on the contributions that 
have been made. Important goal of the conservative or corporate regime is 
therefore income protection, and in doing this, preserving the social order and 
realize social stability.32 Social insurance schemes are an important instrument 
for realizing these goals. Furthermore, both organized employers and organized 
trade unions play an important role in the provision of these insurance schemes.
Finally, in a social democratic welfare state social equality as well as freedom, 
justice and solidarity are important underlying values.33 Vital is also the 
principle of universalism: everyone should be able to participate in society. Th e 
promotion of general well-being therefore is an important aim of the social 
democratic welfare state, but also goals such as reducing poverty, enhancing 
economic equality and personal autonomy are important for realizing social 
equality. Redistribution of resources from the rich to the poor forms an 
important safeguarding instrument in a social democratic welfare state as well as 
the provision of universal benefi ts.
Although the welfare regime classifi cation of Esping-Andersen is criticized the 
distinction between three diff erent ideal types is used up until today since it 
provides a useful heuristic for identifying broad diff erences in welfare regimes.34 
Moreover, what is important for our discussion is that the three welfare regimes 
are expected to diff er with regard to the public support that is given to their 
welfare policies.35
4.2. PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR WESTERN WELFARE STATES
According to Esping-Andersen (1990) social democratic welfare states have the 
highest capacity for decommodifi cation, that is, the extent to which individuals 
can uphold a socially acceptable standard of living independent from their 
participation on the market. Th e capacity for decommodifi cation is lower in 
conservative welfare states, while liberal welfare states have the least capacity for 
decommodifi cation. According to this typology, in social democratic welfare 
regimes the highest public support for government intervention can be expected, 
32 Goodin et al. 1999.
33 Stjernø 2008.
34 Esping-Andersen 1990; Svallfors 1997; Lapinski et al.1998.
35 Lapinski et al.1998.
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followed by conservative welfare regimes. Finally, liberal welfare regimes are 
expected to be characterized by the lowest public support for government 
intervention.36 Th e evidence regarding these hypotheses is, however, partly 
contradicting and partly supporting.
Gelissen (2000), for example, does not fi nd support for the hypothesis that a 
relationship exists between welfare regimes and levels of support. His analysis is 
based on the Eurobarometer 1992 and 2001 surveys and includes the public 
support for a broad range of government interventions, such as, government 
intervention aimed at ensuring a decent standard of living for children and the 
unemployed and housing support. Individuals who live in social democratic 
welfare regimes show less support for these types of government intervention 
compared to individuals living in liberal welfare regimes. When using the 1989 
Eurobarometer survey and investigating the question ‘which social welfare 
programs are absolutely necessary to be able to benefi t from social welfare when 
needed’, Lapinski et al. (1998) also fi nd that social democratic welfare states did 
not attract greater support.
Variations between welfare state regimes are found when the International Social 
Survey Program (ISSP) data for 1985 and 1990 are used. Lapinski et al. (1998) 
fi nd a diff erence in attitude between, on the one hand, liberal countries, and on 
the other hand, conservative and social democratic countries. Individuals living 
in liberal welfare regimes are less supportive. No diff erences between conservative 
and social democratic countries are observed. Andreß & Heien (2001) use the 
ISSP data of 1992. Th ey also fi nd that people in liberal welfare states show low 
levels of support for governmental action. Th ey further fi nd medium level of 
support in conservative regime and high support in social democratic regime. 
Th e questions they use are: whether it is the responsibility of the government to 
reduce income diff erences, whether it is the responsibility of the government to 
provide jobs for all, and whether it is the responsibility of the government to 
provide a basic income for all. Th e measure of public support in the ISSP data is 
therefore diff erent from the measure of the Eurobarometer surveys.
According to Larsen (2008), when focusing on items measuring attitudes towards 
policies concerning the poor and the unemployed, a regime pattern can be found. 
Liberal welfare regimes receive low support, conservative regimes moderate 
support, and social democratic regimes high support. Svallfors (1997) comes up 
with similar conclusions. Based also on the ISSP data of 1992, he concludes that 
the social democratic welfare regime shows the highest redistribute attitude and 
highest support for government intervention, while the redistribute attitude and 
support for government intervention are lowest in the liberal welfare regime. Th e 
36 Lapinski et al.1998.
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analyses of the public support for Western welfare states thus show that welfare 
states show large similarities in public support for a broad measure of government 
intervention. Public support does, however, diff er for policies concerning the 
poor and the unemployed. In the next section possible explanations for these 
diff erences in public support are brought forward.
4.3. EXPLAINING DIFFERENCES IN PUBLIC SUPPORT
In explaining why social democratic welfare regimes are characterized by the 
highest public support and liberal welfare regimes by the lowest public support 
with regard to policies concerning the poor and the unemployed, Svallfors (1997) 
focuses on diff erences in attitudes to income diff erences. He fi nds that citizens 
from diff erent welfare regimes vary in the extent to which income diff erences are 
regarded as legitimate. Compared to citizens living in the liberal welfare regime 
of the United States, citizens of social democratic welfare regimes, in particular 
Norwegians, are much less in favour of income diff erences. From this respect, 
diff erences in public support for income redistribution by the government can be 
explained by diff erent attitudes with regard to the legitimacy of income 
diff erences.
Alesina & Angeletos (2003) explain diff erences in public support by diff erences 
in perceptions regarding the fairness of market outcomes. Th ey argue, that when 
income diff erences are believed to be highly determined by luck higher income 
redistribution is supported compared to situations where income diff erences are 
believed to be highly determined by one’s own eff ort. Lower public support for 
income redistribution in the United States can, from this respect, be explained 
by a strong belief that income diff erences are highly determined by one’s own 
eff ort and not by luck. Th e World Values Survey, for example, shows that 71% of 
the Americans versus 40% of the Europeans believe that the poor could become 
rich if they tried hard enough. According to Alesina & Angeletos (2003), this 
argument is not limited to a comparison of the United States versus Europe, but 
holds for European welfare regimes as well. Th ey fi nd a signifi cant relationship 
between a left ist political orientation in a country and the belief that luck 
determines income.
Th e follow-up question is how diff erences in attitudes toward the legitimacy of 
income diff erences can be explained. Comparing the United States with 
European welfare regimes, Alesina & Glaeser (2004) fi nd that economic 
explanations in terms of a lower pre-tax income inequality and lower income 
mobility give little explanation of why citizens from social democratic welfare 
regimes favour income diff erences less. Th ey fi nd that the political institutions 
and heterogeneity of the population in the United States do form an important 
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explanation. Brooks & Manza (2007) also fi nd that the context in which 
individuals are situated forms an important explanatory factor for welfare state 
preferences.
Larsen (2008, p. 148) off ers an explanation of how diff erences in institutional 
structures may infl uence welfare state preferences. He argues that ‘the 
institutional structure of the diff erent welfare regimes infl uences or frames the 
way the public perceives the poor and unemployed’. His analysis is based on the 
deservingness criteria we discussed in section 3.2: control, need, identity, 
attitude, and reciprocity. According to Larsen a liberal welfare regime, 
characterized by a selective welfare policy, opens the discussion of whether 
people are in need, in control, and have a grateful attitude. Moreover, it creates 
boundaries between ‘them’ and ‘us’ negatively aff ecting the willingness to 
support the welfare state for reasons of identity and reciprocity. Th e logic of a 
social democratic regime, characterized by a universal welfare policy, is in many 
respects contrary to the liberal regime. In a social democratic regime, the 
discussion of whether people are in need, are to blame for their need, or are 
grateful for the welfare resources they receive, is far less important. Th is increases 
the willingness to support the welfare state for reasons of meeting the 
deservingness criteria need, control, and attitude. Moreover, in a universal 
welfare state regime everyone belongs to a national ‘us’ and the boundaries 
between those who give and those who receive are blurred, positively aff ecting 
the willingness to support the welfare state for reasons of identity and 
reciprocity.
Th e hypothesized link between welfare regimes and the fulfi lment of 
deservingness criteria is verifi ed in an analysis of the World Values Study of 
1990. Larsen (2008), for example, fi nds that in the liberal welfare regime of the 
United States 39% of the people belief that the reason for people living in need is 
due to laziness and lack of willpower, while in the social democratic regime of 
Sweden only 16% of the people belief so. In addition to the deservingness criteria, 
Van Oorschot (2000) has emphasized the importance of solidarity for welfare 
state support. According to Van Oorschot (2006b), the support for solidary 
welfare policies highly depends on the interest that the middle class has in the 
regime. He argues that in order to retain high public support it is important to 
make a large part of the population stakeholder of the welfare regime. Th e 
involvement of the social partners is therefore important. Moreover, it might 
form an important explanation for the fi nding that social democratic welfare 
regimes are characterized by higher levels of public support.
All in all, the research described in this section shows that an important factor 
explaining diff erences in public support between welfare states, is the extent to 
which diff erent groups are perceived as being deserving or meet the deservingness 
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criteria. From this respect, a low level of public support for policies concerning 
the poor and the unemployed found in liberal welfare regimes does not seem to 
be an indication of a public values failure. Rather, it indicates that citizens of 
liberal welfare states perceive the position of the unemployed and the poor 
diff erently compared to citizens of social democratic welfare states.
5. TOWARDS AN INTERDISCIPLINARY APPROACH 
TO DEFINING PUBLIC INTERESTS
In the social science approach to defi ning public interests, public values play an 
important role. Th e distinction between public interests and public values is that 
the former is regarded as an elusive ideal, whereas public values have specifi c 
identifi able content. An important message the social science literature brings 
forward is that public values are a social construct. When focusing on the 
question what can be regarded as the public values of the welfare state, a social 
science approach will emphasize that the answer essentially is an empirical one: 
public values are values that are supported by the public at large. What constitutes 
the prevailing public values therefore varies from one country to the next and is 
susceptible to change over time. From the perspective of social science, an 
interdisciplinary approach should therefore take the context into consideration 
when trying to defi ne public interests.
Th e fact that something is regarded to be in the public interest or is perceived as 
a public value does not, in itself, have any implications for decisions with regard 
to the allocation of responsibilities between public and private. According to an 
important stream in the social science literature, the responsibility for the 
government comes up only in instances where public interests are not realized or 
public values fail. Th e question is then, of course, in which instances public 
values fail. Important development in the social sciences is the public values 
failure approach of Bozeman (2007) which formulates general criteria, in line 
with market failure criteria, to describe situations in which public values are 
more likely to fail. A second important element the social science approach to 
defi ning public interests brings forward is therefore that in order to be able to 
make decisions about the allocation of responsibilities between public and 
private, it is necessary to focus on public values failure.
One way of identifying public values failures in welfare states is by analyzing to 
what extent welfare states are publicly supported or democratically legitimized. 
A low level of public support for a welfare regime that does not safeguard the 
public values about which there is normative consensus, forms an indication of a 
public values failure. A low public support may, however, also be explained by a 
Mirjam Plantinga
64 Intersentia
low importance that is attached to the specifi c welfare state regime. In this case, 
a low level of public support does not indicate a public values failure but rather 
forms an indication that something is not considered as a public value.
What is clear from the welfare state literature is that the rank order of public 
support for diff erent needy groups is similar across diff erent welfare regimes. All 
over modern Western welfare states, in various decades, the public was found to 
be most in favour of social protection for 1) old people, 2) sick and disabled people, 
3) needy families with children, 4) unemployed people, and 5) people depending 
on social assistance.37 Th e hierarchy in public support between the diff erent groups 
can be explained by fi ve deservingness criteria: control, need, identity, attitude, 
and reciprocity.38 Given the stability in rank order of public support for diff erent 
needy groups, the low level of public support that is attached to government 
interventions for the unemployed and for people depending on social assistance 
does not seem to be an indication of public values failure but rather indicates a 
diff erence in importance that is attached to the protection of these groups (see 
table 3). Th at is, the unemployed and people depending on social assistance are 
perceived as less deserving in comparison to the old, sick, and disabled.
Table 3. Identifying public values failures for policies concerning diff erent needy 
groups
Importance attached to 
diff erent needy groups 
Public support for policies concerning diff erent groups
Low High
Low No public value
(Poor and unemployed)
No public value
High Public value failure Public value realization
(Old, sick and disabled)
Th e literature further shows that the level of public support for policies 
concerning the poor and the unemployed in liberal welfare regimes is lower than 
the public support in social democratic welfare regimes. Also here the question 
arises whether the low levels of public support found in liberal welfare regimes 
can be explained by diff erences in public values, or whether these low levels of 
support form an indication of a public values failure. Here, the explanations also 
seem to be more in line with the former. Research shows that the extent to which 
diff erent groups are perceived as being deserving or meet the deservingness 
criteria, diff ers between welfare regimes. A low level of public support for policies 
concerning the poor and the unemployed in liberal welfare states therefore does 
not necessary indicate a public values failure. Rather it indicates, as table 4 shows, 
37 Van Oorschot 2006a.
38 Van Oorschot 1998.
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that citizens of liberal welfare states perceive the position of the unemployed and 
the poor diff erently compared to citizens of social democratic welfare states. Th e 
way the position of specifi c groups, such as the poor and the unemployed, are 
perceived is thus context dependent.
Table 4. Identifying public values failures for diff erent welfare regimes
Importance attached to the 
poor and unemployed
Public support for policies concerning the poor and 
unemployed
Low High
Low No public value
(Liberal welfare regime)
No public value
High Public value failure Public value realization 
(Social democratic regime)
Although within each context or welfare regime, the extent to which certain 
groups are perceived as deserving changes over time and is adjusted to economic 
developments such as levels of unemployment, changes in perceptions between 
welfare regimes are likely to persist since they originate from institutional factors 
and are historically grounded.
But what if the context changes? According to Van Oorschot, Opielka & Pfau-
Effi  nger (2008, p. 1) ‘a political culture of neo-liberalism has been steering the 
restructuring of the Western welfare states during the last two decennia’. Th is 
trend entails an increase in forms of privatization and more stringent criteria for 
access to social services oft en including individual work obligations. In other 
words, social democratic welfare regimes have become more liberal. Clasen & 
Van Oorschot (2002) also argue that over the years in European welfare states 
the need principle has increased in importance.
Th e question is to what extent the developments in Western welfare states are in 
accordance with the public values held by the general public. A change in welfare 
regime, such as a decrease in access to social services, can be the result of a shift  
in public values. Certain groups of welfare clients may, for example, be no longer 
perceived as deserving by the public at large. As a result, the importance that is 
attached to social protection for these groups is low, indicating that it is not 
regarded as a public value. In this case, the change in welfare regime is in 
accordance with the public values held by the general public. However, when 
public values have remained unchanged, a change in welfare regime might not 
be in accordance with the public values held by the general public. In fact, when 
due to a change in welfare regime public values about which there was normative 
consensus are no longer being obtained, a public values failure occurs.
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Given that public values are a social construct it is not likely that a change in 
welfare regime leaves the prevailing public values untouched. A decrease in 
entitlements for certain welfare clients may, for example, have a decreasing eff ect 
on the importance that is attached to the social protection of these groups.
General explanations regarding the causality between public values and welfare 
state regimes cannot be given based on the data described in this chapter. On the 
one hand, the social science literature argues that the public values held in 
society should be refl ected in welfare policies. Welfare regimes should therefore 
be the product of the public values held in a certain society. On the other hand, it 
is argued that institutional elements of the welfare state infl uence public values 
and therewith public support for the policy at hand. Public values are thus 
infl uenced or produced by the welfare system. Th is chapter shows that with 
regard to the fi nding that societies are willing to give fi nancial aid to groups of 
people regarded as deserving, the former explanation seems to hold, while with 
regard to the perception of who is regarded as deserving, the latter explanation 
seems to be leading.
To conclude, our analysis of the public support for Western welfare states shows 
that some general notions can be made with regard to what should be considered 
as the inviolable part of the welfare state. A public interest to protect vulnerable 
groups can be identifi ed. Which groups are believed to deserve protection or 
which level of protection is believed to be necessary does, however, depend on 
the institutional context. As a result, the allocation of responsibilities between 
public and private for the protection of these groups depends on the institutional 
context and may therefore diff er from country to country and over time.
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THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE 
WELFARE STATE: A LEGAL APPROACH
Gijsbert Vonk and George Katrougalos
1. INTRODUCTION
Th is contribution examines public interest and the welfare state from a legal 
angle. It addresses the following question: does the law provide a basis for 
defi ning social security as a public interest and if so, to what extent is this interest 
supported by concrete legal standards?
Th is chapter is structured as follows. Paragraph 2 includes some preliminary 
observations with regard to the public interest as a legal concept. While this 
concept is frequently used in the law, it does not have a fi xed meaning. Th e 
concept is a typical example of an open norm, the meaning of which varies 
according to the legal regime, the specifi c context of the case and the nature of 
government policies. For this reason it was decided not to use a ‘public interest 
doctrine’ as a tool for answering our question. Instead we have identifi ed the 
public interest with state responsibility in relation to fundamental socio-
economic rights. Legal doctrine with regard to these rights provides a framework 
for interpreting the state responsibility.
Before proceeding with this analysis, in paragraph 3 we explain how these rights 
developed within a historical context in order to demonstrate the social rationale 
behind their implementation and the process of their constitutional recognition 
as fundamental rights. Paragraph 4 refers to the modern method of diff erentiating 
the state obligations, i.e. the obligation to respect, the obligation to promote and 
the obligation to fulfi l. 
In paragraph 5 we move on to the second part of the central research question, 
dealing with concrete legal standards. Here the quest is to link the framework of 
state-obligations to the principles underlying the right to social security. It was 
tempting to deduce these principles from various legal sources. But it is diffi  cult 
to do so without resorting to subjective arguments and ‘cherry picking’ the legal 
rules in support of these arguments. As a result, we decided to propose our own 
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basic principles, which we then examined in order to fi nd out to what extent they 
are actually supported by concrete legal standards. Th e concrete legal standards 
have been drawn from various sources, i.e. both international and regional 
instruments (such as conventions of the ILO and the Council of Europe), 
domestic legislation, case law and doctrine. Th e article concludes in paragraph 6 
with a number of refl ective remarks about our legal approach to defi ning social 
security as a public interest.
2. THE PUBLIC INTEREST AS A LEGAL CONCEPT
Th e term ‘public interests’ and its equivalents ‘general interests’ and ‘public good’ 
play a major role in legal argumentation. Th e concept seems to be particularly 
relevant in case law when courts feel a need to create room for exceptions to 
established legal rules. Th us, for example, legal doctrine dictates that indirect 
discrimination is prohibited unless it is objectively justifi ed by the public 
interests. Likewise, in European Union law, the public interest test is a means of 
allowing exceptions to the free market regulation. Under this test, trade 
restrictions may be excusable when they are ‘aimed at an overriding reason of 
public interest’. Similarly some fundamental freedom rights for citizens may be 
restricted in the light of the public interest.
When we look at these examples the concept of the public interest each time 
refers to some collective good which superimposes itself over private interests. 
Th is makes the concept potentially interesting for our subject: can social security 
be considered to be such a collective good and if so what are the legal 
consequences of this qualifi cation? Case law on this issue, especially that 
produced by the EU Court of Justice, is indeed helpful when answering this 
question. For example, case law kept the Dutch second pillar pension schemes 
out of the claws of the EU internal market regulation, which threatened to 
undermine the solidarity bases of these schemes.1 It equally put a halt to full 
unbridled intra-community competition in the area of health care, threatening 
to undermine the local hospital infrastructure.2 Th ese are just two examples of 
important public interest exceptions which the ECJ formulated vis-à-vis social 
security schemes.
Yet despite the relevance of the case law, we should not overestimate the relevance 
of a legal ‘public interest doctrine’ for our subject. Th e concept is a typical example 
of an open norm, the meaning of which varies according to the legal regime, the 
1 ECJ J 21 September 1999, C-115/97 to C-117/97 (Brentjens); ECJ 21 September 1999, C-67/96 
(Albany International BV) and ECJ 21 September 1999, C-219/97 (Drijvende bokken).
2 See for example ECJ 13 May 2003, C-385/99, (Müller-Fauré and Van Riet).
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specifi c context of the case and nature of government policies. Th is probably 
explains why there seems to be some reluctance amongst legal scholars to 
examine the nature of the public interest. Case law is complex when it relates to 
the boundaries between free market regulation and social values, generally those 
of the ECJ.3 Recent attempts by the European Commission to develop criteria for 
determining ‘social services of general economic interest’ have also ground to a 
halt.4 It is for this reason that we have decided to discard the public-interest-
doctrine as a tool for answering our research question and instead to embrace the 
concept of state responsibility in relation to socio-economic fundamental rights, 
as this has been historically developed and recognized by international and 
constitutional law. Th us, for the purposes of this contribution ‘public interests’ 
refer to interests for which states bear responsibility. As we will see in the next 
paragraphs the legal doctrine surrounding socio-economic rights is useful for 
identifying such responsibilities in the area of social security.
3. THE HISTORICAL FOUNDATION OF SOCIAL 
SECURITY AS A SOCIOECONOMIC RIGHT
3.1. THE ‘SOCIAL QUESTION’ OF THE 19TH CENTURY
Th e legal concept of social rights emerged in the 19th century in Europe5 not as a 
response to market failure, but as an institutional answer to the ‘social question’: how 
could the market and the representative, timocratic6 political system be made 
compatible with the extension of political and social rights, without a socialist 
revolution?7 Th e appearance of a powerful working class in continental Europe 
resulted in the formulation of new claims toward the state. Within this context, the 
recognition of enforceable social rights was one of the main demands of the social 
revolution of 1848 in France, especially with regard to the rights to work and 
education. However, this revolutionary current has not prevailed. Th e fi nal version 
of the related article 13 of the French Constitution of 1848 replaced the initially 
proclaimed right to work by the freedom to work. Although it also guaranteed free 
primary education and the right to social assistance (art. 8), the conservative majority 
3 Cf. Barnard 2000, p. 39–46.
4 Communication of the European Commission 26 April 2006, COM (2006) 117def. Th e 
commission has decided to no longer pursue this project.
5 Already in 1793, Robespierre had proposed to the Convention a Bill of Rights which 
recognized as legally enforceable the rights to work and to social assistance and which treated 
the right of property not as a natural or absolute right, but as one limited by the law and the 
needs of other people.
6 In UK – the most democratically developed country of this century – only 1.8% of the 
population had electoral rights before the Reform Act of 1832 and just 2.7% aft er it. In 1867 
and 1884 the respective fi gures have been 6.4 and 12.1%. See Zakaria 2003, p. 80.
7 Preuss 1986, p. 152.
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had made clear that the related state obligation was not a legal, but a moral one. 
Th iers, who two decades later was to quell the Commune of Paris (1871), summarised 
the fi nal defeat of the quest for justiciability of social rights in these words:
it is important that social obligations remain a moral virtue, that is, they must be 
voluntary and spontaneous (…). If, actually, a whole class instead of receiving could 
command, it would look like a beggar who preys with a gun in his hand.’8
Th e conservative countercurrent, archetypically represented by the Bismarckian 
paradigm, tried to solve the ‘social question’ with the introduction of social 
insurance, in tandem with repressive measures, such as the laws against the trade 
unions (1854, preceding Bismarck’s chancellorship) and the socialist 
organizations (Sozialistengesetze, 1878–1890).9 Th is reformist alternative was 
ideologically reinforced by the ‘Christian Social teaching’ of the Catholic Church 
(die Katholische Soziallehre) and its fi rst important Encyclical on social rights, 
‘Rerum Novarum’ of Pope Leo XIII (15/5/1891). It is noteworthy that in Great 
Britain during this period the predominance of ‘laissez-faire’ individualistic 
values did not allow many alternatives to the failure of individual achievement 
other than charity and self-help.10 It is true that a reform of the old Poor Laws, 
the so called ‘Speenhamland system’, had been introduced in 1795, in an eff ort to 
appease the social tension and the ideological spread of revolutionary ideas. Th is 
‘system’ provided an allowance from the public treasury to all workers whose 
pay fell below the subsistence level, but its failure was already evident in the 
1830s. Th e Poor Law Commissioners’ Report of 1834 defi ned it as a ‘universal 
system of pauperism’ and ‘bounty on indolence and vice’.11 It is also true that the 
infl uence of the revolution of 1848 can be detected in the Medical Act of 1858;12 
and Disraeli had attacked the existing social legislation on the ground that it was 
relying on the ‘moral error’ that aid to the poor is more a charity than a right. 
Still, it was only aft er the Second World War and the universalistic reforms of 
Lord Beveridge, that the United Kingdom approached the European concept of 
the welfare state and the related rights.
8 Rapport de la commission sur la prévoyance et l’assistance publique, 1850. Cf. Lavigne 1946, 
p. 262.
9 King William I of Prussia, in speech introducing of the new social legislation to the Reichstag 
(17 November 1881), stressed that: ‘it is not a new, socialist element, but just the development 
of the modern State Idea (based on the Christian spirit) that the State, in addition to defence 
and the protection of vested rights, has also the obligation to contribute with positive actions 
to the welfare of all its subjects and especially the poor and the needy’. See Hentchel 1983, 
p. 333.
10 See Rimlinger 1971, p. 62.
11 Deane 1965, p. 144.
12 Vagero 1983, p.83.
Th e public interest and the welfare state: a legal approach
Intersentia 71
However, the introduction of social legislation in continental Europe did not 
signify, initially, the constitutional recognition of socio-economic rights on equal 
footing with traditional rights.13 Th e constitutionalisation of the social 
obligations of the state is, predominantly, a 20th century phenomenon.14 At this 
time, social rights were established on the basis of socialisation of risk, through 
the expansion of the insurance technique, and not as fundamental rights of the 
same nature as traditional liberties. In any case, social rights are not ‘socialist 
rights’.15 Th ey simply provide the legal basis for a political intervention in the 
economic sphere, in order to alleviate major inequalities, without infringing the 
primacy of the market.16 Th ey constitute an interface between the market, the 
state and the family, institutionalizing a kind of national solidarity that does not 
threaten market relationships. Hence, they do not constitute a breach of the 
capitalist system, but rather a breach within it. Th ey have created a diff erent kind 
of market to the supposedly self-regulated liberal one,17 defi ned later by the 
conservative Ordoliberalists in Germany as the ‘social market economy’.
3.2. THE CONSTITUTIONALISATION OF SOCIOECONOMIC 
RIGHTS
Th e incorporation of social rights in constitutions became widespread in Europe 
in the aft ermath of World War I. Th is was mainly the outcome of a political 
compromise between liberal and social-democrat political forces (refl ected also 
in the early legislative work of the International Labour Organization, founded 
in 1919), which aimed at the insulation of western European societies from the 
infl uence of the October Revolution. Even before the emblematic Constitution of 
the Weimar Republic (1919),18 social rights were included in the Constitution of 
13 Donzelot 1988, p.403–404.
14 Sporadic references to social rights, primarily to the right to education, were included also in 
liberal Constitutions of the 19th Century, such as the Constitutions of Portugal (1838) and of 
Denmark (1849).
15 Cf. Schmitt 1970, p. 169, where he characterized social rights as ‘essentially socialist rights’.
16 Cf. Off e 1984, p. 61.
17 Supposedly, because there was never such a thing as a completely self-regulated market. Even 
proponents of the ‘spontaneous order of the market’, like Hayek, are not against the regulation 
of the market according to criteria of economic effi  ciency, not social justice, such as the 
removal of discriminations. Cf. Hayek 1980, p. 141.
18 Th e Constitution of Weimar was the fi rst European Constitution to contain an elaborate list 
of social rights (art. 151–165), including an absolutely unique, both then and now, provision 
(art. 162), that proclaimed it the duty of the State to act on the international level to secure a 
minimum of social rights to the workers of the world. Article 151 § 1 incorporated a ‘Social 
State’ clause: ‘Th e economy has to be organized based on the principles of justice, with the 
goal of achieving life in dignity for everyone. It is within these confi nes that economic liberty 
is protected. Legal force is permissible to realize threatened rights or in the service of 
superseding demands of public welfare. Freedom of trade and industry will be realized 
according to a Reich law’ However, the theory and the case-law interpreted these provisions 
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Finland (1919) and a number of other constitutions followed: Estonia (1920), 
Poland (1921), Italy (1927), Greece (1927), Portugal (1933), Spain (1931, 1938) and 
Ireland (1937).
Although the social provisions of these constitutions were usually not enforceable 
in the courts, their enshrinement in the Constitution signifi ed that social policy 
was no longer left  to the discretion of the legislator. Th is fundamental 
constitutional decision to give to social provisions supra-legislative force was 
revised again in the aft ermath of World War II, via a new compromise between 
social-democratic and Christian-democratic parties (with the exception of 
Scandinavian countries, where the dominant social-democratic parties took shape 
along a more egalitarian and inclusive welfare model, based on social citizenship.)
Th e constitutional recognition of social rights implied a change in the functions 
of the State: instead of regulating the market only on the basis of norms that 
derive from the private law of contract, property and tort,19 the European state 
uses, in addition:
political power to supersede, supplement or modify operations of the economic 
system in order to achieve results, which the economic system would not achieve on 
its own (…) guided by other values than those determined by open market forces.20
Th is ‘market-correcting’ function21 reverberates the words of Abbé Sieyès, that 
the citizens have a right to demand from the state everything it can do for them.22
In order to defi ne this new type of polity, German legal theory has developed the 
concept of the ‘Social State’ (Sozialstaat), enshrined in article 20 of the 
Fundamental Law. Th e term is now widely used throughout Europe, as a 
fundamental normative and organizational general principle of the Constitution, 
on a par with the Rule of Law. Indicative of its continental acceptance is the fact 
that the majority of the new democracies of Central and Eastern Europe have 
incorporated a similar clause in their Constitutions.23 Nearly all countries in 
as mere policy directives, deprived of any legal validity, without the intervention of the 
legislator. See Schmitt 1970, p. 169.
19 Cf. Hayek 1980, p. 141.
20 Marshall 1975, p. 15. Marshall was referring to social policy in general, but his description 
defi nes very precisely also the basic functions of the social state principle.
21 Cf. Deakin & Browne 2003, p. 28.
22 ‘Il suffi  t de dire que les citoyens en commun ont droit à tout ce que l’Etat peut faire en leur 
faveur’. Sieyès 1939, p. 70.
23 Th is radically diff erent understanding of the state’s role is dominant in the public opinion 
both in ‘old’ and ‘new’ Europe. Hence, in the last poll of Eurobarometer, a vast majority of 
citizens of the new Democracies of Central and Eastern Europe agree with the proposition 
that ‘there is a need for more equality and social justice even if this means less freedom for the 
individual’. Poll carried out between 6 September and 10 October 2006, by TNS Opinion & 
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Europe – with the most notable exception being the United Kingdom – are social 
states, either comprising an explicit ‘Social State’ clause in their Constitutions,24 
or an analytical enumeration of social rights,25 or both.26
Hence, the ‘Social State’ can be used as a distinct terminus technicus, not 
interchangeable with the term ‘Welfare State’: the latter is a descriptive concept, 
which denotes the universal type of state which emerged in all developed 
countries in the 20th century, as a response to functional necessities of the 
modern capitalist economy. On the other hand, the ‘Social State’ is a normative, 
prescriptive principle, which defi nes a specifi c polity, where the State has the 
constitutional obligation to assume interventionist functions in the economic 
and social spheres.27 In this sense, the USA or Australia are ‘welfare states’ but 
not ‘social’ ones, as social policy therein has no constitutional foundation. Recent 
empirical qualitative studies show that, despite the greater emphasis on activation 
and individual responsibility associated with the pressure of globalization, real 
diff erences in welfare values remain between social and liberal welfare states.28
Moreover and more importantly, the Social State does not entail only the 
constitutional protection of social rights, but a whole series of new functions for 
public power that are specifi c to it and alien to the liberal state.29 Social States are 
not solely obligated to abstain from the violation of fundamental rights, (the 
traditional ‘negative’ function of rights); they are also subject to a compelling, 
positive obligation to protect against infringement by third parties and to fulfi l, 
i.e. to take the appropriate measures to ensure the actual implementation of all 
rights.30 In this framework, the minimum core of welfare protection is beyond 
the scope of the powers of both the legislature and the administration, no longer 
Social, a consortium created between Taylor Nelson Sofres and EOS Gallup Europe, accessible 
at <http://ec.europa.eu/public_opinion/archives/eb/eb66>. See the Preamble of the 
Constitution of Bulgaria and art. 1 para 1 of the Constitutions of Croatia and FYR of 
Macedonia, 2 of Slovenia, 6 para 1 of Russia.
24 As in article 20 para 1 of the German Constitution, art. 1 of the Constitution of France, art. 1 
para 1 of the Constitution of Spain, art. 2 of the Constitution of Portugal, art. 25 of the 
Constitution of Greece.
25 See, e.g., the Constitutions of Belgium (art. 23), Italy (art. 2–4, 31, 32, 35–38, 41, 45, 46), 
Luxembourg (11, 23, 94), Netherlands (19, 20, 22) Greece (21, 22), Spain (39–52, 129, 148, 149), 
Portugal (56, 59, 63–72, 108, 109, 167, 216).
26 Cf. Katrougalos 1996a, p. 278.
27 On the divergence of American and European versions of economic constitution see also 
Heller 1996, p. 149–165; Katrougalos 1998, p. 56 ff .
28 Cf. Taylor-Gooby & Martin 2010.
29 All these functions are not necessarily associated only with the Social State principle, but they 
can derive from other constitutional foundations, such as the fundamental value of dignity, 
the principle of legitimate expectations (Vertrauenschutzprinzip, principe de confi ance 
légitime),etc.
30 See more on that infra, on paragraph 4, cf. Koch 2005, p. 81.
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‘something that might be changed or abolished whenever the administration 
changes its political hue’ but a constitutive element of social citizenship.31
4. SOCIAL SECURITY AS A FUNDAMENTAL SOCIO
ECONOMIC RIGHT; STATE RESPONSIBILITY
Every person, as a member of society, has the right to social security (…); so 
proclaimed article 2 of the Universal Declaration of human rights in 1948. Since 
then the right has also been adopted in international and regional human rights 
instruments, such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (ICESCR, art. 9), the European Social Charter (ESC, art. 12), the 
EU Charter of Fundamental Rights (CFREU, art. 34), as well as in the national 
constitutions of a growing number of states. In Europe it is enshrined, one way 
or another, in the Preamble of the Constitution of France, article 23 of the 
Constitution of Belgium, 22 para 5 of the Greek Constitution, 30 of the 
Constitution of Czech Republic, 75 of the Constitution of the Kingdom of 
Denmark, 28 of the Constitution of Estonia, 41, 47 and 50 of Spain, 3 and 45.4 of 
the Constitution of Ireland, 31, 32 and 38 of the Constitution of Italian, 9 of the 
Constitution of Cyprus Appendix D – Part II – Rights and Fundamental 
freedoms, 109 and 111 of the Constitution of Latvia, 38, 52 and 53 of the 
Constitution of Lithuania, 11 of the Constitution of the Grand Duchy of 
Luxembourg, 17, 60 and 70E of the Constitution of Hungary, 17 of the 
Constitution of Malta, 20 of the Constitution of Netherlands, 67, 68, 71 and 75 of 
the Constitution of Poland, 59, 63 and 72 of the Constitution Portuguese, 13, 50, 
51 and 78 of the Constitution of Slovenia, 39 and 40 of the Constitution of Slovak 
Republic, 19 of the Constitution of Finland.
Th ere is much confl icting opinion about the meaning of the right to social 
security as a fundamental right (and socio-economic fundamental rights in 
general).32 On the one hand there are ‘optimists’ who believe that with some 
eff ort these rights can be given a concrete meaning. It could be argued that the 
social state principle dictates that the state should determine the scope of the 
social protection system and act as a direct provider of social security as a last 
resort, when the market fails. Merely regulating and facilitating the eff orts of 
others is not enough. Th e rationale behind this is that benefi ts should be made 
available to everyone as a social right and this availability should not be 
jeopardized by the contingencies of the market.33 Others suggest that socio-
31 Waldron 1993, p. 271–273.
32 Most literature refers to socio-economic rights in general, and not specifi cally to the right to 
social security. For an exception, see Riedel 2007.
33 Katrougalos 2009, p. 24.
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economic fundamental rights, including the right to social security are or should 
be individually justiciable, in the sense that they should give rise to a right to 
concrete benefi ts. Proponents of this viewpoint can cite the increasing body of 
case law of constitutional courts in countries such as India and South Africa in 
which individual claims under socio-economic fundamental rights have been 
recognized.34
Yet, on the other side of the scale there are ‘pessimists’ who maintain that most 
of the socio-economic fundamental rights are merely amorphous policy 
guidelines, the legal meaning of which is shrouded in mist: too vague, too 
undetermined and too political. It is up to the legislator to decide how to organise 
social security and judges should respect the choices that are made.
Between these two extremes, there is one thing that cannot easily be contested 
and that is state responsibility. Th e inclusion of the right to social security in an 
internationally binding norm infers that it is the state which must be held 
accountable for the progress a country makes in the social security fi eld. It is a 
simple consequence of international law under which states are legally bound to 
the treaty obligations they have adhered to. It would, for diff erent legal reasons, 
also be the consequence of inclusion of social security in the national 
constitutions.35
In theory, state responsibility does not imply that the right to social security 
prescribes a specifi c division of powers between the state, society at large and the 
individual, let alone that it presupposes that the state should organize or 
administer social security itself. It can equally be contended that it should not be 
the state but rather society as a whole that should take primary responsibility, as 
classic fundamental rights tend rather to restrict the possibility of state 
interference. From this point of view it is more plausible to interpret the right to 
social security as implying that the right to social security could also be 
implemented by means of contractual rights and obligations between citizens 
and private parties, under the supervision of public power. Whatever may be said 
about this, it must be accepted that total state abstinence is no longer an option. 
Social security is a public concern and when the system fails to deliver, it is only 
the state that can be held accountable. Acceptance of social security as a 
constitutionally or/and internationally binding fundamental right makes it a 
compelling public interest.36
34 For a discussion of this case law, see the various contributions in Coomans 2006.
35 Pieters 1985, p. 448–449; Katrougalos 1996b.
36 It is interesting to connect this observation to the events that followed the recent credit 
crunch. As a result of the combination of the collapse of the stock markets and low interest 
rates, many privately run pension schemes have run into trouble. States in all the continents 
which rely heavily on such schemes have reacted to this by taking measures, oft en in the form 
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What are the legal obligations arising from state responsibility? According to the 
ICESCR the answer is that states ‘must take steps (…) by all appropriate means 
(…) to achieve progressively the full realization of the rights to the maximum of 
its available resources’.37 While some refer this matter entirely to the national 
political decision maker (bringing the matter at least within the public domain), 
others argue in favour of a further concretization of the obligations by 
independent experts and judges. In the meanwhile various attempts have been 
made to clarify the legal nature of socio-economic rights.38
Since the 1980s of the previous century a number of scholars have started to 
diff erentiate between various types of obligations that may arise from socio-
economic fundamental rights: the obligation to respect, the obligation to promote 
and obligation to fulfi l.39 Th is method, which is increasingly gaining acceptance 
among human rights experts, turns out to be relevant for our subject. In the 
introductory chapter of this book we rejected the public- private dichotomy for 
social security because it does not take into account the various shades of grey 
that exist between these two extremes: the state plays a variety of roles, supported 
by a great number of diff erent instruments. As we will see, the diff erentiated 
model of obligations is suitable for social security because it takes this variety 
into account.
At this stage reference should be made to an interesting document produced by 
the Commission of Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (CESCR), the General 
Comment No. 19. Th e CESCR is the committee of human rights specialist which 
guards over the application of the ICESCR. In order to clarify the socio-economic 
fundamental rights contained in the Covenant, the CESCR has started to develop 
so called general comments. For a long time, the right to social security as 
contained in article 9 of the Covenant, had not been the subject of a general 
comment, but the latest General Comment No. 19, adopted in November 2008 
made an end to this.40
Th e general comment makes use of the distinction between the three types of 
obligations. Without entering into the full contents, let us take a brief look at the 
outcome of the reasoning.
of strengthening the public elements within the pension system as a whole. For an overview 
of measures that various state have taken in reaction to the credit crunch; cf. Katrougalos 
2009.
37 Art. 2(1) ICESCR.
38 For an offi  cial attempt by human rights experts: the Limburg principles on the implementation 
of the international covenant on economic social and cultural rights, Maastricht 1986; on the 
impact of these principles: Martin 1996.
39 For an overview of the literature: Sepúlveda 2003.
40 Th e document can be accessed on the internet: </www.unhcr.org/refworld/type,GENERAL,
CESCR,,47b17b5b39c,0.html>.
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(a) Obligations to respect
33. Th e obligation to respect requires that State parties refrain from interfering 
directly or indirectly with the enjoyment of the right to social security. Th e obligation 
includes, inter alia, refraining from engaging in any practice or activity that denies or 
limits equal access to adequate social security; arbitrarily interfering with self-help or 
customary or traditional arrangements for social security; or interfering with 
institutions that have been established by individuals or corporate bodies to provide 
social security.
So this is an unexpected outcome. Th e fi rst obligation of the state is to not 
negatively interfere in private social security but to respect its integrity. At fi rst 
sight it not easy to understand why a government would want to upset private 
social security arrangements, at least in a free and democratic society. But 
examples do exist. Th us we came across a recent ruling of the Canadian Supreme 
Court which overturned a ban on private health care insurance in the province 
of Quebec. Waiting lists in the obligatory universal health care services had 
induced some Canadian citizens to take out private insurance in order to be able 
to buy in preferential treatment. But in some Canadian provinces this was 
prohibited. Th e ban on private insurance was considered to be contrary to the 
right to life and personal integrity protected by the Quebec and Canadian 
Charter.41
(b) Obligations to protect
34. Th e obligation to protect requires State parties to prevent third parties from 
interfering in any way with the enjoyment of the right to social security. Th ird parties 
include individuals, groups, corporations and other entities as well as agents acting 
under their authority. Th e obligation includes, inter alia, adopting the necessary and 
eff ective legislative and other measures to restrain, for example, third parties from 
denying equal access to social security schemes operated by third parties or others, 
imposing conditions or providing benefi ts that are not consistent with the national 
social security system; or arbitrarily interfering with self-help or customary or 
traditional arrangements for social security.
35. Where social security schemes, whether contributory or non-contributory, are 
operated or controlled by third parties, States parties retain the responsibility of 
administering the national social security system and ensuring that private actors do 
not compromise equal, adequate, aff ordable, and accessible social security. To prevent 
such abuses an eff ective regulatory system must be established, which includes 
independent monitoring, genuine public participation and imposition of penalties 
for non-compliance.
41 Chaoulli v. Quebec, [2005] 1 S.C.R. 791.
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Th e general comments move on: not only should private social security be 
respected, its proper functioning must also be protected. A more active role for 
the state is born, albeit not as direct provider but as regulator.
Th e regulatory function is particularly relevant in the area of collective 
agreements, being an important source for (supplementary) social security 
entitlements and for employee benefi ts in general, in particular second pillar 
pension schemes. Th e conviction that the state must play an active regulatory 
and supervisory role in this area has become more widespread, particularly aft er 
the bad experiences some countries have had with the introduction of a funded 
private pension system. At fi rst sight such systems off er all sorts of advantages 
over public pay as you go schemes. Th e fi nancial burden is shift ed to another 
generation and funded systems include the promise of higher replacement rates. 
But there are also certain fl aws attached to funded private pensions. Th e levels of 
benefi t are dependent upon the return of investments which are not always 
prosperous and which may fl uctuate, giving rise to diff erences in entitlements, 
not only in time but also between funds. Also there is the risk of bad management 
and failing administration. Th ese risks have led to the belief that a shift  from 
public to private pension schemes must necessarily involve the introduction of 
strict and eff ective regulatory and supervisory machinery.42
(c) Obligations to fulfi l
36. Th e obligation to fulfi l requires States parties to adopt the necessary measures, 
including the implementation of a social security scheme, directed towards the full 
realization of the right to social security. Th e obligation to fulfi l can be disaggregated 
into the obligations to facilitate, promote and provide.
37 Th e obligation to facilitate requires the State to take positive measures to assist 
individuals and communities to enjoy the right. Th e obligation includes, inter alia, 
according suffi  cient recognition of this right within the national political and legal 
systems, preferably by way of legislative implementation; adopting a national social 
security strategy and plan of action to realize this right; ensuring that the social 
security system will be adequate, accessible for everyone and covers risks and 
contingencies, namely income security, access to health care and family support. 
Examples of such steps include establishing a contribution-based social security system 
or a legislative framework that will permit the incorporation of the informal sector.
38. States parties are also obliged to fulfi l (provide) the right when individuals or a 
group are unable, for reasons beyond their control, to realize that right themselves 
within the existing social security system with the means at their disposal. States 
parties will invariably need to establish social assistance or other non-contributory 
42 Cf. Holzmann & Hinz 2005. For the situation in the Balkan countries: Vonk 2007.
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schemes and/or provide support to those individuals and groups who are unable to 
make suffi  cient contributions for their own protection together with mechanism for 
the progressive coverage of all risks and contingencies.
Here, we fi nd the foundation of the welfare state as a whole. States are expected 
to develop a strategy or policy with regard to the welfare state. Th is is left  entirely 
up to the state’s discretion, except where it involves the minimal care for those 
without any protection: setting up a system of social assistance is mandatory. Th e 
latter is a typical consequence of this present state obligation theory: the 
obligation is far more intense when it comes to guaranteeing the bare essentials, 
for further entitlements it becomes more diluted.
It is important to bear in mind that the general comment is not a binding legal 
source. Even aft er having been offi  cially adopted by the CESCR, it does not 
qualify as a source of international law. For us the most important thing about 
the General Comment no. 19 is that it constitutes proof that it is possible to 
establish a normative framework for identifying state responsibility in social 
security with reference to the law. Th e general comment off ers a perfect 
illustration of what such a framework might look like.
5. SOCIAL SECURITY; SUBSTANTIVE LEGAL 
STANDARDS
Th e diff erentiated model is not specifi cally designed for social security but applies 
equally to other socio-economic fundamental rights. It is a framework in the 
formal sense of the word; the exact nature of the obligations depends on the 
substance of the rights involved.
When dealing with the right to social security, we meet a considerable problem. 
Th e meaning of this right cannot easily be determined: it does not say what social 
security is or which social security model should be adopted. As a result, we do 
not know exactly what must be respected, protected or fulfi lled. Indeed, it is 
doubtful that a universal model for social security could be developed anyway, 
or as the ILO puts it in its 2001-publication Social security, a new consensus:
Th ere is no single right model of social security. It grows and evolves over time. Th ere 
are schemes of social assistance, universal schemes, social insurance and public or 
private provision. Each society must determine how best to ensure income security 
and access to care. Th ese choices will refl ect their social and cultural values, their 
history, their institutions and their level of economic development43
43 ILO 2001, p. 2.
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While accepting that there is no single model for social security and that social 
security in itself is a relative concept, an attempt could be made to formulate a 
list of core principles which do have more universal acclaim. Once such a list is 
established we can investigate to what extent the various principles are supported 
by concrete legal standards.
For the purposes of this article we propose a catalogue of seven core principles of 
social security, i.e.
1. Protection. Social security must provide adequate income protection. Th is 
assumes the existence of a system that provides protection against labour 
risks, such as unemployment and labour incapacity, and life risks, such as old 
age, excessive costs and, in the broadest sense of the term, poverty. Th e level 
of protection should ensure a decent standard of living.
2. Universality. Th e right to social security presupposes that the system is 
accessible to everyone, regardless of social position or professional category.
3. Inclusion. Th e system must be aimed at the citizen’s participation in society 
via paid employment, sheltered work places or in some other way.
4. Reliability. Th e social security system must be durable and reliable. Th is 
assumes a proper balance between a solid fi nancial basis and respect for 
accrued benefi t entitlements.
5. Solidarity. Social security can only be realized when there is a certain degree 
of support from the strong for the weak. Th e fi nancing of the system should 
at least partly be based on a collective responsibility of groups, in the widest 
sense employees, employers and the state and may for this purpose be 
rendered obligatory.
6. Equality and non-discrimination. Equality of treatment should co-exist with 
extra attention to vulnerable groups, such as the disabled, the chronically ill, 
and minorities. Th e system may furthermore not discriminate on grounds of 
gender, race, religion, etc.
7. Good governance. Th e system on which social security entitlements are based 
must be managed and implemented effi  ciently, transparently and without 
prejudice. Good governance also infers that the rights and obligations are 
vested in law.
Th ese principles have diff erent characteristics. In fact there are three groups. 
Principles one, two, three and four (protection, universality, inclusion and 
reliability) constitute objectives (as in French: fi nalités); numbers fi ve and six 
(solidarity and equality) constitute intrinsic values; the last principle (good 
governance) could be considered as pre-conditional.
Th ese seven principles are our list of ‘outcomes’ for which the state bears 
responsibility. Although these principles are only proposals, the result of 
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theoretical generalisation, each of them can be related to more rules that are 
clearly vested in international law or national constitutional norms. Th is is the 
objective of the last phase of our method: connecting principles to legal 
standards.
5.1. PROTECTION
Th ere are various ways that the principle of adequate protection can be identifi ed 
with legal standards of supra-legislative force. First of all the ‘core content’ of the 
right to social security can be taken into account. Th e core content can be seen as 
a method of interpreting socio-economic fundamental rights which is based 
upon the notion that each right contains a hard nucleus that is not to be 
negotiated under any circumstances.44 Th e CESCR perceives the core content of 
social security as the minimum level of social security that is essential for 
acquiring water and sanitation, foodstuff s, essential primary health care and 
basic shelter and housing, and the most basic forms of education, which must be 
accessible on a non-discriminatory basis. In matters between life and death, it 
should be possible to establish this bottom line proposed by the CESCR. 
Although it may not be much it is a least something to fall back upon.
Secondly, it can be argued that the notion of protection cannot be fi xed with 
reference to one specifi c standard, but that it depends on the circumstances of 
the case. Th is contextual interpretation would be similar to the so called 
‘reasonableness approach’ adopted by the South African Constitutional Court 
and which has led to its famous sequence of socio-economic fundamental rights 
cases, dealing inter alia, with the bulldozing of townships without off ering any 
support or compensation to its inhabitants (Grootboom-case), providing 
medicine to children with HIV/AIDS (TAC-case) and the right of permanent 
resident non-citizens to the South African old age grant (Khosa-case).45 In 
general, the incipient case law relating to socio-economic fundamental rights of 
both national courts and international authorities, such as the European 
Commission of Social Rights, can be seen as a treasure chest for legal 
interpretations of protective standards provided by the right to social security.
Th irdly, reference can be made to minimum social security standards adopted by 
the ILO and the Council of Europe. Th ere are a large number of such ILO 
instruments, both recommendations and Conventions. Th e mother of all 
conventions is considered to be Convention No. 102 which contains minimum 
standards for all branches of social security (but excluding social assistance). 
44 Cf. de extensive study of Young 2008.
45 Liebenberg 2007; Olivier, Smit & Kalula 2003, p. 87–90.
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Other conventions cover specifi c branches, such as industrial accidents and 
occupational diseases (No. 121), invalidity and old age (No. 128), and 
unemployment (No. 164). Besides these there are social security standards as 
part of categorical conventions which apply to specifi c categories of workers, 
such as seamen and migrant workers. Th e main instrument of this nature within 
the Council of Europe is the (revised) European Code on social security and, at a 
more general level, the European Social Charter. On the one hand these 
instruments contain sets of system requirements for each of the branches of 
benefi t, on the other hand they formulate minimum percentages of coverage and 
of benefi t levels. For instance, article 12 of the Revised European Social Charter, 
not only protects the right to social security as a fundamental social right, but in 
its paragraph 1 it that ‘adequate’ and ‘eff ective’ benefi ts are provided.46 Th e 
European Committee of Social Rights in its interpretation of the European Social 
Charter, considers that the level of income-replacement benefi ts should be fi xed 
such as to stand in ‘reasonable proportion to the previous income and it should 
never fall below the poverty threshold defi ned as 50% of median equivalised 
income and calculated on the basis of the Eurostat at-risk-of-poverty threshold 
value’.47
Fourthly, the notion of protection can be given a more concrete meaning when 
judged in the light of the legal obligations which exist in the various national 
countries and, especially in Europe, in the light of social state principle. Just to 
give an example: when in the Netherlands the minimum level of subsistence is 
associated with 90% of the so-called social minimum, which in itself is derived 
from a percentage of the minimum wage (depending on household status), this 
might be considered as a point of reference for defi ning the minimum level of 
protection under the right to social security. Th is would infer that it would be 
contrary to the principle of protection to exclude certain groups from this 
minimum subsistence level, at least when there is no objective justifi cation for 
doing so. In a similar line, the German case-law, considers that a social minimum 
with respect to a decent living, an ‘Existenzminimum’ stems from the Social 
State’s clause and the fundamental principle of human dignity, in relation to the 
right of life.48
46 Conclusions XVI-1, Statement of Interpretation on article 12, p. 11.
47 Conclusions XVIII-1 (Greece) p. 13, Conclusions XVIII-1 (United Kingdom), p. 520. In the 
latter, the Committee found the United Kingdom not to be in conformity with article 12§ 1 of 
the Charter on the grounds that at least for single persons the level of the Statutory Sick Pay, 
the Short-Term Incapacity Benefi t, and the contributory JSA are manifestly inadequate. On 
the contrary, it considered the level of the old-age pension to be above the poverty threshold 
as a consequence of the compulsory second tier, the State Earned Related Pension, which is 
meant to complete the fi rst tier, the Basic State Pension, and the introduction of the 
Stakeholder pension.
48 See art. 2 I of the German Constitution and BVerfGE 40, 121, (133), 82, 60 (80); 110, 412 (445), 
cf. also the recent decision on the Lisbon Treaty, BVerfG, 2 BvE 2/08 of 30 June 2009 and the 
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However, the most striking relevant jurisprudence is a series of decisions of the 
Hungarian Constitutional Court, which in 1995 unanimously rejected 
26 provisions of an austerity package of social security reform.49 Part of these 
judgments is related to the concept of ‘legal certainty’. However, the Court also 
established that the right to social security contained in article 70/E of the 
Constitution entails the obligation of the State to secure a minimum livelihood 
through all of the welfare benefi ts necessary for the realization of the right to 
human dignity.50 In one of its early decisions, the Constitutional Court pointed 
out that the State is obliged to organize and operate a public system of social 
security.51 Its further obligations in respect of the social security of its citizens 
are defi ned in a general manner by the provisions of article 70/E (1) of the 
Constitution. Th e legislature has a relatively great amount of liberty in 
determining the methods and degrees by which it enforces these constitutionally-
mandated state goals and social rights. Th is liberty is not, however, unlimited,52 
as the welfare benefi ts may not be reduced to below a minimum level. Th e right 
to social security entails the obligation of the State to secure a minimum 
livelihood and not to reduce the benefi ts below the level necessary for the 
realisation of the right to human dignity.53
It is oft en argued that the notion of adequate protection goes further than 
providing a minimum subsistence level alone. Benefi ts should stand in a 
‘reasonable proportion’ to the previous earnings of a person. When it comes to 
social insurance schemes which qualify as income replacement benefi ts, this 
point of view is supported by the relevant minimum standard conventions of the 
ILO and the Council of Europe.
5.2. UNIVERSALITY
Th e right to social security presupposes that the system is accessible to everyone, 
regardless of social position or professional category. Th is is recognised in 
article 22 of the Universal Declaration of human rights and fundamental 
freedoms which stipulates that everyone has the right to social security ‘as a 
member of the society’. Th e vehicle of bringing social security to everyone is the 
national state. Th is infers that the universal acclaim is not an absolute one. Illegal 
decision of 9 February 2010 on the validity of social assistance benefi t levels 1 BvL 1/09, 1 BvL 
3/09, 1 BvL 4/09.
49 Decision AB, 43/1995 (VI. 30.), cf. also the Decisions 32/1991 (VI. 6.) AB, 26/1993 (IV. 29.) AB 
42/2000 (XI. 8.) AB. Cf. Schwartz 2000, p. 92 ff .; Ferge & Tausz 2002, p. 176–199; Czúcz & 
Pintér 2002; Barr 2005.
50 Decision 32/1998 (VI. 25.), Decision 42/2000 (XI. 8.) AB.
51 Decision 32/1991 (VI. 6.) AB, at 163.
52 Decision 26/1993 (IV. 29.) AB, 196 at 199–200.
53 Decisions 43/1995 (VI. 30.) AB, 42/2000 (XI. 8.) AB.
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immigrants, who are formally excluded from state membership, are oft en 
excluded from social security and international law does little or nothing to 
come to their rescue.54 Also there are still many states where a fully fl edged social 
security system has simply not yet come into being. 50% of the world population 
is not covered by any formal system of social security at all. Th e extension of 
social security to larger groups of the population of the third world remains a 
major challenge.55 ILO minimum standards are hardly ratifi ed by the poorer 
countries. Th us also the universal acclaim of these standards is not fully realised 
in practice.
It has been argued that this challenge can be realised better by a new social 
security instrument dealing with minimum subsistence schemes, than by 
increasing the number of ratifi cations under ILO Convention 102. Th is idea has 
been picked up by the ILO which is currently contemplating the possibility of 
developing a separate convention for a so called social security fl oor.56 Th is kind 
of fl oor could be achieved by means of a convention that stipulates regulations 
for the most essential forms of support. Th e following are currently being 
considered in this context: basic healthcare, family benefi ts that allow children 
to attend school, focused programmes for work and support for the poorest of 
the poor, and a basic pension system for those who are no longer able to work. 
However, this is not true only for the developing countries. In the USA, for 
instance, President Obama’s Health bill which will provide coverage to 31 million 
uninsured people, will still leave 23 million uninsured in 2019.57 In the USA 
social security is not recognized as being a constitutional imperative. Th e 
situation is diff erent in Europe. In Europe, the constitutional protection of social 
security, in tandem with the Social State principle, entails, by its nature, the 
universality of scope of its implementation as a right of social citizenship.
5.3. INCLUSION
Th e inclusion principle of social security has regained much attention ever since 
governments have embraced the idea of the ‘activating welfare state’. Many policy 
documents stress the need of integrating social security benefi ciaries into the 
society. Yet, the ‘activating welfare state’ as a legal concept has rarely been 
54 Cf. Vonk 2002, p. 77–93. For a positive exception see for see the decision of ECSR of 
20 October 2009 in the collective complaints procedure of Defense for Children against the 
Netherlands, No. 47/2008. Th is decision is however not legally binding, within the strict sense 
of the word.
55 Cf. ILO 2001.
56 See, among others, Cichon & Hagemeyer 2007, p. 169–196.
57 According to estimates of the Congressional Budget Offi  ce, see R. Pear, Senate Passes Health 
Care Overhaul on Party-Line Vote, New York Times, 24 December 2009.
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examined.58 And when examined, the conclusion is that a fully fl etched right to 
integration or a legal doctrine on activation has not yet emerged.59
Despite these misgivings, two things must be pointed out. Firstly, the principles 
of social security, or indeed social security as a public interest, are not only 
refl ected in the law by means of individual rights, but also by obligations. 
Obviously, obligations are as much part of the legal sphere as rights. It can well 
be argued that the obligation to be available and accept work is a necessary 
consequence of the reciprocity principle; it may not be nice for the individual, 
but it is in the interest of the society at large.
Secondly, even when solely focussing on rights it should be pointed out that the 
principle of inclusion is not entirely without legal protection. Before the advent 
of the new activating policies, the right to work emerged as a fundamental right. 
It is adopted in the national constitutions of many countries, as well as in various 
international instruments on socio-economic fundamental rights, such as the 
European Social Charter (art. 1 ESC) and the International Covenant on social, 
economic and cultural rights (art. 6 ICESCR). It is not easy to catch the meaning 
of this right in a single phrase. It suggests that everybody should be able to earn 
his living in an occupation freely entered upon. On the one hand it presupposes 
a positive obligation of the state to strive for a high and stable level of employment 
and to provide and promote employment services and occupational training. On 
the other hand it displays characteristics of a freedom right where it protects the 
freedom of occupation. In the latter sense the right to work is related to the 
prohibition of slavery and forced labour, adopted in the other human rights 
instruments, such as the International Covenant on Economic, Social and 
Cultural Rights (art. 6) the European Convention on Human rights (art. 4) and 
conventions of the ILO.60
Nonetheless, it is true to say that the introduction of the new activating welfare 
policies have done little to enhance the right to work as a fundamental right. On 
the contrary, these policies, in particular if they fall under the heading of 
‘workfare’, have led to a negative shift  in the balance between obligations and 
rights of social security claimants. Workfare policies come with more 
discretionary powers for the administration, more stringent criteria and harsher 
sanctions and not with more rights for the persons involved. Protective legal 
standards are far and in between.61 In that sense one must indeed be careful not 
to associate these policies too closely with the inclusion principle anyway. It 
58 Sol et al. 2008, p. 163.
59 Noordam 1987; Sol et al. 2008, p. 217.
60 E.g. Forced Labour Convention, 1930 (ILO, No. 29).
61 Vonk 2009.
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would be better to seek protective legal standards elsewhere, for example in the 
area of rehabilitation services for the handicapped and the elderly.
5.4. RELIABILITY
While the long term sustainability of our social security schemes is primarily an 
economic issue, the balance between a solid fi nancial basis and respect for 
accrued benefi t entitlements is also a legal question. Th is question has entered 
the legal domain with the recognition that social security benefi ts should be 
considered as property rights. Social security benefi ciaries can claim protection 
under this right when governments interfere with existing rights, for example for 
budgetary reasons. It is then up to the judiciary to decide whether any 
infringement of accrued rights is legitimate on grounds of overriding arguments, 
such as the long term fi nancial viability of the system.
With respect to this issue, the case law of the German Bundesverfassungsgericht 
has particular relevance. Th is court has a long tradition in applying the 
constitutionally enshrined principle of peaceful enjoyment of property in the 
fi eld of social security benefi ts.62 In order to meet requirements prescribed by 
the German court, special transitional arrangements are required if social 
security schemes are negatively adjusted. In practice, these usually involve a 
gradual rather than an immediate implementation of adjustments, be it that in 
this process the legislator ultimately has discretionary powers in formulating 
such arrangements.
A more or less similar case law has evolved ever since the European Court of 
Human Rights has accepted that social security benefi ts fall under the concept of 
property rights, as protected by the fi rst protocol of the European Convention on 
Human Rights.63 Th ereby the European Court does not refrain from calling cut 
backs in social security into question when it feels that the government does not 
pursue legitimate aims.64
In all, the shaping of transitory regimes accompanying cut backs in social 
security is fi rmly subject to legal scrutiny.
62 Cf. Schuler 1988, p. 131–134.
63 ECrtHR 16 September 1996, Gaygusuz v. Austria, Koua Poirrez v. France of 30.9.2003, 
Wessels-Bergervoet v. Netherlands of 4.6.2002, Luczak v. Poland of 27.11.2007.
64 ECrtHR 12 October 2004, Άsmundsson v. Iceland.
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5.5. SOLIDARITY
Although solidarity can be voluntary, most oft en it is not. It is enforced by law. 
Th is can take various forms: obligatory statutory insurance, a duty to participate 
in collective or private schemes, or mere contribution or tax liability. Solidarity 
and forced participation in social security is very much an issue in European 
Community law where a line must be drawn between activities which come 
under the free trade and competition rules and activities which do not. Initially 
it seemed that only public social security institutions which operate purely on 
the basis of mandatory participation were not to be qualifi ed as commercial 
undertakings within the meaning of European Community law.65 Th e ECJ case 
of Fédération Française66 had made clear that as soon as institutions move 
outside this domain they run the risk of being qualifi ed as commercial 
undertakings. Such was the fate of the Caisse Centrale, the governing board of 
the French old age insurance scheme for farmers; the fact that this scheme was 
not mandatory but based upon optional participation played a major role in this 
decision. However, it has now become clear that the qualifi cation of a social 
security institution as an undertaking is not crucial for answering the question 
whether social security schemes should come under free trade and competition 
law. Especially the Brentjens cases have been of importance here.67 Th e question 
at stake in these cases was whether Dutch companies could be obliged to 
participate in occupational, second pillar pension schemes, even though this may 
run contrary to the freedom of movement of services and competition law. Th ese 
schemes are based upon collective labour agreements. Th e ECJ ruled that the 
Dutch pension funds are to be considered as undertakings for the purposes of 
competition law. But this did not aff ect the outcome of the case. As the Dutch 
pension schemes are based on solidarity and serve social objectives, the exclusion 
of these schemes from competition law was considered to be justifi ed on grounds 
of the general interest. Th e post-Brentjens case law has oft en been very tolerant 
vis-à-vis obligatory participation in non-statutory social security schemes. Th us 
in Pavlov68, the duty for medical specialists to participate in Dutch occupational 
pension schemes was considered to be justifi ed. In Van der Woude69 the ECJ 
had no diffi  culties in accepting that certain Dutch contribution facilities for 
employees are only payable to those who are affi  liated to a health insurance 
company chosen under a collective agreement. And in Cisal70 it was beyond any 
65 ECJ 17 February 1993, C-159/91 (Poucet en Pistre).
66 EC 16 November 1995, C-244/94 (Fédération Française des Sociétés d’Assurance v. Ministère 
de l’Agriculture et de la Pêche).
67 ECJ J 21 September 1999, C-115/97 to C-117/97 (Brentjens); ECJ 21 September 1999, C-67/96 
(Albany International BV) and ECJ 21 September 1999, C-219/97 (Drijvende bokken).
68 ECJ 12 September 2000,C-180/98 to C-184/98.
69 ECJ 21 September 2000, C-222/98.
70 ECJ 22 January 2002, C-218/00.
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doubt the Italian Institute for occupational accidents insurance could impose 
contribution liability on a building company. In short, all those claimants who 
hoped to circumvent their social security obligations by invoking EU free trade 
and competition law were let down by the ECJ. It is this type of case law which 
illustrates how much solidarity is alive in legal practice not only as a bone of 
contention for some individual claimants, but also as a point of reference in case 
law.
5.6. EQUALITY AND NON DISCRIMINATION
Th e legal basis of the principle of equality can be easily established. Equality 
has two objectives. Firstly, there is the core principle of non-discrimination. 
Any lawyer will recognize the meaning of this principle as an important 
safeguard against governmental arbitrariness. He will be aware of the diff erence 
between direct and indirect discrimination and recognize the importance of 
the so called objective justifi cation test on grounds of which discriminatory 
measures may be justifi ed by certain objectives, provided that these measures 
are necessary and proportionate. He will appreciate that direct discrimination 
on certain grounds such as race, gender and religion is prima facie suspect, 
while in matters of indirect discrimination judges retain considerable leeway to 
strike down discretionary provisions or allow such provisions to continue to 
exist.
Secondly, the principle of equality requires a policy that compensates 
inequalities and protects vulnerable groups. Th e legal standards that meet this 
part of the principle of equality can be found in the special treaties and 
conventions, such as the Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities 
or the Convention on the Rights of Children. International treaties protect all 
kinds of vulnerable groups that bear social risks that are hard to secure. In the 
Netherlands, the relevance of international law can be illustrated by the events 
that followed upon the privatisation of the public invalidity insurance scheme 
in 2004. As a result of this privatisation pregnant self-employed women were 
left  unprotected as no insurance company would off er them insurance (for the 
insurance companies it would be unwise to do so, as the risk of payment is 
100%). Hence, with regard to pregnant women the privatisation was regarded to 
be contrary to international treaties, such as the UN Convention on the 
protection of the rights of women. Th is claim was not awarded by the Dutch 
Courts on purely formal grounds, but nevertheless the legislator adjusted the 
system and created a special scheme for this group (the so-called ‘Self-employed 
and pregnant scheme’).
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5.7. GOOD GOVERNANCE
It could be considered quite controversial to include a principle such as good 
governance in our catalogue. It is potentially so large that it is capable of swallowing 
up all the others. However, here it is used in the narrow sense of the word. Social 
security is not only a matter of good intentions. It requires stable machinery for 
supervising claims and delivering benefi ts. For us the notion of good governance 
refers to the standards which defi ne a proper administration of the schemes. Such 
standards can be found in various laws, sometimes specifi cally designed for social 
security, sometimes of a more general nature. Th us, acts do not only regulate the 
legal status of the administrative institutions and their powers, but also the time 
limits within which decisions must be taken or benefi ts must be delivered, 
transparency rules, the protection of personal data, the involvement of interested 
parties, client participation, etc. As a matter of fact, the involvement of third 
parties in the administration, in particular employer and employee organisations 
is also prescribed by international minimum standards on social security.71
Good governance also presupposes that social security is governed by the rule of 
law. Th e rationale behind accepting the rule of law as one the principles of the 
right to social security, is related to the distinction between the pre-modern 
concept of charity and the contemporary concept of social security as a right. 
Th is diff erence has a legal connotation. Charity does not presuppose a legal 
obligation to provide benefi t; this is a matter of discretion for the charitable 
institution which is – at most – under a moral obligation to deliver. As a result in 
a charitable system there cannot be any corresponding right to a benefi t either 
for the recipient. Th e right to social security however presupposes a system under 
which persons are entitled to support. Th is suggests that the benefi ciary has some 
sort of legally defi ned position and there is access to justice, in particular in 
terms of the possibility to bring disputes before an independent tribunal which 
has the power to take binding decisions. Th is is the right to a fair and public 
hearing as laid down in article 6 of the European Convention on Human Rights 
and Fundamental Freedoms. Th e various aspects of the right to a fair and public 
hearing have been codifi ed in national and international rules; there is an 
abundance of case law (also in relation to social security disputes72) and a large 
body of legal doctrine. Th e subject is broken down into numerous sub-principles: 
access to court (full jurisdiction, legal aid, etc.), right to a fair trial (equality of 
arms, the right to adverse proceedings, etc.), public trial and public 
pronouncement of judgment, the reasonable time requirement, independent and 
impartial tribunal, the presumption of innocence, etc.
71 Cf. art. 72 ILO Convention No. 102.
72 Referring to the famous cases of the ECrtHR in Deumeland and Feldbrugge of 29 May 1986, 
appl. 8562/79 and 9384/81 and subsequent developments.
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Th e ‘rule of law’ eventually requires subordination to all human rights. Many of 
them have been proven to be of importance to social security, in particular the 
right to property, the prohibition of discrimination and the right to privacy.73
6. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In the introduction to this paper we raised the following question: does the law 
provide a basis for defi ning social security as a public interest and to what extent 
is this interest supported by concrete legal standards? As we have seen, legal 
doctrine relating to socio-economic rights supplies us with a formal framework 
of state responsibility and consecutive claims of the individual. Th e main thing 
that we have learned from this framework is that state responsibility for social 
security is predominant, although it does not rule out the involvement of private 
and collective arrangements. Under the doctrine of state responsibility any 
division of power is feasible as long as it realises the objectives of social security. 
At the same time, it must be realised that the responsibility lies on the shoulders 
of the state when it comes to providing the minimum protection. Th e state must 
at least provide a minimum subsistence level. Furthermore, a system of basic 
social insurance cannot do without a strong element of state interference either, 
as the necessary solidarity amongst the insured population presumably will not 
arise spontaneously. When dealing with additional benefi ts the state can more 
easily fall back upon a regulatory or facilitating role.
Our formal framework of state responsibility needs to be supplemented with a 
substantive notion of social security. For the purposes of this article seven 
principles were identifi ed which constitute the core of social security: protection, 
universality, inclusion, reliability, solidarity and good governance. Th ese 
principles have been put to the test as regards the presence of concrete legal 
standards. We have found that these principles are somehow supported by 
international or/and constitutional law, albeit some more than the others and in 
diff ering degrees of concreteness. For example, the principle of equality of 
treatment is much more part of the legal domain than the principle of inclusion.
Th e fact that social security principles are supported by the law is not surprising. 
Th ese principles constitute an expression of the public interest in social security 
and the law is an important instrument for safeguarding this interest. Th is 
should, as such, not be confused with a preference for public social security. Law 
is an instrument to regulate the public and the private sphere alike.
73 For the impact of the case law of the ECrtHR: Social security cases in Europe: Th e European 
Court of Human Rights (2007).
Intersentia 91
THE PUBLIC INTEREST AND THE 




If a few centuries of political philosophy would have to be summarized in a few 
words, one could say that it is a quest for the right balance between the concept 
of the individual as an autonomous being who is responsible for his own life 
course, and the concept of an individual as a social animal who can only give 
meaning to his life in relation to the community in which he lives. Th is quest for 
the right balance is particularly relevant in theory formation with regard to 
social security. Aft er all, social security can be described as the collectivisation 
of risk cover. Th us, by defi nition, social security transgresses the boundaries of 
individual interests. Th e essential question here is what the relationship between 
the individual and the public interest should be. Th is chapter addresses 
contemporary political-philosophical opinions regarding this issue.
Th is chapter looks at the role played by today’s political philosophy based on the 
proposition that as a result of what is known as the ‘Keynesian consensus’ of the 
1960s and 1970s, the reciprocity between the public and private interest gradually 
unravelled. Th ere was no longer any distinction between both types of interests 
because the respecting of private interests by the state was justifi ed by economic 
theories about state expenditure, such as social security payments. Private vices 
became public virtues, to misuse the words of Mandeville in this context. When, 
however, the Keynesian paradigm became stranded in the 1970s, the relationship 
between the private and the public interest had to be reassessed. However, the 
political philosophy of that time could no longer be of any help.
1 In writing this chapter more use has been made of the following general introductions: 
Fleischacker 2004; Hampsher-Monk 1992; Kymlicka 1990/2001; Scruton; 1981/1985; Wiser 
1983 and Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy. With a view to readability no more separate 
references shall be made to these works.
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If it can be said that the entire history of Western philosophy consists of a series 
of footnotes to Plato, with the same exaggeration the same can be said of the 
relationship between Rawls and modern-day political philosophy. It is however 
not an exaggeration to state that the publication of Rawls’ ‘A Th eory of Justice’ in 
1971 represented a revitalizing of normative political philosophy, which was 
much needed at that time.2 Th e book broke through a post-war academic 
stance, which left  no space for normative statements about political justice. Th e 
prevailing logical positivism dictated that statements were only meaningful if 
they could be empirically proved. Statements related to social justice obviously 
fell outside this category. In the United Kingdom Isaiah Berlin defended the 
plurality of values, between which, he argued, it was in principle impossible to 
choose.3 Subsequently the French structuralists, such as Foucault, announced 
the end of modern time. According to them the post-modern time no longer 
accommodated ‘big stories’ such as Marxism or Christianity.
Th is chapter is structured as follows. It starts with a brief description of the 
philosophical background of social security and the departure point of modern 
political philosophy. Th e following paragraphs explain contemporary philosophy. 
I would like to point out at this point that the issue ‘social security’ is not at the 
heart of the modern politico-philosophical debate. If social security is mentioned 
at all by the various theories, it is only indirect. As a consequence the following 
paragraphs do not focus on social security stricto sensu, but they examine what 
each separate movement has to say in general about the relationship between the 
public and private interest in the welfare state. First of all focus is on egalitarian 
liberalism, as described by Rawls. It will then become clear that ‘A Th eory of 
Justice’ cannot only be seen as a starting point for contemporary political 
philosophy, but also as a fi xed point. Other movements included in this chapter 
can be seen as a response to Rawls’ work, as they implicitly, but more oft en 
explicitly refer to it when launching other forms of egalitarian liberalism, such as 
the ‘luck egalitarism’ that is related to egalitarian liberalism but which emphasises 
individual preferences more strongly. Subsequently liberalism sees the emergence 
of a confl icting movement in the form of liberalism focussing more on self 
ownership. Th is is followed by an examination of the criticism aimed at the 
resurgence of liberalism. Harsh criticism of the liberals’ vision of the individual 
as the ultimate moral agent and the neutral state came from the communitarian 
quarter. Although communitarians can recognize individual normative interests 
(although they do not necessarily do so), the public interest is always given an 
intrinsic normative value.
2 Rawls 1971. In later years Rawls has his theory amended and adjusted to communitarian and 
pluralist critics. In 1999 he published a revised edition. In this chapter reference is only made 
to the 1971 edition.
3 Berlin 1958/2002.
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Th e analytical approach to the concept ‘public interest’ refers back to Rousseau. 
Th e theme of this chapter is the interpretation of the public interest by the 
respective philosophies: is the public interest the sum of each individual interest 
or should the public interest be summarized as the volonté générale as described 
by Rousseau. Th e contemporary debate between liberals and communitarians is 
therefore about the defi nition of the public interest. Where the liberals have a 
predominantly instrumental interpretation of the public interest – namely as an 
instrument for attaining individual goals –, in the communitarian approach the 
public interest is the end in itself, to which in extreme cases, individual 
aspirations are subordinate.
To conclude, a balance is made. At the end of this chapter the diff erent movements 
are examined alongside the developments in social security and an evaluation is 
made of how far the movements have visibly infl uenced these developments. Key 
here is the question how far they have been able to contribute to the need for a 
new look at the relationship between the public and the private interest in social 
security. Here the problem arises that the philosophies, as noted above, do not 
usually comment explicitly on the specifi c position social security has with 
respect to the public interest. Neither is it true that the developments in social 
security can be exclusively linked to a particular philosophy or, conversely, that a 
particular philosophy necessarily leads to one specifi c model of social security. 
Th is means that this balance is largely intuitive and exploratory in nature.
Finally, a note regarding the scope of the subject. Strictly speaking, given the 
subject of this book, the description of the modern political-philosophical 
movements could be limited to the opinions of them regarding the nature and 
scope of the public interest. It does not need to include the relevant legal justice 
theory. Th is would, however, render this chapter unreadable, and probably make 
it incomprehensible. For this reason I have taken the liberty to loosely combine 
remarks regarding the role of the public interest in the relevant theories with an 
examination of the content of these theories.
2. THE COMMUNITARIAN ROOTS OF SOCIAL 
SECURITY
Social security is rooted in communitarian ground.4 Bismarck’s 19th century 
Germany, to which the origins of social security can be traced, was dominated by 
Hegelian-Marxist ideas. As we know, Hegel dismisses Kant’s range of liberal ideas, 
in which the individual autonomy is central. Hegel saw the state as the vehicle of 
4 Much in this paragraph is derived from Dupeyroux 1966 and Vloemans 1980.
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the world spirit, to which individual interests were, when necessary, subordinate. 
Th e central role of the state, as formulated by Hegel, found its way into the social 
democratic body of thought via Marx. Of course there is a world of diff erence 
between Hegel’s and Marx’s concepts of the state. For the fi rst, the state was the 
objective, for Marx the state was merely a tool in the transition phase to 
communism, and would ultimately disappear. Both, however, agree that the state 
is the level at which the public interest is defi ned, whereby Marx assumes that the 
state ceases to be necessary once the public and private interest converges, a 
conclusion that has not been adopted by the social democrats. Th e Hegelian-
Marxist infl uence over social security in its infancy is expressed in its focus on 
the employee’s labour relationship. Individuals need labour in order for them to 
strike a balance with nature. A proportional reward is thereby required, or a 
reward in proportion to the labour performed, so that humans do not become 
‘alienated’ from nature. Th e public interest in social security aims to provide a fair 
– in other words a wage-related – reward during temporary periods of inactivity.
Catholic doctrine, the other communitarian source of social security, is also 
based on the fair wage.
‘… remuneration for labor is to be such that man may be furnished the means to 
cultivate worthily his own material, social, cultural, and spiritual life and that of his 
dependents, in view of the function and productiveness of each one, the conditions of 
the factory or workshop, and the common good’ (2nd Council of the Vatican, 
Constitution, on the church in the world of today, Gaudium et Spes, 7 Dec 1965).
Th e mere fact that the parties have reached agreement is not suffi  cient to morally 
justify the wage amount. But there has always been a strong strain against the 
concept of state in catholic (and protestant) teachings. Augustine views the state 
simply as being the result of the Fall, of the human desertion of God. Th e true 
state is Th e City of God. Th is argument continued to form the basis for the 
Catholic Church’s approach to the state, even aft er the ‘social issue’ also became 
an important issue for the Catholic Church in the second half of the 19th century. 
Th us the encyclical Rerum Novarum, published in 1891, also has strong 
sentiments against the state. In this encyclical the Church announced a 
corporatist vision of society, in which the public interest is represented by 
communities of interested parties. In shaping social policy the state was granted 
only a supplementary – subordinate – role. Th is resulted in many European 
states having many corporatist features, especially those in the southern catholic 
countries. But the Netherlands too has a corporatist tradition, in particular 
where implementation is concerned.5
5 But not only where implementation is concerned. Th e history of the Dutch old age insurance 
in the late nineteen fi ft ies is a good illustration of the clashing and merging of the state’s 
position with respect to these two forms of communitarianism. Th e social democrats worked 
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Although both these – continental – schools have diff erent views of the role of 
the state, they both allot the same task to the public interest. Th e public interest 
lies in determining the fair wage in return for labour and a wage-proportional 
benefi t during times of inactivity. Th is standard of justice prevails over individual 
interests. Aft er all, the fair wage is determined on the basis of material – non-
neutral – politico-philosophical notions of what a fair wage is, over which the 
autonomous individual has no infl uence.
Th e liberal infl uence over social security can be traced to the Anglo Saxon 
quarter. First and foremost we can point to utilitarians such as Jeremy Bentham 
and John Stuart Mill, who contributed substantially to the 19th century reforms 
in the United Kingdom. Th e reforms introduced by Roosevelt in 1929 in response 
to the Great Depression form a more recent contribution. Where the response on 
the continent to the Industrial Revolution was initially political, the measures 
introduced with the New Deal linked the elimination of poverty to measures to 
promote the recovery of the economy. Th e philosophical background to these 
measures was American pragmatism. Furthermore these measures were justifi ed 
by the up and coming economic theory of Keynes by which government 
expenditure on social security payments could be defi ned as a stimulus for the 
economy.6 For this reason the question as to the form given to the public 
interest (state or other forms of community) that arose on the European 
continent never became an issue in the United States. Th e New Deal led to a 
system of fl at-rate benefi ts – based on the subsistence minimum, not on notions 
of justice –, whereby the autonomy of the individual was respected by 
maintaining the freedom of communication between employee and employer. 
Th e public interest lay in the recovery of the economy, which would ultimately 
make it possible for the free market to once again resume its regulatory function. 
It is this form of social security that, through the Beveridge Report, infl uenced 
the West European systems established in the aft ermath of World War Two.
for the introduction of a state pension. Th e confessionals feared the intervention of the state 
would be too great and stuck to the vision of insurance upon which the classical Bismarck 
model is based. Th e compromise: a national insurance, whereby the full title of the benefi t 
entitlement is indeed the insurance, but whereby the coverage of this insurance extends to the 
entire population, including the non-working population. Th e implementation was in the 
hands of regional Councils of Labour, a council of employers and employees under the 
supervision of a chairman appointed by the state. In other words materially a state pension, 
but in the shape of an insurance scheme.
6 Keynes himself did not make explicit conclusions about the macro-economic consequences 
of social security expenditures. His main focus was the eradication of unemployment. For 
that reason it is not correct to point to Keynes as the ideologist of the modern social security 
concept. Andries Nentjes brought this to my attention. Keynes’ infl uence on Roosevelt 
however is undeniable. Moreover, the politician Keynes endorsed, and even promoted, the 
Beveridge report. Anyhow, the post-war political perception of Keynes’ economic theories 
provided a strong legitimacy to the extension of the welfare state.
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Th e social security systems that came into being aft er World War Two in the 
Western European welfare states are founded on an amalgamation of these 
philosophies, which embraced strict notions of justice with regard to the public 
interest. Little by little these ideological theories of justice made their way into 
the ‘Keynesian consensus’, which had begun to dominate the Western world. As 
stated earlier this consensus originated in the US in the thirties and was exported 
to West Europe in the shape of the Marshall Plan. Th e West European welfare 
state was able to develop by virtue of the Keynesian notion that government 
expenditure increases demand and thus promotes economic development. Th e 
Keynesian paradigm also included the merging of the private and public interest, 
or at least they became less easy to distinguish from each other. Aft er all the 
remuneration of private wishes and preferences through extensive social security 
schemes also benefi ted the public interest. In a nutshell, this ultimately led to the 
‘permissive society’ of the 1960s and 1970s, when the public interest ceased to be 
recognisable. Where social security was concerned this meant that the concept 
‘reciprocity’ was pushed into the background.
When the Keynesian paradigm faltered and the supply economy took over, 
national states were forced to scale-down their welfare state schemes. Th is called 
for a new defi nition of the public interest, which was necessary in order to 
redefi ne the division of responsibility between the state and its subordinates. Th e 
concept ‘reciprocity’ had to be re-examined. But, as we recalled in the 
introduction, the academic ideas in force at that time had no room for normative 
statements about political justice. Th e traditional ideologies of the welfare state 
had lost their resilience. Neither social democracy nor Christian democracy had 
an answer to the questions that arose following the demise of Keynes. Neither 
could traditional liberalism come up with an alternative. When Friedrich Hayek 
discussed this political movement in his famous article in 1973,7 he referred to 
it in the past tense. He observed that liberalism had only a few supporters left , 
and these were mainly to be found among economists (such as himself).
Th us the scene is set against which today’s philosophical debate takes place. As 
we have already seen, contemporary political philosophy presented itself in the 
form of ‘A Th eory of Justice’ by John Rawls in the early 1970s. Rawls had been 
expanding his theory since the nineteen fi ft ies and important parts of it were 
already published.8 However, these publications were largely unnoticed outside 
the circle of colleagues. It was not until the 1970s that conditions were right for 
his theory to take off .
7 Reprinted in Hayek 1982, p. 119–151.
8 Th e majority of these publications are contained in Rawls 1999.
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Rawls’ attempts to reconcile the concepts ‘freedom’ and ‘equality’ in a single 
normative theory, ‘A Th eory of Justice’ provided for the (European) need for a 
theory that once again gave substance to the concept ‘reciprocity’, without it 
being necessary to relinquish the principle fundaments of the welfare state. Both 
social democrats and liberals were (and are) inspired by this in their new 
approach to the public interest.9 Th is resulted in liberalism regaining its 
position as a political factor and in social democracy focusing more on the 
responsibility of the individual. Only among the Christian democrats did Rawls 
fail to gain support. For this his emphasis on the autonomy of the individual was 
too great.
3. EGALITARIAN LIBERALISM
Rawls was a reader and great admirer of Kant all his life.10 As a consequence his 
ideas regarding the individual and the public interest are also much infl uenced 
by him. Th is applies in particular with regard to his basic assumption that every 
individual person is a moral entity. Here Rawls adheres to the categorical 
imperative of Kant that the individual human exists as a subject in itself, not 
merely as a tool for the random use of others.11 Every individual, suggests Rawls 
in imitation of Kant, is a free and reasonable human individual planning (and 
perhaps adjusting) his own course of life unconnected to his position in society 
or his relationships with other individuals. In this context liberals refer to the 
individual as ‘the unencumbered self ’, a concept that has come in for much 
criticism from communitarian quarters, as we shall see below.
Th e basic liberal assumption of Rawls is thus that individuals are responsible for 
their own future, but, and here the egalitarian side of Rawls puts in an 
appearance, undeserved inequality between individuals may not aff ect the 
possibility for an individual to shape his own future. Talent and origins are not 
moral merits and in a just society they should therefore be excluded as being 
criteria for the division of welfare.
Foremost in Rawls’ theory is thus that it is up to the individual to put his own life 
plans into action: the state must remain neutral with respect to diff erent 
conceptions of the good life. In Rawls’ eyes the public interest has no intrinsic 
moral value; the state is ‘a cooperative venture of mutual advantage’.12 Th e 
9 Hereby it must be noted directly that this was not Rawls’ intention. As an American he is, as 
we shall see later, not committed to the European model of the welfare state.
10 Kant 1785/1997, p. 81.
11 Kant 1785/1997, p. 81.
12 Rawls 1971, p. 4.
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central question Rawls asks himself is under what conditions the state can 
regulate the confl icting individual interests so that the individual members of 
the society can optimally realise their life plans.
Rawls therefore sees the public interest as being the ‘well-ordered society’ within 
which the individual human is able to optimally realise his ideal of the good life. 
Th is does not imply that a well-ordered society must provide for all the wishes 
and requirements that an individual can think of. To Rawls the neutrality – and 
defi nition – of the public interest means that the state is only responsible for the 
just division of the so called ‘primary goods’. Rawls understands primary goods 
to be the basic liberties, equal opportunities to hold social offi  ce, income and 
wealth and the social basis for self-respect, such as the possibility to start a family 
and to join organisations. Th ese are the ‘Lego blocks’ that make it possible for 
every reasonable individual to plan his own future in his own way and which are 
fairly divided within a ‘well-ordered society’. It is not a public interest to realise 
personal preferences that cannot be satisfi ed using the primary goods.
Th e core of Rawls’ argument is based on the principle that this division takes 
place on the basis of the principle that ‘free and rational persons concerned to 
further their own interests would accept in an initial position of equality as 
defi ning the fundamental terms of their association’.13
With this Rawls returns to the tradition of the social contract, as developed by 
Hobbes, Locke and Rousseau. However, his model of a social contract is 
substantially abstracter by nature. He does not refer to a historical original 
position, but he places the – notional – participants in the social contract in a 
fi ctive original position, whereby they are ignorant of their social place in or 
value to society. In the original position the participants are, in the words of his 
famous metaphor behind a ‘veil of ignorance’. With this mental experiment 
Rawls attempts to enable the participants to formulate the just society on the 
basis of moral principles and not based on their expectations regarding the 
manner in which their specifi c individual qualifi cations and skills shall be valued 
in the society designed by them. Rawls’ claim is that the contract participants 
placed in such a fi ctive original position shall opt for the following two principles 
of justice for distributing the so called primary goods.
In the fi rst place each person has an equal right to the same basic liberties. Th e 
basic liberties of individuals are the right to the integrity of the person, freedom 
of speech etc. Th ese basic liberties can be traded off  against each other, but this 
trade-off  must apply to everyone in the same way; in allocating the rights and 
13 Rawls 1971, p. 11.
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implementing the trade-off s no distinction whatsoever may be made between 
individuals.
Th e second principle is hierarchically subordinate to the fi rst and concerns the 
distribution of social and economic goods. It is the best known part of Rawls’ 
theory. Rawls permits inequalities in the distribution of social and economic 
goods to individuals, but in a just basic societal structure these goods are 
distributed in such a way that each inequality benefi ts the worst-off  members of 
the society (the famous ‘diff erence-principle’). Th is is attached to the condition 
that offi  ces and positions are open to all. In other words, everyone must have 
equal opportunity to obtain the same social and economic benefi ts.
Rawls is indeed referred to as the philosopher of the liberal welfare state,14 but 
this typifi cation is not without its problems. Indeed, in his later work Rawls even 
explicitly rejects the capitalist ‘welfare state’:
Welfare state capitalism (…) rejects the fair value of the political liberties, and while 
it has some concern for equality of opportunity, the policies necessary to achieve this 
are not followed. It permits very large inequalities in the ownership of real property 
(productive assets and natural resources) so that the control of the economy and 
much of political life rests in few hands. And although, as the name ‘welfare state 
capitalism’ suggests, welfare provisions may be quite generous and guarantee a decent 
social minimum covering the basic needs, a principle of reciprocity to regulate 
economic and social inequalities is not recognized.15
Although in his ‘Th eory of Justice’ Rawls does not yet adopt a position with 
regard to the type of community that best refl ects his principle of justice theory, 
or which does so not at all, this harsh judgement of the capitalist welfare state 
still does not come totally out of the blue. Th is can be explained with reference to 
the part played by reciprocity in the diff erence principle. ‘(T)he diff erence 
principle expresses a conception of reciprocity. It is a principle of mutual 
benefi t.’16 Th e cooperation of all can only be assured through the application of 
the diff erence principle: it gives the worst-off  a concrete incentive to play their 
part as they are able to share in the profi ts; on the other hand, it is a just basis on 
the grounds of which the better endowed and socially better equipped individuals 
can expect to receive the cooperation of all for the benefi t of the common 
interest.17 Although he does not say so as such we can glean from Rawls’ 
criticism of the welfare state that he is concerned that social security could 
undermine the reciprocity principle and in so doing deny the citizen his liberties. 
14 In the Netherlands: Van der Burg 2003.
15 Rawls 2001, p. 137–138.
16 Rawls 1971, p. 102.
17 Rawls 1971, p. 103.
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Or, to put it more strongly, a benefi t granted by the state erodes the autonomy of 
the individual. Aft er all Rawls’ basic starting point is that the free citizen shapes 
his own future. In this portrayal of the citizen it is fi tting that the citizen takes 
precautionary measures ex ante to enable him to cope with any misfortune that 
may come his way. By compensating misfortunes ex post the state runs the risk 
of creating a benefi t-dependent ‘sub-class’.18
In other words Rawls also sees a public interest in the maintenance of the reciprocity 
principle. Rawls distinguishes two problems that could undermine the ‘diff erence 
principle’ as a result of the reciprocity being broken. First of all he refers to the so 
called ‘free-riders’ problem. How do you avoid the situation in which an individual 
ceases to make his contribution to the community because he will get his share 
anyway? Alongside this he distinguishes the ‘prisoner’s dilemma’ as being 
potentially damaging to the diff erence principle. Why should I make my 
contribution to the community if I cannot be sure that my neighbour will do so too? 
Th is means that a society cannot operate without some form of state that is able to 
monitor whether and penalise if the citizen fails to deliver his or her fair share:
Th erefore, to maintain public confi dence in the scheme that is superior from 
everyone’s point of view (…) some device for administering fi nes and penalties must 
be established. It is here that the mere existence of an eff ective sovereign, or even the 
general belief in his effi  cacy, has a crucial role.19
Rawls’ Th eory of Justice inspired many subsequent authors to publish their own 
interpretation of egalitarian liberalism. Many authors have endeavoured to refi ne 
or improve Rawls’ Th eory of Justice. However, they continue to work within the 
framework of the question posed by Rawls as to how the neutral public interest 
of the autonomous individual can best be promoted.
3.1. CAPABILITY APPROACH
Th us Sen argues that what individuals can make of their lives cannot depend 
exclusively on the degree of access that individuals have to primary resources.20 
As an alternative, Sen proposes the concept of ‘basic capability equality’, which 
18 Here Rawls touches upon the recurring theme in the work of Foucault that the social 
institutions consolidate the balance of power within society.
19 Rawls 1971, p. 270.
20 While writing this chapter ‘Th e Idea of Justice’ was published, a summary in which Sen 
integrated (and perhaps slightly popularized) all his earlier work. In this book he further 
formulates his objections to egalitarians such as Rawls. He opposes any transcendental 
concept of justice instead proposing a ‘realization-focused comparison’ not aimed at the 
establishment of the ideal society but at a gradual improvement of the capabilities of the 
inhabitants of especially (but not only) the developing countries. Sen 2009.
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also takes into account the personal potential of the individual to be able to shape 
his or her future.21 Th is idea also aff ects the interpretation of the public interest. 
Aft er all the state need not concern itself with the distribution of primary 
resources but with the development of the individual’s basic capabilities, through 
which an individual is able to shape his or her own future. Th ese basic capabilities 
include health, being able to enter into relationships with others (which the state 
can support by creating institutions such as marriage) and being able to 
participate in the political decision making process.
3.2. LUCK EGALITARIANISM
Other egalitarian liberal philosophers argue that the emphasis placed by Rawls 
on the equal distribution of primary resources is at the expense of individuals’ 
notions of the good life, and the choices they make as a consequence. Rawls does 
not distinguish between the hard working factory worker who is willing to work 
overtime and the surfer in Malibu who spends half the day on the beach and 
makes shift  with a modest income. On grounds of the diff erence principle the 
surfers in Malibu should indeed have a share in the output of the factory workers’ 
overtime. Th e so called luck egalitarianism therefore makes a distinction between 
brute bad luck and risks consciously taken ‘bad option luck’. Th e individual bears 
full responsibility for risks consciously taken. He can take out – private – 
insurance against these, but state intervention would be paternalist. Th e public 
interest relates solely to the removal of inequalities that are the result of brute 
bad luck, for instance origin, lack of talent or physical defects.
Th e best-known advocate of the luck egalitarianism is Dworkin.22 His target is 
equality of resources. In other words everyone should possess the same level of 
resources with which they can shape their own future. To achieve this Dworkin 
has come up with a new variant of the contract theory. He hypothesizes a desert 
island and imagines a group of people are stranded there and form a new 
community. How should they distribute the island’s resources? Dworkin 
proposes they have an auction: every member of the community receives the 
same measured quantity of clamshells, which they can use to bid for the island’s 
resources. An individual who likes apples will bid a higher price for an apple tree 
than will an individual who likes pears. Th e idea is that at the end of the auction, 
when everyone’s shells are fi nished, the island’s resources will have been 
21 See for example Sen 1979. Martha Nussbaum has elaborated upon this ‘capability approach’ 
in a large number of articles and books. A (temporary?) conclusion was made by her in 
Nussbaum 2006. Th ere is an association, of which Sen was the fi rst chairman, and Nussbaum 
the next, for promoting the concept ‘capability approach’: <www.capabiltyapproach.com>.
22 Dworkin 1981. Dworkin himself however did not consider himself to fully represent the ‘Luck 
Egalitarism’, see Dworkin 2003.
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distributed in accordance with the personal preferences of each member of the 
community, so that nobody has cause to be jealous of another individual’s parcel 
of resources.
But Dworkin can’t stop there. One individual will be better equipped than 
another to achieve a happy life with the resources purchased at the auction. Aft er 
all, talent and physical qualities are unequally distributed. An individual who, as 
a result of brute bad luck, was born blind is entitled to – fi nancial – compensation 
because his handicap limits his capacity to shape his own future. Dworkin 
therefore supplements his auction theory with an insurance scenario as a means 
of determining the amount of this compensation. He claims it is a public interest 
to provide coverage against the risks that the stranded person would have 
guarded himself, if he was unaware beforehand whether he would incur the risk, 
whereby everyone has an equal chance of incurring the risk. Th e amount of tax 
– or social security contributions – to be levied is determined based on the 
amount of the hypothetical insurance premium that in such a case the inhibitors 
of the island would be willing to pay.
Dworkin thus claims it is a public interest that everyone is equal at the starting 
gate from which position they can make their own life choices. Everyone must be 
given the opportunity to achieve the same degree of happiness. Obstacles to such 
happiness, for instance lack of talent or physical defects should therefore be 
removed using resources fi nanced from public means. However, if an individual’s 
future is derailed by misfortunes that are the result of the individuals own life 
choices, then the state no longer acts as a safety net. In this case the solution 
must be sought in the private sphere. An individual who is blind from birth is 
entitled to a benefi t fi nanced from public means; the individual who loses his 
sight setting off  fi reworks is only entitled to an invalidity benefi t if he has taken 
out private insurance against such a risk.
Other ‘luck egalitarians’ go even further than Dworkin and claim ‘equality of 
welfare’. Th ey do not take into account the starting gate but the fi nal position.
3.3. DEMOCRATIC LIBERALISM
Elizabeth Anderson has expressed important and infl uential criticism of the 
‘luck egalitarianism’.23 Her chief objection is that luck egalitarianism violates 
the equality that should underlie the relationship between all individuals. 
23 Anderson 1999. She does not explicitly state that her criticism also includes Rawls. According 
to Pierik 2007, a distinction should be made between Rawls and Anderson on the one hand 
(‘citizen egalitarism’) and Dworkin and others on the other hand.
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Anderson claims that if it is a public interest to compensate a citizen due to lack 
of talent, or birth defects, in doing so the state not only expresses a moral, but 
also an off ensive opinion regarding the ability of a citizen to live a fulfi lling 
existence.24 In her eyes luck egalitarianism is based on the implicit implication 
that some individuals are unable to obtain quality of life. As an alternative to 
luck egalitarianism Anderson proposes ‘democratic liberalism’, which assumes 
all individuals are fully equal, making it unnecessary to compensate specifi c 
categories of individuals. It is, however, in the public interest that everyone is 
able to participate fully in social and political life, whereby the cause of an 
individual’s physical or mental defect is, in principle, irrelevant. Th e individual 
who his unable to walk as the result of a birth defect, is not entitled to 
compensation because his life is supposedly incomplete, but he is, however, 
entitled to any resources that allow him to lead a life that is as normal as possible, 
for instance a wheelchair. In other words Anderson does not consider distributive 
justice as being a criterion in itself for compensating individuals who are worse-
off  due to factors that are morally irrelevant. From her argument that society is a 
system of cooperation it follows that she supports the notion of a safety net, also 
for less careful individuals, this can be defi ned in the form of a minimum wage 
or invalidity insurance schemes. Mandatory social insurance for medical care is 
also in the public interest according to Anderson. Her reasoning behind this is 
that everyone is entitled to medical care, even the heavy smoker. It follows from 
this that everyone must contribute by means of premiums or tax. Th is is not 
paternalist as luck-egalitarians may think, aft er all everyone is at liberty to refuse 
such medical care if is off ered to him.
4. LIBERTARIANISM
4.1. NOZICK
‘Individuals have rights, and there are things no person or group may do to them 
(without violating their rights).’ With this powerful and famous opening sentence 
Robert Nozick lays his claim in his book ‘Anarchy, State and Utopia’ for ‘the 
minimal state’ in which there is no room for the state as distributor of social 
justice.25 Nozick’s book can thus also be seen as a plea for the minimization of 
the public interest. With this book, which was published in 1974, and that is a 
direct response to ‘A Th eory of Justice’, Nozick entered acceptable circles, in 
particular those of the American intellectuals, and has thus (together with 
24 Her examples are hilarious. For instance she gives examples of a letter from the hypothetical 
State Equality Board with the following tenor: ‘Sir, you have been born so ugly that you may 




Hayek) laid the philosophical grounds for the economic neoliberal reforms of 
Reagan and Th atcher.
Nozick’s theory is based on the assumption, and here he does not diff er 
substantially from Rawls, of self-ownership. But whereas Rawls describes society 
as a communal enterprise focusing on mutual advantage, Nozick accepts no such 
responsibility for the fate of others. A society is based on voluntary cooperation, 
whereby the members of the society, contrary to what Rawls believes, do not have 
a normative relation. Rawls stated that the participants in the social contract are 
reasonable human beings (in other words are able to take the interests of others 
into account) who plan the course of their lives in a rational manner. Nozick 
does not distinguish such a basic Kantian standard in the mutual relations 
between individuals.
From the concept ‘self-ownership’, as summarised by Nozick, fl ows the concept 
of absolute property rights and the justifi cation of the free market (property-
ownership). Where Rawls was greatly infl uenced by Kant, Nozick is inspired by 
Locke. According to Nozick, property can only be ‘justly’ acquired on the 
grounds of three principles. First of all is the principle of transfer, what is justly 
acquired can be justly transferred. Th is is the principle upon which the free 
market is based. Th e principle of just initial acquisition explains how an 
individual fi rst acquired a good that can be transferred in accordance with the 
principle of transfer. A good that is appropriated from nature without causing 
disadvantage to others, can be justly transferred. Th e third principle, the 
principle of rectifi cation of injustice provides for rectifi cations of violations of 
the fi rst two principles. Th ese three principles are jointly referred to by Nozick as 
his entitlement theory.
It is important to dwell upon the principle of initial acquisition, the principle 
that legitimates property appropriation in the initial natural state. Th e 
assumption is, as we have seen, that ownership in the natural state is justly 
acquired through appropriation, such as the picking of fruit or the tilling of the 
land. As a result of self-ownership, an individual has an inviolable right to that 
which is produced by the labour his own body.26 Th e fact that an individual has 
the absolute right of self-ownership means that justly acquired property cannot 
be disputed in any way.27 Th is privatization of the common property is however 
subject to one condition. It must not result in other individuals in nature being 
26 According to John Locke’s statement regarding property acquisition: ‘Whatsoever then he 
removes out of the state that nature hath provided, and left  it in, he hath mixed his labour 
with, and joined to it something that is his own, and thereby makes it his property.’ Locke 
1690, Sec. 27.
27 It is this mental leap in particular for which Nozick came in for much criticism, because it 
was claimed that it lacked a philosophical base; see for example Nagel 1975.
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worse-off  than they would have been if privatization had not taken place. In 
other words: you have to make sure there is enough left  over for others. Locke 
also laid down such a condition and it is therefore referred to as the ‘Lockean 
proviso’.28
Th e entitlement theory is the starting point of Nozick’s political philosophy. 
Rather than a contract theory he uses the invisible hand explanation of his 
interpretation of the state. According to his theory, which makes no claim to 
historical correctness, in the state of nature individuals shall spontaneously, as if 
driven by an invisible hand, form protective associations to guard their acquired 
property against attacks from third parties. Th ese separate protective associations 
shall, Nozick goes on to suggest, not fi ght out their diff erences among each other 
but shall lay them before a third organisation, the dominant protective 
association. Th ese associations are the fi rst forms of state. In Nozick’s words:
‘…there arises something very much resembling a minimal state’.29
But this is as far as the public interest goes as far as Nozick is concerned. He 
rejects all forms of state that go beyond a minimal state, the night watchman 
state, and which intervenes in matters such as the distribution of welfare and 
education, because such a state breaches his entitlement theory and in doing so is 
an unacceptable violation of its citizens’ rights of ownership. Nozick most 
strikingly suggests that the levying of taxes is on a par with forced labour.
Th us Nozick also abhors political philosophies, such as those advocated by Rawls 
and Dworkin that are based on a desired pattern for the distribution of welfare. 
Th e best known example used by Nozick to explain his horror of patterned 
theories is that of Wilt Chamberlain, the top NBA basketball player at the time 
his book was published and still a legendary name. Suppose, says Nozick, that a 
community has been created in which a just system of income distribution 
applies in line with notions of justice stated beforehand (a patterned theory). 
Now suppose that Chamberlain has concluded a contract with his club under 
which he shares in the takings. How in this case can the patterned theory be 
applied to solve the problem that arises when it appears that people are willing 
en masse to pay an additional 25 cents to see Chamberlain play? Th ese shift s in 
income, which make Chamberlain a rich man, lead to a disturbance in the 
pattern that had previously been stamped as the only form of just distribution. 
Do the incomes have to be distributed again to return to the original just 
distribution? And what happens if people want to watch Chamberlain again? 
28 ‘…no man but he can have a right (…) at least where there is enough, and as good left  in 




Will there be redistribution? Nozick shrinks from the state intervention that 
would result from this.30
Political theories such as Nozick’s (and Hayek’s) have infl uenced the neo liberal 
economists who, led by Friedman, sought a new way of allocating responsibility 
with respect to social security. Pinochet’s Chilli was used as a pilot project for a 
new pension system. A defi ned contribution scheme was introduced, under 
which the amount of the contribution is fi xed but the amount of the benefi t is 
not guaranteed, being dependent on the results on the stock exchange. Th is 
model has been adopted in many South American countries. Th e schemes, under 
which pension risks were borne collectively, were wholly or partially replaced by 
private savings accounts, which are not based on solidarity, but by which the 
individual bears the risk associated with the yield of his investment. As a result 
multi-pillared pension schemes were usually created; an individually borne 
second pillar was added to the collectively fi nanced fi rst pillar. Th is multi pillar 
model has been adopted by the World Bank,31 and therefore also forms the basis 
for the pension reforms in many Central and East European countries. Much 
more modest forms of private savings accounts have also been introduced in 
Sweden and the UK. In America itself this form of fi nancing is used for 
occupational pensions. Even before the advent of the credit crisis, however, it 
appeared that this pension system failed to yield what was expected of it. Not 
only were the profi ts on the stock exchange disappointing aft er the Internet 
bubble burst, but, in practice the administrative costs turned out to be 
disproportionately high.32 Th e World Bank also partially retraced its footsteps 
to the extent that the report published in 2004 entitled ‘Keeping the Promise’ 
gave greater import to the collectively fi nanced pillars.33
Nozick is generally referred to as a right libertarian. Th is, however, only applies 
with respect to his economic opinions. With regard to ethical issues Nozick is 
unmistakably left -wing. Alongside Nozick there are also left  libertarians and 
libertarians who can be considered as being much more right-wing. Th ese 
qualifi cations can be awarded in accordance with their interpretation of the 
Lockean proviso. To start with the extreme right libertarians, for instance Rothbard, 
30 With this sort of criticism Nozick is close to Friedrich Hayek, another source of inspiration 
for him, who in his famous book ‘Th e Road to Serfdom’ saw state intervention in the well 
being of the individual as the fi rst step down the road to dictatorship.
31 See the report by the World Bank: ‘Averting the Old Age Crisis’ of 1994.
32 Fultz 2004.
33 It is apparent that pension benefi ciaries in countries that have embraced this form of national 
capitalism most enthusiastically, for instance in Bulgaria much more than Poland, are being 
hit hardest by the crisis. Because with respect to ten years ago the stock exchanges have made 
no progress, no pension accrual whatsoever has taken place. On the other hand, there is no 
guarantee that the collectively fi nanced systems will survive the current crisis, although the 
most recent reports are apparently more positive about this.
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refuse to accept that there are any moral conditions attached to the acquiring of 
property.34 If an individual has the right to own his own body it follows that 
everything an individual appropriates from nature belongs to that individual as 
long as the bodily integrity of others is not violated. Rothbard leaves so little room 
over for the public interest that he should in fact be seen as an anarchist.
4.2. LEFT LIBERTARIANS
Th e left  libertarians, who, just like Nozick attempt to minimize the role of the 
public interest while trying to link it to an egalitarian notion of the distribution 
of resources, are indisputably more interesting from the point of view of the 
social security debate. Left  libertarians base their ideas on the assumption that 
the natural resources are common property. However, whereas Locke and Nozick 
accept that an individual may acquire property as long as others do not become 
worse-off  as a result, left  wing libertarians argue that the acquisition of property 
may never detract from other individuals’ rights to the common property. In 
other words, left -libertarians do not accept the Lockean proviso as justifi cation 
for the acquisition of property. In the words of Tideman & Vallentyne (2001):
Unlike right-libertarianism, left -libertarianism holds that natural resources (land, 
oil, air, etc.) are owned in some egalitarian sense and can be legitimately appropriated 
by individuals or groups only when the appropriations are compatible with the 
specifi ed form of egalitarian ownership.
A striking example of this movement is Philippe van Parijs (1988), who, on the 
basis of libertarian motives argues for a basic income. He arrives at this 
conclusion in two stages. (a) Everyone has an equal claim to all the natural 
resources. (b) To keep state intervention with regard to the distribution of these 
resources to a minimum this claim can best be expressed in the form of a basic 
income. Moreover from (a) it follows that the granting of a basic income may not 
be subjected to conditions. Th is brings him to the conclusion that individuals, 
who have a preference for spending the whole day on the beach at Malibu, are 
also entitled to a benefi t. Hereby he also notes that the amount of this benefi t 
need not be above subsistence level, and that over-priced surfb oards do not fall 
within the justifi ed expenditure pattern. Rawls warded off  this criticism aimed at 
Van Parijs by supplementing his list of primary goods with leisure time.
A frequently heard criticism of left  libertarians is that they adopt a progressive 





Now that the neoliberal tide would seem to be turning, we will see whether left -
libertarianism can continue as an independent movement.
5. COMMUNITARIAN CRITICISM
Th e Communitarian roots of social security were described earlier in this 
chapter, namely the Hegelian-Marxist and Catholic doctrine. It is striking that 
present-day Communitarianism is almost entirely disconnected from these 
roots. Echoes of Marxism are virtually inaudible in the social security debate, in 
reality the same applies for the confessional philosophies.36 Present-day 
communitarianism is fi rst and foremost a response to liberal philosophers such 
as Rawls and Nozick, not a continuation of the past. But history does repeat itself. 
Whereas Hegel is a response to the liberal enlightenment ideal, the 
communitarians oppose the budding liberalism of Rawls and Nozick.
Th e diff erent communitarian writers are linked in their criticism of the liberal 
concept of the neutral state. Th ey propose the ‘embedded self ’ as an alternative 
to the ‘unencumbered self ’, the individual who is embedded in the context of the 
environment in which he lives, for instance his family, is not (fully) in a position 
to determine his own aims as an autonomous being.37 Communitarianism 
consists, no more than liberalism, of a homogenous group of authors. Th e 
spectrum is broad. As two extremes in this spectrum we will examine two very 
diff erent authors, Alasdair MacIntyre and Michael Walzer, who only have in 
common their criticism of Rawls’ and Nozick’s liberalism.
5.1. MACINTYRE
MacIntyre remains in tune with the Catholic tradition by resolutely rejecting the 
state and through his references to Catholic icons such as Th omas van Acquino 
and St. Benedictus.38 However, he is fi rst and foremost the modern advocate of 
the re-examination of Aristotle’s virtue ethics. For him, defending these classical 
values means that he fundamentally rejects the Enlightenment Project, including 
the liberal nation-state that he considers to be a product of the Enlightenment. 
What we have lost as a consequence of the Enlightenment is a common tells 
(‘objective’). He believes we no longer have public standards for gauging what a 
36 Th e political scientist Jos de Beus called it remarkable in a recent TV programme that the 
Christian-democrat prime minister in the Netherlands sought inspiration from among the 
American communitarian Etzioni rather than falling back on the European Christian 
heritage.
37 See for example Sandel 1984.
38 For this paragraph use have been made of, among others, Murpy 2003.
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good life is. Th e result of this is a pluriformity of values in which an individual is 
no longer able to convince another individual that he is right.39 MacIntyre 
illustrates this by comparing Rawls and Nozick. Both are in the right insofar as 
the principles they believe in work out. Th eir principles are, however, irreconcilable. 
MacIntyre (1981) takes this seriously. In his eyes modern politics is ‘civil war 
carried on by other means’. In this context he also talks of a social catastrophe.
What is MacIntyre’s alternative to the Enlightenment Project? Central to 
MacIntyre’s political philosophy is the concept of the ‘common good’. Th e concept 
of the ‘common good’ is not, as is the concept of the ‘public interest’ advocated by 
the liberals, subordinate to the separate interests of individual members of the 
community, but has an intrinsic normative value. First and foremost the members 
of a community are bound by a common understanding of the good life. Examples 
of human communities are the family, neighbourhoods and professional groups. 
In this context MacIntyre explicitly refrains from referring to the state. Th e good 
life is not the result of common activities in these communities, but rather the 
manner in which this result was achieved. Individual members of the community 
fi nd their value and self-respect through the manner in which they contribute to 
the ‘common good’. Examples of the manner in which individual members can 
contribute are the concepts derived from Aristotle’s’ ethics such as ability, 
professional pride and merit. In defi ning the good life a major role is attributed to 
the public interest. Th is is namely the role of ‘governing institutions’ in creating 
an arena in which the good life can be defi ned in common deliberations. It is 
important that no one is excluded from this debate. For MacIntyre this is an 
important as well as a practical reason to reject the modern nation-state: it is quite 
simply too big to enable everyone to have their say. McIntyre is, however, fi rst and 
foremost a moral rather than a political philosopher. He has never developed his 
theories about the right form of government any further, although they are grist 
to the mill of supporters of the corporate model.
5.2. WALZER
At the opposite end of the communitarian spectrum we have Walzer (1983), who 
claims to belong to the social democrats.40 His arguments regarding distributive 
justice contained in his book ‘Spheres of Justice’ fi nd expression in his assumption 
that human beings are most of all social beings. Walzer attempts to reconcile this 
conviction with the principles of the liberal nation-state.
39 In fact he comes to the same conclusion as Isaiah Berlin (see note 4). Berlin however took this 
conclusion much more light-heartedly. Put more strongly, he considered this to be a 
requirement for a strong democracy.
40 For this paragraph use has been made, among others of Trappenburg 1994.
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In Walzer’s opinion the public interest is the common defi nition of the good life. 
Th is defi nition is not the sum of what individuals envisage, but is the result of a 
quest for standards already existing within the group. Walzer is not searching 
for objective truths and universal opinions in his theory of distributive justice, 
but for the hidden meanings of shared values, ‘shared meanings’, as these apply 
in the existing community. In his eyes philosophical notions of a just and 
egalitarian community are always hypothetical.
If such a society isn’t already here – hidden as it were in our concepts and categories 
– we will never know and realize it in fact.41
Th us Walzer considers Rawls’ social contract to be nothing but a clinical mind 
experiment that says little about what happens in real life let alone that it 
contributes to a more just society.
Th e importance attached by Walzer to the research and explanation of ‘shared 
meanings’ has resulted in his concept of justness being bound to the borders of 
the national-state.42 Aft er all shared values only have meaning and remain 
meaningful if they can be set-off  against the shared values of other groups; 
otherwise they lose their ability to diff erentiate.
Walzer calls for equality within the borders of the national state. Th e manner in 
which goods are distributed must recognize and confi rm the equality of the 
members. But Walzer’s concept of equality is complex. In a liberal society it is 
permitted to distribute resources unequally provided the diff erences are limited 
within a single sphere of justice. Walzer argues that the modern liberal nation-
state has diff erent spheres of justice, such as politics, education, health care etc., 
between which watertight partitions must be erected whenever just distribution 
is concerned. Th e powerful politician is not entitled to priority treatment with 
respect to health care; children of millionaires have no right to special treatment 
when it comes to education.
Th e specifi c communitarian element in Walzer’s argument is, as observed above, 
the great importance he attaches to shared meanings. Th ereby the community 
itself also attends to the needs of its members:
But one of our needs is community itself: culture, religion and politics. It is only 
under the aegis of these three that all other things we need become social recognized 
needs, take on historical and determinate form.43
41 Walzer 1983, p. XIV.
42 Another consequence is that his book is very narrative, which has resulted in it being 
criticised as anecdotal.
43 Walzer 1983, p. 65.
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Walzer explains this with reference to, among other things, health care. Th e 
importance currently attached by Western society to good health can, according 
to Walzer, only be understood in the context of present-day culture and its level 
of knowledge. Today’s health cult would mystify the mediaeval man, who sought 
only spiritual welfare and who put up with physical discomforts.
5.3. ETZIONI AND GIDDENS
Since the 1990s communitarianism has been highly infl uential as a counter 
balance to liberal notions. Th e emergence of these philosophers coincided fi rst 
and foremost with a growing social dissatisfaction about the lack of ‘values and 
standards’ and the state’s neutral disposition. As a result ideas related to a 
morally tinted public interest were surreptitiously included in the formation of 
public opinion. In the Netherlands this was fodder for the debate about society’s 
‘standards and values’ that emerged during the 1990s.
But communitarianism also became so infl uential due to authors such as 
Anthony Giddens and Amitai Etzioni who formulated the communitarianism 
philosophy, both in their books and in their personal recommendations to 
government leaders, in such a way that it became suitable for political use.44 
Giddens was the founder of the Th ird Way ideology, the movement that 
attempted to link neoliberalism with the communitarianism of social democracy. 
Th is movement sought to fi nd a balance between the social democrat concepts 
such as Community (community-minded) and Opportunity (opportunity for 
individuals to advance themselves), and the liberal principles of Responsibility 
and Accountability (between individuals and the government). In doing so he 
helped to found the New-Labour movement under Tony Blair, and in general 
boosted the revival of social democracy in Western Europe during the 1990s. In 
the Netherlands, the Th ird Way ideology opened the door for a coalition between 
the social democrats and the liberals.
Etzioni’s work focuses on strengthening the moral foundation of modern 
societies. Although he uses the individual and his rights as a starting point, he is 
concerned about the dislocating and alienating eff ects of an ideology that 
allocates overmuch importance to individualism and the free market. For this 
reason he calls for a better balance between the individual and the 
community.45





At the start of this chapter reference was made to the need that arose in the mid 
1970s, as a result of the running aground of the Keynesian consensus, for a new 
look at the relationship between the public and the individual interest in social 
security. It was claimed that this consensus had led to the watering down of the 
diff erences between the public and private interest. Once it appeared that the 
validity of Keynes’ economic theory had run its course, it became necessary to 
reformulate the relationship between the public and private interest. Th is is 
followed by is a description of the major movements in political philosophy that 
have endeavoured to respond to this need. Th e distinction between liberalism 
and communism is a red thread running through this description.
Liberals are united in their opinions regarding the autonomy of the individual 
and the neutrality of the state. Egalitarian liberalism formulates the public 
interest as being a ‘joint venture’ for the benefi t of the individual participants. It 
puts strong emphasis on reciprocity because the cooperation of all is needed to 
make the joint venture a success. Th rough this the concept of distributive justice, 
including social security, acquires instrumental characteristics: it is considered 
by these liberals as a means to ensure the cooperation of all. Libertarians do 
acknowledge a common fate, but this goes no further than providing mutual 
protection in the face of external threats. Th e public interest is principally 
revealed in the protection of the inalienable rights of the individual, in particular 
the right of ownership. Th e private interests can be best realised through the 
operation of the market.
Communitarians oppose both notions. In their eyes the individual can only be 
comprehended as part of the community in which he lives: as a result the 
individual is not autonomous and neither is the state neutral. By its very nature 
communitarianism is immersed in the reciprocity principle. Aft er all the very 
core of communitarianism is that the individual can only develop in interaction 
with the community.
At this point the question arises as to how the developments in social security 
since the 1970s can be explained on the basis of these antipoles. Th e developments 
within social security display a hybrid picture, within which a number of trends 
can be distinguished. On the one hand these developments have been derived 
from libertarian thoughts, inspired by Nozick, on the other hand they can be 
reduced to communitarian ideas regarding the role of the state and the 
individual.
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Th e fi rst response to the economic crisis that manifested itself in the late 1970s as 
a result of the collapse of the Keynesian paradigm, is of a fi nancial-economic 
nature. Cuts are made in the system by reducing the level of benefi ts. Alongside 
this ‘volume management’ is practiced by tightening the entitlement 
requirements, or introducing or extending qualifying periods. Th is budget-based 
approach to social security stems from libertarian ideas of the public interest 
within social security. Th e community no longer feigns full responsibility for the 
welfare of the individual and will only continue to provide the primary 
guarantees for his existence.
In later years there is a further neoliberal sequel to this budget-based response, 
as the operation of the market is seen as the means for best realising the private 
interest. Th is resulted in parts of the social security system being privatised. In 
the Netherlands this resulted, de facto, in the abolition of the Sickness Benefi t 
Act, which was replaced by an obligation under private law for the employer to 
continue to pay wages. Th e employer can choose whether or not he wants to take 
out insurance to cover this risk. In addition major parts of the health care system 
were privatised, whereby public guarantees were created with regard to the scope 
of the care package and the contribution amount. In other European countries 
private elements are creeping into the pension systems, as described earlier in 
this chapter.
On the basis of these developments it should not be assumed that neoliberal or 
libertarian ideas had the upper hand. Other trends demonstrate communitarian 
leanings. Firstly, the community’s boundaries are being more strictly defi ned. 
Th e declining growth in welfare in the 1980s, in combination with an increasing 
fl ow of migrants, put the issue of welfare distribution on the agenda. Where less 
can be distributed, the circle of entitled persons has to be more strictly limited. 
Solidarity can only be applied within a group that has a certain degree of 
commitment. Or in the words of Walzer: ‘Th e idea of distributive justice 
presupposes a bounded world within which distribution takes place: a group of 
people committed to dividing, exchanging, and sharing social goods, fi rst of all 
among themselves.’46
In the Netherlands this was expressed most markedly in the shaping of the Dutch 
admissions policy of foreigners in combination with the introduction of the so 
called Linkage Act in 1998. Th e admissions policy for immigrants is becoming 
increasingly restrictive in nature. Whereas in the 1960s and 1970s migrants were 
actively sought aft er, since the 1980s only labour migrants who can explicitly 
show that they have an added value for the labour market, are being admitted 
(for instance knowledge migrants) or those who are prepared to perform low 
46 Walzer 1983, p. 31.
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skilled work that the native Dutch population refuses to perform. At the same 
time the introduction of the Linkage Act meant that those persons not admitted 
to the Dutch labour market could no longer call upon public services, for 
example the right to social security.
As such these restrictive measures do not necessarily have a communitarian 
strand. If resources are becoming scarce, it is in the interest of the separate 
members of the group to mark the circle of people who are entitled to share in 
the distribution of goods, and to exclude those who do not contribute to the 
common good. For that reason the Linkage Act can also be understood within 
the liberal paradigm.
However, the tightening of the circle of solidarity went hand in hand with a new 
evaluation of the relationship between the public and private interest. Th is 
reassessment revealed itself in a stronger emphasis on the reciprocal relationship 
between the citizen and the state. Th is emphasis on reciprocity in social security 
means that benefi ts and work have become more closely connected. Th e principle 
goal of social security is no longer income protection; the goal is shift ing towards 
the return to work, whereby in return for his benefi t the individual has 
obligations imposed upon him intended to bridge the distance to the labour 
market.
Th is communitarian reassessment of the relationship between the private and 
the public interest must be analytically distinguished from the neoliberal trends 
described above. Communitarian and neoliberal movements do have parallel 
interests – both movements aim to reduce the state’s (fi nancial) contribution to 
the private interest-, but they do not have parallel motives.47 Whereas the 
neoliberal or libertarian tendency is based on a public interest that is normatively 
neutral, the communitarian movement has strong normative visions regarding 
the best way in which an individual can do justice to himself. Th e communitarian 
standard is based on the working individual and if necessarily the community 
actively encourages behavioural changes to achieve this standard.
For social security this means that a stronger emphasis is put on reciprocity. On 
the European continent the source of the ‘activating social security’ was to be 
found in the Scandinavian countries as early as the 1970s. Th ese Scandinavian 
programs are based on the assumption that the universal coverage of the welfare 
state remains intact, but that within this model strategies are sought to lead those 
eligible for benefi ts back to the labour market, whereby greater demands are 
made on individual responsibility. Th e community activates the benefi ciary ‘for 
his own good’, to participate (again) in the working life.
47 Anderson 2009.
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In Anglo-Saxon countries reciprocity is stimulated slightly more. In these 
countries since the 1980s programs have been set up under the name Workfare, 
in which all able-bodied benefi ciaries are obliged to participate and which focus 
less on the personal development of the benefi ciary in the longer term. Th e old 
moral biblical standard: ‘If any do not work, neither shall they eat.’ seems still to 
be predominant in these countries.
In the Netherlands these communitarian developments can be found particularly 
in the reform of the disability benefi t scheme and the Work and Social Assistance 
Act. Incapacity for work is no longer interpreted as a numeric concept, the 
presumption is that no one is fully incapacitated for work and hence all 
individuals incapacitated for work should make themselves available on the 
labour market to make use of their remaining capacity for work. In fact this 
means that the traditional distinction made in social security between incapacity 
for work and unemployment is fading. Th e granting of social assistance is also 
less automatic. Obligations to apply for jobs are being tightened, even for groups 
that were previously exempted, such as single mothers.
To conclude, another eff ect of the increasing reciprocity is an increase in punitive 
elements in social security as a means of encouraging behavioural eff ects. In the 
Netherlands the Act on Fines and Measures entered into force in 1996, on the 
grounds of which benefi ts can be (partially) withdrawn and fi nes can be imposed 
when compliance rules are violated. In the introduction to this chapter it is 
claimed that modern philosophy started with Rawls. But where does ‘Rawlism’ 
stand now in relation to the libertarian and communitarian trends in social 
security described above?
Th ere is no easy answer to this question. Th e troublesome relationship between 
Rawls and social security has been summarised earlier in this chapter. Aft er all 
Rawls’ starting point is the free citizen creating his own course of life. In this 
vision of the citizen, the citizen himself must make arrangements to deal with 
any misfortune, for instance by saving or taking out private insurance. In this 
the state is expected to remain neutral, because the moral autonomy lies with the 
individual. In this respect Rawls is fully in line with the liberal tradition and 
would distance himself from communitarian concepts of social security with 
normative features, because these features would violate the individual 
autonomy.
On the other hand the function of the public interest is to regulate the private 
interests so that full justice can be done to them. Hereby, as we have seen, the 
concept of reciprocity plays a major role. For Rawls is the diff erence-principle a 
form of reciprocity, that forges the link between the interests of the autonomous 
individual and the neutral state. Social security can help the diff erence principle 
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to take shape. Th e most important question Rawls hereby lays before the 
participants of the social security debate is how a bridge can be built between 
libertarian opinions regarding the autonomy of the individual and 
communitarian concepts of reciprocity. In his eyes reciprocity between the 
public and private interest may not be at the expense of the freedom of the 
individual (and the self-respect that can be derived from such freedom), which 
would be the case if the public interest is painted too normatively.
Political philosophy remains a quest for the essence of the individual: the 
individual seeks the protection of the community, but while doing so it does not 
wish to lose too much of his autonomy. Th e same quest applies to the theory of 
social security.
7. EPILOGUE
While this book was being written it was announced that as a result of the 
current fi nancial crisis the number of people in the world suff ering from hunger 
has risen to more than one billion.48 Th is adds urgency to the question of 
whether the national state is properly representing the public interest in social 
security. If egalitarian liberals see a public interest in the discarding of morally 
irrelevant factors such as talent and origins for the sake of a just distribution of 
welfare, the question of whether an individual’s country of birth is not equally 
such an irrelevant factor is unavoidable. Th is question, fi rst posed by Peter Singer 
a year aft er the publication of ‘A Th eory of Justice’, has led to a wholly new, 
parallel debate about justice world-wide, and the question of how the public 
interest should be given substance.49 Th is debate heavily emphasises that the 
state is not an absolute entity when it comes down to realizing the public 
interest.
48 NRC Handelsblad, 20 June 2009.
49 Peter Singer 1972. Singer approaches this question from a utilitarian point of view. See for an 
egalitarian-liberal outlook Beitz 1979 and Pogge 2004.
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INSTRUMENTALISATION OF THE 
PUBLIC INTEREST IN SOCIAL 
SECURITY: AN ECONOMIC 
PERSPECTIVE
Andries Nentjes and Edwin Woerdman
1. INTRODUCTION
In our chapter on the economics of the public interest in social security we made 
a distinction between the period of building up social security and, from the late 
1970s on, its revision. Th e instruments applied by the government in the two 
periods are basically the same: regulation of the private sector and bringing the 
provision of social security under direct government control. Th e diff erence 
between the two periods rests in how the instruments were designed and how 
they were applied.
At the beginning of the 20th century income support for persons and households 
with an income below the poverty line was brought under the control of the 
public sector, with implementation being delegated to local governments and 
fi nanced through taxes. Th is organisational set-up has basically remained 
unchanged. However, the fi rst half of the 20th century only saw the development 
of social security arrangements for wage-earners. Th ese arrangements were 
implemented with the instrument of regulation, while leaving the organisation 
and implementation to the cooperation between employers and trade unions. 
Th e government used its power to regulate the private sector by making 
insurance against the fi nancial consequences of a range of risks mandatory. Th e 
insurance was provided by a monopolistic insurer operating on a non-profi t basis 
under control of the branch organisations. Th is meant that the insured person 
had no free choice and that competition between insurance fi rms did not exist. 
Insurance of wage-earners against the costs of medical care was based on the 
same principle, although implemented per region and not per business branch. 
Th e supply of medical care remained as it had always been: a private sector 
activity, partly on a non-profi t base (hospitals), and the scope for consumers to 
choose their own supplier remained free, in principle.
Andries Nentjes and Edwin Woerdman
120 Intersentia
Th e second half of the 20th century, but mainly the years between 1950 and 1970, 
saw the introduction of social security covering the whole population, with equal 
entitlements for all citizens and fi nanced through income-dependent premiums 
and taxes. Th e overarching instrument to safeguard the public interest in the 
new type of social security was to keep the arrangements fully under government 
control by making them public sector activities. Th e provision of insurance by a 
public monopolist, the collection of mandatory contributions and the distribution 
of benefi ts all remained within the public sector. However, the delivery of medical 
and other types of care, which in the past oft en had started as private initiatives 
of caring citizens to provide care for the needy, remained within the private 
sector.
In the building-up period a diff erentiated and complex set of instruments had 
emerged to safeguard the public interest in social security. In this chapter the 
focus is on what happened with those instruments and their application in the 
decades of repair and reconstruction of social security. We will use the 
transformation of Dutch social security as an illutration, though the tendency in 
the use of the instruments is similar to that of other countries. Since the 1970s 
safeguarding of the public interest in social security has very much been 
conceived of as detecting and remedying the public sector failures in the 
arrangements. Potential public sector failures have been identifi ed in the previous 
chapter on the economics of the public interest in social security. Section 2 
presents a survey of the diverse adjustments made to cope with the new 
challenges. In section 3 health care is discussed separately because, unlike in 
other social security sectors, a new arrangement geared to correcting market 
failures as well as public sector failures has been implemented. Section 4 
questions whether there has been a paradigm change, as some authors argue, in 
the provision of social security. Conclusions are drawn in section 5.
2. THREE DECADES OF REPAIR AND 
RECONSTRUCTION
An array of adaptations in instruments has been made in the past three decades 
to mitigate public sector failures in social security arrangements. Th ey have 
diff ered in the degree of incisiveness in changing existing entitlements and 
practices.
2.1. MACROECONOMIC SIGNALS
Overproduction and overconsumption have been identifi ed as major potential 
public sector failures. Th e fi rst signals of this date from the 1970s. Th e problem 
showed up at the macro-economic level in a strong growth of total taxes and 
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social insurance contributions; in 1975 calculated to be at a rate of 2% of the 
national income per year.1 A publication of the CPB (Netherlands Bureau for 
Economic Policy Analysis) of 1974 pictured a scenario of a vicious spiral of high 
public expenditure, requiring higher taxes and social contributions, which in 
turn would drive up labour costs. Th e higher costs of labour would lead to job 
losses and increasing unemployment, which would cause a further increase in 
the costs of social security and the costs of labour, leading to even more 
unemployment.2 Th e steadily increasing level of unemployment in the 1970s 
seemed to support the analysis. A worst case scenario was no longer unthinkable, 
in which an ever increasing share of national income going to social security 
would actually undermine the economic basis on which the whole social security 
system rested, resulting in economic and social collapse. Th e CPB-report was 
infl uential and acted as a political eye opener in the Netherlands bringing about 
the U-turn in the views of the future of the welfare state.
A fi rst political symptom of the change in mood was the decision of the 
government in 1976 that the sum of taxes and social contributions should not be 
allowed to increase faster than by 1% of national income per year. For the fi rst 
time social security was integrated in the macro-economic and budgetary 
guidelines for government decisions on its public fi nance. In the 1980s the norm 
was made more stringent by requiring a stabilization of taxes and premiums as a 
percentage of national income.3 Th e example illustrates how economic analysis 
can give an indication of unsustainably exuberant social security provisions. 
Moreover, one could say that economics helped to change political views and to 
force a shift  from consensus on expansion to agreement on restraint and 
reconstruction aiming at economic sustainability. In retrospect one can view the 
introduction of the integrated norm as a new supporting macro-economic 
instrument to signal and contain overproduction and overconsumption in social 
security.
2.2. LOWER BENEFITS, FEWER ENTITLEMENTS, MORE 
OBLIGATIONS
To eff ectuate a sustainable level of social security expenditure a range of 
adaptations and reforms has been undertaken. As we will see, these have mainly 
been made in the fi eld of mandatory insurance for wage-earners. Th e fi rst major 
cuts were made in the 1980s. In 1985 benefi ts above the minimum level were 
lowered from the existing 80% of the former wage to 70% for unemployed 
1 Postma 1995.
2 Den Hartog & Tjan 1974.
3 Postma 1995.
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persons, the disabled and the absentees due to illness. Th e 1980s also brought the 
end of a regulation that linked the level and increase of minimum social benefi ts 
in all social security arrangements to the net offi  cial minimum wage. Instead of 
occurring automatically the link would be made at the discretion of the 
government. Th e lowering of benefi t levels did what it was meant to: bring down 
total social security expenditure. In some cases it was also eff ective in bringing 
down the consumption of the social arrangements, for example the percentage of 
personnel absent due to illness dropped.4
Comparable with lowering monetary benefi ts was the restriction of entitlements 
within a social security arrangement and making benefi ts dependent on more 
stringent conditions and obligations. Both approaches have been applied in the 
1990s and 2000s to unemployment insurance. Th e period of entitlement to 
benefi ts was shortened and made dependent on the previous employment record. 
Th e exemption from the requirement to look for work for older unemployed 
persons was abolished. Aft er a year of unemployment lower paid jobs had to be 
accepted. Sanctions for not meeting the obligations – reproachable unemployment 
– were strengthened.
Insofar as lower benefi ts, fewer entitlements and more obligations do reduce the 
number of persons in social security arrangements are concerned, the eff ect 
comes from the impact on incentives. Users are encouraged to look harder for 
other more attractive options outside the protection off ered by the arrangement. 
Th e changes in legislation also refl ected an attitude change in society at large. 
Workers are no longer seen as exclusively victims of circumstances, but are 
supposed to have some choice left .
2.3. RESTRICTING ELIGIBILITY
To bring the number of users of social security down further the admission to 
social security arrangements was restricted by making eligibility criteria more 
stringent. Th e outstanding example is the mandatory invalidity insurance for 
wage earners. Since its start in 1967 it had seen three decades of high infl ow and 
low outfl ow, which resulted in a steady increase in persons receiving payments 
under the arrangement. In the 1990s it had risen to more than 10% of the 
working population: by international standards an incredibly high level of 
incapacity. Lowering of the higher than minimum benefi ts from 80 to 70% had 
enacted only little eff ect on the ample use of the arrangement. A parliamentary 
inquiry in the early 1990s affi  rmed the fi ndings of earlier studies that the law had 
been used on a grand scale to shed off  redundant workmen by off ering people a 
4 Stegeman 2005.
Instrumentalisation of the public interest in social security: 
an economic perspective
Intersentia 123
better jobless income arrangement than unemployment insurance could provide. 
Next to that the organisational set up to implement the law (controlled by 
representatives of employers and trade unions) was criticized for doing little to 
stimulate partly handicapped persons to search for a job.5
Th e incisive revision of the Invalidity Insurance Act in 2005 had more eff ect. It is 
telling that the name changed into Work and Income (Capacity for Work) Act. 
Th e criteria for eligibility became stricter by making a distinction between the 
really needy with a close to 100% labour handicap and the not so needy who are 
partly handicapped. Th e last category has been heavily curtailed in or excluded 
from benefi ts. A national agency has been set up and money has been made 
available to support people actively in their search for a suitable job. Th e number 
of persons using the arrangement has decreased and aft er medical re-examination 
60% of those who lost all or part of their benefi ts had a job.6
Th e demand for benefi ts from insurance does not only depend on the behaviour 
of the employee. Th e incentives for the employer also play a role. Social insurance 
created the possibility to shift  costs of labour from the individual fi rm to the 
industry. For the employer it was a cheap option to solve problems at work or 
redundancy by accepting or even encouraging absence due to illness of the 
employee. Payment of benefi ts (100% of the salary in the fi rst year and 70% in the 
second year) and monitoring was taken over by the public insurer. Aft er two 
years of absence the patient was eligible for passage to the income arrangement 
for workers with a labour handicap. For the employer the incentives to prevent 
illness or to invest in reintegration were evidently weak. In order to mitigate 
abuse, successive steps have been made in the 1990s and 2000s to shift  the wage 
cost burden of ill employees back to the employer. From 1996 on, the employer 
had to continue payment during the fi rst year and from 2004 on over the full two 
years. If the employer wishes to take out private insurance, the payable 
contribution will depend on his track record regarding staff  illness. Some authors 
have labelled the reform a privatization of the Sickness Benefi ts Act. Th at is 
misleading, since the law is still in existence as a safety net for those who would 
otherwise be unprotected, such as ill employees working at a fi rm that goes 
bankrupt. Th e changes have been eff ective in structurally bringing down the 
percentage of absence due to illness, despite demographic changes that tend to 
raise the percentage. Th e structural component of absence fell from about 8.5% 
of total personnel at the start of the 1980s to 4.5% in the early years of the 
2000s.7
5 Parliamentary Papers II (Netherlands) 1992/1993, 22 730.
6 Astri 2009.
7 Stegeman, 2005.
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Referring to the comments we made on the introduction of mandatory public 
insurance for wage-dependent workers in our chapter on the public interest from 
an economics perspective, it should not come as a surprise that we view the 
so-called privatization of the Sickness Benefi ts Act as a welcome correction of 
the public sector failure of government intervention in a domain where economic 
theory cannot fi nd a public interest according to its own defi nitions.
2.4. CHANGING PUBLIC SECTOR SUPPLY INCENTIVES
Instead of the incentives for consumers of social security and their employers 
reform can address the incentives of the public suppliers of social security. One 
of the causes of the public sector failure of overconsumption and overproduction 
was the separation between making decisions on eligibility for benefi ts on the 
one hand and providing the necessary fi nancial means on the other hand. Under 
the Dutch Social Assistance Act local governments decided on the eligibility of 
inhabitants for income support and the national government provided the 
fi nancial means. Aft er the coming into force of the Act in 1965 the number of 
people receiving support increased steadily. From the 1980s on, various eff orts 
were made to turn the tide. Th e level of benefi ts relative to the net minimum 
wage was lowered, eligibility criteria as well as obligations were stricter, the 
monitoring of clients and sanctions for abuse were strengthened. It seemed to 
work. In the second half of the 1990s and fi rst years of the 2000s the number of 
persons younger than 65 shows a rather steady decrease. Yet the most incisive 
change was the reform in the way local expenditure on income support is 
fi nanced in the new Act on Work and Assistance of 2004. Instead of receiving 
full compensation from the central government for every euro spent, as it used 
to be, the local government receives a fi xed sum of money. If more is spent on 
poor relief than the fi xed budget the local government has to curtail expenditure 
on other tasks or raise local taxes. A surplus eases its fi nancial position. Local 
governments have an incentive to apply eligibility criteria more strictly, to be 
more active in supporting clients to fi nd work and to intensify the monitoring of 
clients to detect abuse. Local administrations reacted the way the economic 
textbook predicts. Econometric studies done by CPB and SEO, taken together, 
estimate that the new Act reduced the number of persons receiving income 
support by 6% over its fi rst three years (2004 through 2006).8 Over a ten year 
period the number of benefi t recipients below the age of 65 decreased from 
397,000 in 1998 to 262,000 in September 2008.9
8 CPB 2006; SEO 2007.
9 Ministerie van Sociale Zaken en Werkgelegenheid 2008.
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A similar story can be told about the reform in the fi nancing of care provided at 
home for ill and handicapped (usually elderly) persons. Until 2007 the decision 
on eligibility for subsidized home care and on the type and hours of care to be 
provided was made by regional committees of experts and offi  cials that had no 
responsibility for total expenditure. Th e arrangement was fi nanced out of the 
national public purse. Th e home care services were provided by regional non-
profi t organisations that charged a fi xed tariff  per hour of provided type of care. 
Clients could choose between registered suppliers. Th ey paid a personal 
contribution related to their income, which the provider had to return to the 
public fund. Th e year 2007 brought reform. Instead of payment for services 
provided without a limit on total expenditure, the public funds for home care 
were distributed among the municipalities as fi xed budgets. A budget surplus 
could be used to fi nance other tasks of the local government. Under the new 
fi nancial regime suppliers of home care services had to negotiate, on price per 
type of care and on total hours per type of care to be provided. Th is gave 
municipalities a strong fi nancial motive to be tough: asking much while giving 
little. In the fi rst year, 2007, the average tariff  per hour per type of care was about 
10% lower than in 2006. A further striking change was a shift  from care provided 
by personnel with high professional qualifi cations to lower qualifi ed, less 
expensive care.10 Furthermore, the traditional providers reported that labour 
conditions for their personnel had deteriorated.11 It also led to complaints that 
the quality of service had deteriorated dramatically. Against such criticisms the 
municipalities have taken the stand that they simply, and strictly, apply the 
eligibility criteria. Th eir view is that in the past, due to lax application of 
eligibility criteria and lax monitoring of public subsidies, much of the low quality 
care, such as cleaning the house, was given by overqualifi ed and therefore 
overpaid personnel. Municipalities refused to pay more for the service than the 
strictly necessary costs.
2.5. MITIGATING XINEFFICIENCY
Th e changes in public sector incentives discussed in 2.4 were in the fi rst place 
meant to counter overproduction and overconsumption. However, the overhaul 
in how the social arrangements are fi nanced has also helped to reduce 
X-ineffi  ciency. Th e input of over qualifi ed personnel in home care is an 
illustration of glaring X-ineffi  ciency. Aft er the fi nancial reform local governments 
have an incentive to avoid unnecessarily high costs because it gives them 
opportunities to improve the level of locally delivered services.
10 Th e care delivered by high qualifi ed personnel was 50 to 80% of total care in 2006, but it had 
decreased to 5 to 25% in 2007.
11 Van der Velde, Smeets & Van Essen 2007.
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Similarly allowing abuse of income support arrangements and inactivity of the 
bureaucracy in bringing recipients back to work means that public money is 
wasted on paying benefi ts. Restricting benefi ts to those who really need it is as 
much a reduction of X-ineffi  ciency as a cut in public sector personnel.
2.6. STRENGTHENING COMPETITION BETWEEN 
SUPPLIERS
In the previous section, we have discussed various repairs and reconstructions in 
social security arrangements carried out to remedy public sector failures. In this 
section we discuss one more option, being the participation of private enterprise 
in the provision of social security, hoping that market incentives will weed out 
public sector failures, such as lack of choice, X-ineffi  ciency and lack of innovation. 
In social security the best possibilities for partial privatisation are situated in the 
production and delivery of care and in insurance.
Table 1 represents four feasible options for organizing a market in the delivery of 
social security, labelled A, B, C and D. In all options, the service is delivered to 
eligible users who have free choice of supplier. Th e public sector fi nances output 
and decides on the quantity it will maximally demand and fi nance per fi rm. Th e 
price (subsidy) per unit of service of a defi ned minimum quality is either fi xed ex 
ante (A and C), or it is determined via competitive bidding (B and D).
Table 1. A semi-market for social security provision
Demand side Supply side
Closed market with 
non-profi t fi rms only
Open market with 
free entry, for-profi t 
fi rms included
Bureaucracy fi xes price and minimum 
quality; negotiates on quota; fi nances output
A C
Bureaucracy fi xes minimum quality; 
negotiates on quota; fi nances output
B D
In option A non-profi t suppliers compete on a market closed to outsiders for a 
publicly fi nanced quota (market share). Th e price to be paid per unit of service is 
set by the bureaucracy and is not a subject of negotiation. Having negotiated 
their quota, the fi rms still have to attract consumers. When the fi xed price 
exceeds the effi  cient cost of producing output of the required minimum quality, 
fi rms are urged to compete on quality. A supplier that stays behind in quality of 
service will lose customers who have free choice. Consumers will then switch to 
a more client-oriented supplier. Suppliers with X-ineffi  cient high cost per unit of 
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output surpassing the fi xed price, will run into losses. If they do not improve, 
such fi rms end up bankrupt and eclipse from the market. So there are clearly 
visible indicators of success and failure in performance.
Option B goes a step further than A by letting suppliers also compete on the 
price to be paid for services of a defi ned (minimum) quality. Th e bureaucracy 
could, for example, organize an auction and select the lowest cost suppliers. 
Firms are forced to focus their competition on the price of a minimum quality 
service. Low cost suppliers are identifi ed from the start and high cost suppliers 
will drop out earlier than in option A.
If the introduction of competition leads to shedding high cost suppliers, it is 
evidently in the public interest. But will it work? Th e closed market can easily 
drift  into a silent consensus not to compete on quality of service (in option A) or 
not to bid in the auction below an agreed upon minimum price (in option B). 
Collusion between suppliers degenerates the market into a cartel, which performs 
hardly any better than the former delivery through the bureaucracy. Even if 
suppliers do not collude, the non-profi t fi rms cannot pay out profi ts, so there 
remains an incentive to use the (potential) surplus for X-ineffi  cient expenditures, 
while they might show little eagerness to innovate with all its risks of not 
succeeding. All this casts doubts on how eff ective competition will actually be. 
In 2009 the Dutch Competition Authority did forbid a merger of regional 
providers of home care because it found that, next to other objectives, it had the 
purpose to restrict competition by dividing the regional market.
From an economic point of view, the preferable alternative is the open market 
with free entry for ‘outsiders’, including for-profi t fi rms (options C and D). Th e 
incumbents have to fear that conspiracy not to compete will tempt potential 
competitors to enter the market. In option C, eff ective competition between 
fi rms that try to draw in consumers will result in output of a quality appreciated 
by the consumers. And for-profi t fi rms tend to be more aggressive in trying out 
innovation that reduces costs as well as innovation that raises quality. In option 
D, suppliers have to keep costs per unit of output as low as possible to get a quota. 
Cost-reducing innovation of for-profi t fi rms forces non-profi t fi rms to follow.
Recent developments in home care in the Netherlands off er an illustration. Over 
the past decades home care became increasingly fi nanced through the public 
sector by way of mandatory social insurance (the Exceptional Medical Expenses 
Act). However, the delivery of home care remained in the hands of non-profi t 
organizations. A semi-market similar to option A in table 1. In 2007 the 
government intervened with a twofold change. Th e local government was made 
responsible for the distribution as well as for fi nancing local home care. And the 
market for subsidized home care was opened for so-called commercial suppliers. 
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Th e established regional non-profi t suppliers now had to compete on price and 
quality with for profi t fi rms. Th e reform very much resembles the passage from 
option A to D in table 1. Th e new fi nancing system made local governments 
tough negotiators in their bargaining with suppliers who did not want to lose 
clients to competitors. As we mentioned before, the average tariff  per hour per 
type of care was about 10% lower in the fi rst year than in the year before the start 
of the new system. Th e second striking change was the shift  to the more austere 
type of services.12 Th e majority of traditional non-profi t suppliers failed to adjust 
organization and personnel in due time. Th e lower tariff s and the change in the 
composition of demand caused such a fall in revenue that its costs were no longer 
covered. Organizations had to eat their capital. Th e 10% price reduction and the 
shift  to more austere services are indications of forced cuts in the X-ineffi  ciency 
that prevailed under the old arrangement due to lack of competition. In the next 
year 2008 performance was better; with 25% of the organizations making a loss.
Th e opening of the home care market for competitors has also triggered 
entrepreneurship and innovation. Against the trend of enlarging the 
organizational scale a former manager in home care started his own business in 
2006 with the building up a network of small-scale local and regional teams of 
about 10 nursing professionals with a mix of higher and intermediate vocal 
training. Team members are paid a wage according to the Collective Labour 
Contract for the home care sector. Th e organizer and employer of the team 
members conclude the contracts and delegate the contracted work to the teams 
that organize their own work.13 Th is is a form of self-management without a 
complicated monitoring mechanism. It is the opposite of the strategy of the large 
organisations that have increasingly centralized the planning of work and split 
up the tasks per client in their smallest elements with minutes set per element. 
Such bureaucratization has led to an overhead cost of on average 30% of total 
cost and for nursing personnel it has brought loss of work satisfaction. In contrast 
the aforementioned network of small teams has an overhead of 8% and where 
nursing personnel see the opportunity they leave the bureaucratic organisations 
to join a local/regional team. In a comparison of 308 Dutch organizations for 
home care the network got the highest score on client satisfaction.14 Th e case is a 
vivid illustration of how opening the market for new competitors attracts 
entrepreneurs who try out new combinations in a sector beset by 
overconsumption (in quality), X-ineffi  ciency and counter-productive 
‘innovation’.
12 Van der Velde Smeets & Van Essen 2007.
13 De Veer et al. 2008; Wammes 2009.
14 De Veer et al. 2009.
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Competition in an open market makes suppliers more pro-active. In the end, 
badly managed fi rms, with sustained high cost and/or poor quality of service, 
will not survive. Although such eclipses are dramatic events, one should not 
overlook the fact that they are an inseparable part of recovering from 
X-ineffi  ciency. Safeguarding the public interest in social security should not be 
confused with safeguarding the special interest of maintaining the status quo.
Partial privatisation and creation of semi-markets in the Netherlands looks at 
times like an Echternach procession, one might say: three steps forward followed 
by two steps back. Around the year 2000 the task of reintegrating unemployed 
persons was taken away from the public sector organisations that register 
unemployed persons and pay benefi ts. All reintegration activities in support of 
unemployed people’s job search had to be outsourced to reintegration fi rms. 
Tenders had the form of either no-cure-no-pay contracts or no-cure-less-pay 
contracts. A few years later the reform was partially turned back. From 2006 on, 
the public sector organisations were again allowed to have in-house reintegration 
and were free to decide whether to contract reintegration fi rms or not.15 Th e 
steps back seem to have been inspired by suspicions that contracted fi rms were 
selective, making eff orts to assist only those unemployed person who were 
relatively east to place. An ex post evaluation has revealed that such ‘cream-
skimming’ was only manifest in no-cure-no-pay contracts for a relatively small 
group of unemployed persons with a labour handicap. More of a worry was that 
the labour contracts of the clients were oft en for a short period only.16 One can 
hope that within a few years’ studies will appear comparing the costs and 
eff ectiveness of the public internal trajectory with the market trajectory. Learning 
by doing and comparing results seems to us an appropriate approach to the 
issue.
2.7. INCREASING CHOICE FOR CONSUMERS
In a normal market, the consumer can choose between varieties of a product, 
diff ering in quality and price. Th e semi-markets discussed in the previous 
subsection do not off er that choice. Th e quality and price of social security 
services are basically determined by the bureaucracy and tend to a uniform level, 
either with price and quality somewhat above the minimum (option C) or at the 
defi ned minimum quality at the lowest price (option D).
To provide for competition in a market with real choice for consumers, a more 
radical reform is needed. Public funds have to be channelled directly to eligible 
15 Koning & Heinrich 2009.
16 Koning & Heinrich 2009.
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consumers of the social security services by giving them their own budget. 
Consumers order the type of service they want. Th eir account is charged with 
the bill and the expenditure reduces the remaining personal budget. Th e 
consumer can exceed his budget, but he or she has to fi nance the excess costs 
him- or herself. Suppliers are forced to focus on what the user of the service 
demands. When consumers diff er in needs and preferences, fi rms have an 
interest in supplying them with diff erentiated services, diff ering in costs and 
accordingly in price. Th e instrument eliminates the public sector failure of lack 
of choice for users. Competition between suppliers limits X-ineffi  ciency.
A Dutch example is the introduction, a few years ago, of a personal fi xed budget 
for eligible sick and incapacitated persons. Th e voucher scheme enables them to 
make their own choice in buying care for certain handicaps from competing 
suppliers of home care. It is also under development in care for persons with 
specifi c handicaps. Alongside this personal budgets, or ‘rucksacks’, are also 
available for long term unemployed persons to fi nance coaching in job searching 
and training to raise capabilities. In creating the latter facility, the hope was that 
the new arrangement would also stimulate innovation in the type of options 
off ered on the market for job training. One of the arguments against voucher 
schemes is that participants might lack the information on what is off ered on the 
market and what would suit their needs best. To counter the problem, the public 
authority can draw up a list of recognized providers and stipulate that budgets 
can only be expended on their services. Th e downside is that such certifi cation 
throws up barriers for entry of potential competitors.17 One can conclude that a 
government introducing ‘rucksack’ arrangements should also consider it as its 
task to provide reliable and relevant information on available supply.
3. CONSTRUCTION AND RECONSTRUCTION IN 
HEALTH CARE
We have defi ned the 1970s as the decade of transition from the period of building 
up social security to the time of its consolidation asking for repair and 
reconstruction. Th is picture is, as all schemes are, a simplifi cation. As recently as 
2006, an impressive new wing has been added to the social security building: the 
Care Insurance Act that covers the costs of health care of all Dutch citizens, 
wage-earners, persons dependent on benefi ts as well as the self-employed. Instead 
of a British-type national health care service, the structure is mandatory 
insurance for each citizen against the costs of a standard package of health care. 
Citizens have free choice between private fi rms supplying insurance. Under the 
17 Groot & Maassens van den Brink 2009.
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old regime such choice was lacking for wage-earners with mandatory insurance 
and non-wage-earners not dependent on benefi ts, could remain uninsured. 
Insurers are forbidden to refuse customers or to diff erentiate contributions on 
the basis of health status or age. Th rough a mandatory scheme of money transfer, 
insurance companies with a share of old and chronically ill clients above the 
average receive compensatory payments from insurers with a lower percentage of 
clients in the high medical cost category. Insurers compete on price (the 
insurance contribution) and on quality of service. In the fi rst years of the Act 
competition between insurers has been eff ective in preventing insurance 
contributions from rising too fast.
Insured persons pay their contributions to insurers. Th ey also pay a special care 
insurance tax, which is proportional to personal income (presently about 5%) 
and which is capped. Tax revenue is partly redistributed in support of insured 
persons with low income. Th e attractive feature of the scheme is that it combines 
free choice of insurer for consumers, similar to what they would have had in a 
market for private insurance, with the fi nancial capability to aff ord insurance, 
comparable with the former mandatory insurance for wage-earners. In our 
chapter on the public interest of social security, the thesis was developed that the 
vertical distribution of lifelong benefi ts of and mandatory contributions to 
welfare state arrangements in the Netherlands refl ect a considerable amount of 
caring (or: solidarity) of citizens with higher incomes with fellow citizens with 
lower incomes. If one accepts that thesis, one can interpret the vertical 
redistribution through the care insurance tax as an instrument that internalizes 
caring externalities in the domain of health care, correcting the market failure 
that would have existed otherwise. With regard to its social and political 
acceptation it is of interest that the redistributive tax did not come in a fl ash, but 
had gradually evolved over a long period.
Th e public interest comprises more than insurance in order to assure citizens 
equal admittance to health care. Th e quality and price of health care itself are 
also at stake. Th e objective of recent government policy is to develop and 
strengthen the market for health care as well as the market for health care 
insurance, in the expectation that competition will lead to better care at lower 
costs. Up to now the insurance market has lived up to the desired curbing of 
ever-increasing insurance contributions. How the market for health care 
provision is faring is less clear. Th e supply of health care has remained a private 
sector activity, mainly by non-profi t fi rms, thus refl ecting the sector’s early 
development as private charity. In the second half of the 20th century the 
government became increasingly involved, starting with the instrument of 
subsidies for hospitals and infi rmaries, for instance, to keep health care 
aff ordable. It was followed by regulatory intervention, such as price regulation 
Andries Nentjes and Edwin Woerdman
132 Intersentia
and the control of investments in health care, mainly geared to keeping rising 
costs under control. Th e government’s blueprint for the future is to reduce price 
regulation and other direct interventions. Insurance companies, representing 
their clients’ interests, will negotiate with providers of health care on the price 
(of a steadily growing list) of cures for which no regulated tariff  exists. At the 
moment of writing this chapter, it is too early to assess the results. To be able to 
make such an assessment, three important issues have to be cleared up in the 
near future.
First, to make informed decisions, insurers need detailed and reliable information 
on the quality of care provided by individual hospitals, for instance. Progress has 
been made in the past years, although there is still a long way to go. Th e hope is 
that with gradually increasing transparency on the quality of care, the medical 
performance of hospitals will become more and more an issue in the negotiations. 
In economic terminology: market demand will then exert pressure on suppliers 
to weed out quality-impairing X-ineffi  ciencies.
Second, the market, where insurers and health care providers negotiate on price 
and quality, evidently has the structure of an oligopoly at both the demand and 
the supply side. Th at makes it hard if not impossible to predict what the fi nal 
outcome will be.
Th ird, in 2009 infl uential political representatives are backing away from earlier 
decisions and have started to contest the acceptability of for-profi t fi rms in health 
care, and even participation of private for-profi t capital in non-profi t fi rms. Th at 
relapse is not in the public interest. On the contrary, it is bad for variety of choice 
for consumers, bad for competitive pressure to reduce X-ineffi  ciency, and bad for 
innovation in health care.
Health care off ers a most interesting case. It combines a further build-up and 
extension of social security, rooted in notions of solidarity, as if we were still in 
the 1960s. At the same time it is a work of reconstruction, trying to cut away a 
proliferation of public interventions and restore the function of markets in health 
care.
4. A PARADIGM CHANGE?
In the literature the question is raised, for instance by Asscher-Vonk (2005), 
whether there has been a ‘paradigm change’: a transition from providing security 
and income protection to making social security subservient to the interests of 
the economy, such as a smooth functioning of the labour market. Although it is 
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not mentioned, the author must have focussed on social insurance for wage-
earners. As has been indicated in this chapter incisive changes to bring down 
expenditure have been made in mandatory insurance against the risk of loss of 
wage income due to unemployment, illness and invalidity. In the domain of 
social security it has only been paralleled by the reforms culminating in the 
transition from the General Assistance Act to the Work and Assistance Act. Th e 
impact of all structural changes to bring down expenditure on income support is 
refl ected in a decrease in social security expenditures as a percentage of gross 
domestic product from 19% in 1980 to a (predicted) 13% in 2010. Th e 1990s have 
been the decade with the harshest cuts. However, to get a complete picture one 
should also have a look at care. Th ere the development has been in the opposite 
direction. Th e major event has been the introduction of mandatory insurance 
covering the cost of medical care for all citizens. Next to that the changes in 
other care legislation have been geared in the fi rst place to improving effi  ciency 
and not to stop the growth in care. As a result the expenditures on social care 
have been rising steadily from 5% of the gross domestic product in 1980 to a 
(predicted) 10% in 2010.18 Taking the fi gures together, collective expenditure for 
social security and care as a percentage of gross domestic product was 24% in 
1980 and the prognosis for 2010 is 23%. In a society where the average income 
per person is roughly 50% higher than thirty years ago, the percentage spent on 
social security and care is only a fraction lower.
Th e transition that actually has occurred is the shift  from social security 
exclusively provided to wage-dependent citizens to social security and care for 
all citizens. One could call it a paradigm change, but in an interpretation very 
diff erent from Asscher-Vonk. From the argumentation in our chapter on the 
public interest of social security it follows that the government has been 
withdrawing from a domain where it hardly had a task since it is obscure what 
the market failure in providing insurance is. Economic theory dictates that when 
there is no market failure to be corrected, there is no public interest asking for 
governmental action. However, the government has extended its interventions in 
the domain of care, where shortcomings in private eff orts to organize solidarity 
create a kind of market failure. Over the past thirty years the government has 
continued its eff orts to fi ll the gaps left  due to market failure and simultaneously 
repair public sector failures in the provision of care. So from an economic point 
of view, the government has been retracting to its core business, which is, serving 
the public interest.
If there are reasons to worry it is about the far from imaginary threat that in the 
domain of care the government will overshoot the mark, as it did in the 1960s 
and 1970s with regard to social security arrangements providing income support. 
18 Source: CPB, Tijdreeks overheidsfi nanciën.
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On its introduction, the Exceptional Medical Costs Act was meant to cover 
medical costs that were unexpected and extremely high, such as long stay 
residence in a hospital for the mentally ill. In the course of time its coverage has 
been extended to include care that does not come unexpectedly or that has costs 
which the large majority of citizens can pay out of current income.19 If the trend 
of the past decades is not defl ected, expenditure on social care as a percentage of 
gross domestic product will creep up further during the coming decades.20 
Since care expenditure is fi nanced by social premiums, care tends to drive up 
labour costs. In a worst case scenario, the economic troubles of the 1970s 
(discussed in section 2.1) might reappear on stage. Th e aft ermath of that period 
should call to mind that what at fi rst sight looks like a confl ict between social 
and economic interests is actually a symbiotic relationship. Social security 
benefi ts and services require resources that are withdrawn from other uses. A 
broad and solid system of social security is only feasible in a state able to keep 
economic problems under control and able to sustain economic growth. It 
cannot survive in a failing economy. Aft er the emergence of economic weaknesses 
in the 1970s and a seemingly uncontrollable increase in social security 
expenditure, decades of repair and reconstruction have followed to make social 
security sustainable. It has been a sobering lesson, not to be forgotten.
5. CONCLUSION
In our chapter on the public interest of social security we have argued that in 
building up social security, governments had a broader conception of the public 
interest than the criteria of economic science prescribe. In the Netherlands, it 
resulted in a public sector provision of certainty of income and care on a scale 
that went further than the correction of market failure. However, we have also 
signalled that government policy in the past three decades has been shift ing. Th e 
political view of what the public interest in social security is has come more in 
line with the economic demarcation. Social security arrangements in the domain 
of social insurance for wage-earners, which cannot be justifi ed as a correction of 
market failure, have been slimmed down. Nevertheless, social security has been 
extended to health care, where we had in fact identifi ed a market failure in the 
organization of solidarity and thus a genuine public interest requiring 
involvement of the public sector. Social care fi nanced out of the public purse has 
even been proliferating to such an extent that it is overshooting the mark.
Next to reorientation of social expenditure the government has introduced 
reforms that will reduce X-ineffi  ciency and may stimulate innovation. An 
19 Groot 2009.
20 De Kam 2009.
Instrumentalisation of the public interest in social security: 
an economic perspective
Intersentia 135
example is competition in the markets where social security services are delivered 
to clients by allowing commercial suppliers free access to the market. Personal 
budgets or vouchers that give consumers more choice, both of supplier and of 
type and quality of service, have been given a try.
In short, the evidence that we have collected does not support the hypothesis 
that the government has let down the public interest in social security. On the 
contrary, by introducing mandatory care insurance and through adjustments to 
suppress X-ineffi  ciency in the provision of care, the government has focused on 
what it had to do: safeguarding the public interest in social security and trying to 
make it sustainable. What remains is the question whether the repairs have been 
suffi  cient to make social security sustainable for the next decades. Time will tell.
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INSTRUMENTALISATION OF PUBLIC 
VALUES IN SOCIAL SECURITY: 




When we try to get to the core of what the ‘instrumentalisation of public values’1 
might be, we are confronted with three general questions:
– What are public values?
– What is instrumentalisation or safeguarding?
– What diff erent ways of safeguarding public values are there?
Th e aim of this contribution is, to attempt to answer these questions from a 
public administration perspective – fi rst in a general way and then applied to the 
policy fi eld of social security.
Traditionally, many public administration scholars considered the guarding of 
public values one of the core themes of the discipline. According to this view, 
both the structuring and the operation of organizations in the public sector 
should be geared primarily to upholding public values such as equity, fairness 
and professional service. Public administration as an academic discipline should 
study the ways and means by which public administration practitioners could 
accomplish these aspirations.2 In the whirlwind of New Public Management 
(NPM) that has swept the fi eld over the past 25 years, this focus seems somewhat 
lost, be it in diff erent degrees. Th e centre subject of NPM is another public value: 
the effi  ciency of the public sector and how to make use of market type 
mechanisms to enhance public effi  ciency.3 In the wake of NPM, many academic 
1 In this chapter the term ‘public value’ is used, referring to the social science approach 





institutions changed their name from ‘public administration’ to ‘public policy’ 
or ‘public management’. Accordingly, the mission of academic scholarship 
partially shift ed towards developing tools for a more market-oriented approach 
of public policy. Still, a substantial part of public administration research was 
aimed at a critical evaluation of NPM devices and accomplishments.4 Th e NPM 
revolution did not leave the policy sphere of social security untouched. On the 
contrary, some of the most striking experiments with market type mechanisms 
have been implemented in precisely this area. Privatization, outsourcing and 
voucher systems are a few of the policy instruments that found widespread 
application in the social security and social care of most industrialized countries. 
As scholarship followed suit, a host of papers on topics such as voucher systems, 
contractual relations and cooperative governance, all in social security, fi lled the 
public administration journals.
It is important to note that the NPM-wave not only implied a modifi cation of the 
tools of choice for public governance, but also an alteration of the underlying 
values, or at least a shift  in the emphasis on diff erent public values. Th is in turn 
has led to a new refl ection of what constitutes core public values that public 
administration is to uphold. We fi nd this for instance in the work of Bozeman 
(2007), but also in the WRR-study (2000) on ‘Safeguarding public values’. Th e 
question ‘what are public values’ is extensively dealt with elsewhere in this 
volume. Suffi  ce it to remark here that from a theoretical perspective, the concept 
remains elusive, all attempts at clarifi cation and operationalisation 
notwithstanding. At the same time, determining public values that require public 
safeguarding is the bread and butter of politics in modern states. Capturing and 
categorizing public values from such a practical point of view is routinely done. 
A simple catalogue in a public administration textbook lists the following:5
– provision of collective goods and quasi collective goods;
– maintaining market infrastructure;
– addressing external eff ects of human activity;
– provision of merit goods and de-merit goods;
– compensating for unequal distribution.
Especially the last one oft en appears as the value base for social security policies 
and arrangements. More specifi c public values that are commonly considered 
essential for the sustainability of social security are solidarity, effi  ciency and 
social and economic participation.6 Th is small inventory seems as good a starting 
point as any to discuss in more depth the idea of safeguarding public values in 
social security.
4 Pollit & Bouckeart 2004.
5 Bovens, Pellikaan & Trappenburg 2005.
6 See Plantinga in this volume.
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2. SAFEGUARDING
We now come to the question: what is the ‘safeguarding of public values’? Before 
we enter into a discussion of safeguarding itself, it is worthwhile to make some 
general remarks concerning ‘social order’. In the social sciences, it is a commonly 
accepted model that social order comes in three distinct fl avours: markets, 
hierarchies and communities.7 Each has its own types of interaction and of 
social control; the Invisible Hand of the Market, the Harsh Hand of Hierarchy 
and the Helping Hand of the Community. Some toll the virtues of the market 
and its capacity to create order without law or hierarchy.8 Others emphasize 
the indispensable and vital nature of community order, trust and social capital 
and denounce the crowding out of structures such as a civil society by markets 
or hierarchies.9 Yet most social scientists would agree that a vital society will 
need a well balanced combination of all three attributes for generating social 
order.10
Th ere is a distinctive diff erence between markets and communities on the one 
hand and hierarchy on the other hand. Although it does not necessarily have to 
be that way, unlike the other two forms of social order, hierarchies are usually 
intentionally designed, created for a purpose. While the social ordering of 
markets and communities can in some sense be considered ‘invisible’, that of 
hierarchies is not. All its ordering devices such as rules, instructions, control, 
sanctioning are man-made and observable. In markets and communities we see 
the social regularity that many individual choices add up to collective phenomena 
that are not or not necessarily intended by any of those individuals making those 
choices. Th ere is a gap between individual choices and collective outcomes that 
constitutes the proverbial invisible hand coined by Adam Smith. Hierarchy 
conversely is an intended result of individual or collective choice. Hierarchy then 
stands for intentional intervention in the social processes of markets and 
communities.
With this in mind, we return to the concept of safeguarding. By the safeguarding 
of public values is generally meant: any intervention in societal aff airs by a 
governmental body or public agency. A few particulars of this defi nition should 
be noted.
First of all, safeguarding is qualifi ed as an activity, an intervention. One approach 
to identifying public values is to consider anything a public value if it is dealt 
7 Ross 1901, Ellis 1971, Goudsblom 1974.





with as a public value. In other words, because the body politic safeguards it, it 
qualifi es as a public value. Such a concept of public values implies that public 
intervention and public values are congruent. When there is public intervention, 
there are public values and vice versa. Th is concept is fl awed inasmuch as that 
there are public values that can endure without government intervention. Th e 
social order and its derivatives that are generated by markets and communities 
are indispensible and therefore in many ways collective interests. Generally 
speaking, the common good is brought about quite oft en without intentional 
social engineering. However, there are collective outcomes of individual choice 
that are not in the common interest, but on the contrary constitute a threat to 
the common good. One class of such outcomes produced by the invisible hands 
of the market or the community is what economists call ‘external eff ects’ – with 
environmental pollution as a prime example. Th e ‘tragedy of the commons’ is 
the parable that illustrates how collective outcomes can be detrimental to the 
best interests of every individual involved.11 Th ese and other threats and missed 
opportunities constitute reasons for government intervention, for the activity 
that we call ‘safeguarding public values’.
Secondly, safeguarding is an activity of public bodies, governmental in one way 
or another. Again this follows from the previous assumption that much of the 
common good is generated by the ‘invisible hand’ of markets and communities. 
Active visible intervention requires accruing power in a collective actor: 
safeguarding public values starts with ‘transferring individual rights of control’ 
to a public authority.12 Th e one distinguishing feature of a government is its 
monopoly on legitimate force. By compelling individual actors to comply with 
collective choices, negative or substandard outcomes of markets and communities 
can presumably be thwarted or corrected. Yet the deployment of public authority 
has its own drawbacks. Time lags, ineffi  ciency and ineff ectiveness are but some 
of the criticisms levelled at many government interventions in society. While the 
fl ipside of market blessings is market failures, the reverse of government 
intervention is government failure.13 Th us safeguarding of public values requires 
careful balancing of interventionist activities with societal capacity for 
maintenance, recuperation and improvement.14
Th irdly, there is a wide variety of public interventions, of ways to use ‘collective 




14 Th ere is a similarity between the choice for the optimal policy mix and the make-or-buy 
choice fi rms are confronted with. When buying (parts for instance) a fi rm makes use of 
market forces to reap effi  ciency benefi ts. When making, the fi rm uses hierarchy to reap the 
benefi ts of enhanced control (Coase 1937).
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authority in societal aff airs brings about and sustains a system of civil law, the 
infrastructure for contractual exchange. At the other end of the spectrum of 
public interventions is the production of collective goods or services by the 
public authority itself. Again, the choice of collective action instruments for 
safeguarding a specifi c public value is a balancing act that involves a lot of trial 
and error. Beyond that, the optimal public policy mix may change overtime, due 
to changing contingent factors, such as technology. More generally, in modern 
society there is hardly any market activity that is not aff ected in some way by 
collective intervention aimed at safeguarding one or more public values.15
Th e concept of ‘safeguarding public values’ thus implies looking at government 
policy from a specifi c angle. Th e concept takes into account that modern society 
has numerous ways to preserve and reinvigorate social order apart from and 
beyond what governments can contribute. Yet modern society has numerous 
ways of disrupting social order as well – witness the 2008 credit crisis. 
Government policy from the perspective of safeguarding public values appears 
as the art of fi nding a precarious balance between preventing societal disruption 
and stimulating societal preservation of social order. Public value failure16 can, 
within this framework, be thought of as a failure of a society at large to preserve 
a desired social order and safeguard corresponding public values. A 
rearrangement of public and private involvement in that area is then called for.
3. VARIATIONS IN SAFEGUARDING
3.1. VARIATIONS IN INTERVENTION
Public values come in diff erent categories and one may assume that each type of 
public value requires its own mix of public interventions, as a complement to 
societal (market and community) ways of social ordering. Th e underlying logic is 
that by combining several ordering principles, weak aspects of one principle can 
be compensated by mechanisms of the other ordering principles.17 However, 
fi nding the right mix is not without problems.18 One complication is that usually 
a number of diff erent public values will have to be preserved at the same time. 
An instrument that eff ectively safeguards one public value may very well be 
detrimental to another one that is equally important. Th e market might promote 
effi  ciency and eff ectiveness of service delivery at the expense of public values 
15 Bozeman 1987.
16 Public value failure is the concept developed by Bozeman 2007. It is discussed extensively in 
the contribution of Plantinga to this volume.




such as equality of rights and legal certainty, while government regulation might 
safeguard public values yet have damaging eff ects on effi  ciency. Th us, when 
searching for the right policy mix there are inevitably tradeoff s between diff erent 
public values. Furthermore, safeguarding is costly, and the costs of an extensive 
set of safeguarding instruments may outweigh its benefi ts.19 Moreover, the 
optimal mix of interventions may change over time, due to changing 
circumstances. Finding the optimum is a recurring societal experiment, and 
easy solutions are not available, all the convictions of social theorists 
notwithstanding.20
One such experiment is to be found in the sector of infrastructure: utilities such 
as railways, electricity, gas, water, and telephone. Typically these utilities were for 
a long time conceived to be natural monopolies and therefore collective goods. 
Th e required infrastructure prohibited a competitive way of providing services. 
On these grounds, in Europe the public policy of choice for safeguarding public 
values of uninterrupted, relatively effi  cient and cost eff ective service was 
government self production by public companies. In the United States, many of 
these utilities were run by private fi rms (such as the monopoly Bell Telephone 
company) while safeguarding of public values was achieved by heavy regulation.
New technology, especially IT, created a host of new ways to use one 
infrastructure system by a number of competing fi rms. Th eoretically this opened 
up the opportunity for enhancing the effi  ciency and cost eff ectiveness by 
privatization: transferring the provision of these services to the social order of 
the market. Yet this gives rise to the question of how to preserve other public 
values related to these utilities, such as uninterrupted service, aff ordability and 
safety. Government policies aimed at creating safeguards for these public values 
with privatized utilities again may use a mix of strategies that relate to the three 
primary forms of social order.21 Government may use hierarchy, imposing and 
enforcing rules concerning the public values it wants to protect. Government 
may also attempt to enhance market mechanisms and facilitate consumer choice, 
including exit options, by enhancing transparency of procedure and performance 
of private fi rms. Finally, government may try to harness community forces, and 
approach the collective of utility fi rms as a civil society and create incentives for 
self-regulation, peer assessment and control within the sector.
19 Mitnick, 1981.
20 Th e idea that safeguarding public values is a a matter of permanent learning by trial error is 
put forward, too by Stam, Stellinga & De Vries 2010.
21 De Bruijn & Dicke 2006.
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3.2. VARIATIONS IN LEVELS OF SAFEGUARDING
A second approach for gaining more insight in the process of policy intervention 
makes use of a social system model of society and its myriad subdivisions.22 A 
systems approach emphasizes a few specifi c features of societies and subunits of 
a society. One such feature is that a system operates in interaction with an 
environment. To model that interaction, a system is considered to have an input 
and an output. Processes within the system are labelled throughput. Typically, 
outputs generate reactions in the environment that are fed back as new input into 
the system. Th is feedback loop is thought to be the most important single feature 
of the relation between a system and its environment.
A policy system (as a subsystem of a society) can be conceived of as the whole of 
institutions and legal arrangements that develops, implements and sustains a 
certain policy complex within a society. From the perspective of the policy 
system, society appears as its environment. Policy systems diff er from one to 
another, depending on the public values, the support and the resources that go 
into the system (its input), on the dynamics of those values within the system (its 
throughput) and depending on the way the system is designed to provide for 
outputs, that is the implementation of policy. Th e safeguarding of public values 
may be located at each of these three levels of the policy system.
At the input level, ample support and resources need to be secured in order to 
make and keep the policy system viable. Political institutions that convert 
societal interests and demands into governmental policies and actions typically 
are the linking pin here between society and the policy system. If this part of the 
system is not functioning well, public value failure results.23 Secondly, 
safeguards at the throughput level are inherent in the institutional design of the 
policy system itself. Ideally the design is such that the policy system is fully 
capable of developing and implementing all those policies that are required for 
upholding and safeguarding its public values. Design features will typically 
consist of a choice of market-type, community and hierarchical tools. A social 
health system, for instance, may be designed to produce a certain level of physical 
wellbeing in society under conditions of equal access and equal distribution. Th e 
policy system mix could include private insurance fi rms, non-profi t health 
providers and public regulators. Th irdly, at the output level of a policy system, 
chosen policies are implemented. At this level the design of the interface between 
the system and the citizens is a core issue. Both the values intrinsic to the policy 
and the accompanying values of for instance citizens’ rights have to be 
safeguarded here. Depending on the institutional mix in place, clients could be 
22 Luhmann 1995.
23 See Plantinga in this volume.
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confronted with street level bureaucrats, private contractors or non-profi t 
professionals – or all three. Th e ways and means of safeguarding public values 
will vary accordingly.
3.3. VARIATIONS IN THE TOOLS OF GOVERNMENT
Traditionally, government policy interventions are hierarchical by nature. 
Making, applying and enforcing rules is the core business of government 
agencies. Even when enlisting market forces or community action, the tools for 
government intervention are regulatory by nature. However, much of the present 
day literature denounces the hierarchy of command and control regulation as 
old fashioned, ineff ective and ineffi  cient.24 Instead regulators are experimenting 
with forms of regulation that allow for more fl exible and tailor made solutions to 
threats to public values. Typically there are three general deviations from the 
traditional command and control kind of regulation to be seen.
Th e fi rst deviation is found within the conception of regulation. While the 
traditional view requires binding rules, to be made by a democratically controlled 
legislature, present day approaches stretch the involvement of stakeholders in the 
rule making process. Responsive regulation is one concept for such an 
approach.25 Self-regulation and other forms of soft  law, sometimes backed up by 
a threat of public regulation, is another form.
Th e second deviation is found within the application and enforcement of rules. 
Where the traditional view of regulation stretches the importance of equal 
treatment, latter day approaches emphasize case by case problem solving.26 Not 
adherence to the rule as such, but tackling the problem that the rule is supposed 
to cover should be the essence of regulatory and supervisory activities. Th us we 
may observe experiments with ‘interactive implementation’, ‘compliance 
assistance’, ‘testing best practices’ and ‘bench mark assessments’. It is quite 
apparent that the old paradigm of legality and equal treatment under the law is 
in jeopardy here.
A third deviation is aimed at enhancing market mechanisms. Divergences from 
a norm or rule are not enforced but exposed. Naming and shaming, transparency 
and other public exposure techniques are used as incentives for customers to 
choose those providers that adhere best to public values. Research shows 
however, that public opinion may well diff er from the opinion of the regulators 
24 Solomon 2008.
25 Ayres & Braithwaite 1995.
26 Sparrow 2000.
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on what constitutes best value for money, and that consumer exit is not 
necessarily an eff ective sanction to promote the desired norm compliance.27
Even though these new approaches are presented as ‘the state of the art’ in 
safeguarding public values, it remains to be seen whether they constitute more 
than a gradual shift . Constraints to be found in time honoured legal principles 
governing public intervention, such as legality, equality and the prohibition of 
arbitrariness, could limit their practical value. Beyond that, some features 
labelled as new inventions, such as interactive rule making, have been practiced 
for a long time in some jurisdictions. It might very well be that we are witnessing 
a modifi cation in approach and attitude, more than a shift  in regulatory 
paradigms.
4. SAFEGUARDING PUBLIC VALUES IN SOCIAL 
SECURITY
Government involvement in social security, or more generally, in safeguarding 
income security under dire circumstances, has a long tradition. Income security 
as such can be considered a public value in the modern welfare state. It falls in 
the general public value category of ‘compensating for unequal distribution’. 
History has shown that neither the market nor civil society are capable of 
producing suffi  cient safeguards against loss of income generating capacity, due 
to impairing accidents, illness, old age and such on the one hand, and loss of 
income due to lack of jobs on the other. For instance, experience taught time and 
again that safeguards against ‘occupational health and safety’ could not be 
contracted for in normal labour contracts. Th erefore in most industrialized 
nations some kind of legislation to correct this market failure can be found. Over 
time, such threats to income security have been met with collective arrangements. 
In fact many industrialized nations have a complicated system of welfare 
provision in which all kinds of risks to a larger or lesser degree are covered. Still, 
there is a large variation from country to country as to the range of risks and the 
strength of protection that public arrangements off er. Or in the terms of our 
previous discussion, there is a large number of ways in which public values in 
social security are being upheld. Just like each policy system, a welfare system 
can be conceived of as the whole of institutions and legal arrangements that 
provides social welfare in a society.28 Welfare systems diff er from one to another, 
depending on the public values that go into system (its input), on the dynamics 
of those values within the system (its throughput) and on the way the system is 





Th ere is not just variation across nations, but also over time. Over the years, a 
shift  in emphasis in institutional arrangements of social welfare systems can be 
observed, a shift  fi rst from community to state, and then to market mechanisms.29 
Th e fi rst welfare arrangements in the 19th century relied on private initiative, 
with an auxiliary regulatory role for the state. Th e churches looked aft er the poor 
and the employers and employees developed funds to cover employment related 
risks. State regulation was not to interfere with these private initiatives. During 
the 20th century, governments increased their role in the provision of welfare, 
creating agencies that supply coverage for a host of income security risks, while 
involvement of community-based associations dwindled. As from the end of the 
20th century, there is a tendency to apply market type mechanism and engage 
private fi rms in the institutional arrangements of welfare policy systems.30 
Underlying these recent shift s toward the market is the same expectation that 
has driven the NPM wave as a whole: the belief that it will increase the effi  ciency 
of the system and therewith decrease public spending.31 State agencies are 
withdrawn from direct provision of welfare services and state intervention is 
gradually reduced to regulation. For some, these developments are a reason to 
qualify present welfare systems as ‘regulatory welfare state’.32
We will now take a closer look at some essential issues concerning the 
safeguarding of public values in such a more privatized social welfare system. 
We do so by applying the social systems modelling developed above. We assume 
that, like any policy system, social welfare systems display input, output and 
throughput levels, and that each level provides a leverage point for safeguarding 
the public values intrinsic to social welfare.
5. SAFEGUARDING AT THE INPUT SIDE
On the input side of the system, we fi nd three distinct policy dilemmas that are 
inherent to all welfare systems:33 a) universality vs. selectivity; b) redistribution, 
especially between generations; c) individual responsibility vs. collective 
responsibility. Welfare policies that are selective target specifi c groups, primarily 
the poor and needy, while universal policies cover a much broader range of risks 
and will also encompass the middle class. Th e degree of redistribution that a 
welfare system is allowed to generate is a second value choice. A third one is the 
29 Huber, Maucher & Sak 2008.
30 Van Oorschot 1998.
31 Walsh 1995; Bredgaard & Larsen 2007.
32 Leisering 2003.
33 Van der Veen 2008.
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degree of collective responsibility and the trade off  with individual responsibility 
that a welfare system may engender.
At fi rst glance, all three dilemmas seem to represent pretty straightforward 
public value alternatives. Safeguarding those values would then imply designing 
a welfare system that is capable of transforming these values into practical 
policies and implementing those policies in the realization of entitlements. 
However, the safeguarding of public welfare values turns out to be more 
complicated than that. Public values themselves, that is public support for 
specifi c policy choices, are infl uenced by design parameters of the welfare system. 
Beyond a certain threshold, too much selectivity erodes support, launching a 
vicious circle of increasing selectivity and decreasing support. ‘Th e more we 
target benefi ts at the poor and the more concerned we are with creating equality 
via equal public transfers to all, the less likely we are to reduce poverty and 
inequality.’34 Just the same, there are self-enforcing feedback eff ects the other 
way around: universal systems tend to buttress support for welfare. More so, it 
has been shown that a universal system enhances social capital and participation 
of a civil society in the common good.35 Bowling alone is more likely in societies 
with a selective system than in societies with a universal system. Similar positive 
feedback eff ects have been observed for public values concerning redistribution 
and collective responsibility. Organized solidarity spawns a sense of solidarity 
while collective responsibility may enhance individual respon sibility.
Yet negative feedback eff ects may occur as well. Th us an overly universal system 
can erode individual and community responsibility. If the government takes care 
of everything, why should citizens take care of anything? Avoiding this type of 
moral hazard is a necessary system requirement. Instruments such as residual 
risk for citizens and giving citizens choice in selecting service providers (through 
a voucher scheme for instance) are some of the latter day attempts to remedy 
such defi ciencies.36
More generally, in order to sustain a social welfare system, welfare policies 
should aim at strengthening positive feedbacks and limiting negative feedbacks. 
Solidarity and social trust are precarious yet indispensable resources for the 
maintenance of social welfare systems. Both can be eroded by negative feedbacks 
like a sense of wastefulness or signs of inequity in the system. In this sense, the 
safeguarding of public values in social security starts with the choice of the goal 
parameters of the policy system.
34 Korpi & Palme 1998.
35 Salamon, Sokolowski & List 2003.
36 Heinrich & Choi 2007.
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6. SAFEGUARDING THROUGH SYSTEM DESIGN
Next, safeguards for the public values of social welfare are to be found in the 
throughput of the welfare system, that is: in the allocation of tasks and powers to 
diff erent public and private actors and in the devices for coordination and 
control.
Th e overall design of social welfare systems may include direct provision by the 
state (in the Netherlands: administration of social assistance by municipalities 
and of unemployment benefi ts and disability benefi ts by the state agency UWV); 
provision by corporatist arrangement (employers and employees) under a 
legislative umbrella; provision by private collectives under a legislative and 
supervisory umbrella (pension funds), provision by private insurance fi rms 
under a legislative and supervisory umbrella (life insurance companies). 
As is oft en the case, in the fi eld of social security too, there is some competition 
or trade off  between several public values. Key public values, apart from income 
security itself, are those of ‘social and economic participation’ and ‘effi  cient 
provision’. Th e prime order of the market may provide for the latter value. For 
instance, private insurance companies are thought to operate relatively effi  ciently. 
Yet the value of income security might not be fully realized: fi rms in the market 
are under the incentive to avoid bad risks (adverse selection), and to take more 
entrepreneurial risks than are compatible with long term social security (‘fi rms 
should be able to fail, but life insurance fi rms are not allowed to fail’). For the 
policy mix there is the choice between accepting the greater risk of the market in 
exchange for more effi  ciency, or building in additional state safeguards to 
promote equal access (prohibit adverse selection for instance) or to prevent 
insurance company insolvency.
Th e value of ‘social and economic participation’ may be jeopardized by income 
security schemes, as the incentive for the unemployed to invest in new 
employment is blunted (a type of ‘moral hazard’). To counter this, the state could 
moderate benefi t schemes, or put in additional instruments to promote the 
return of unemployed persons to the labour market. Here again, employment 
reintegration services can be provided for by the state itself or by private fi rms, 
and again there may be trade off s between effi  ciency on the one hand, and other 
public values such as equal access on the other.
Under present day more privatized conditions, the overall system design tends 
towards a division of labour in which market parties provide forms of income 
security and related services, while state activities are more and more limited to 
providing safeguards against breaches of public values through regulatory 
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interventions. In the words of a well known NPM slogan, state interventions shift  
‘from rowing to steering’.37 Th ere is increasing evidence that a social welfare 
system loaded with market type mechanisms, requires a strong regulator, a 
market authority that can limit or even purge infringements into what constitutes 
the core values of the system.38 Market type mechanisms harness specifi c 
incentives such as profi t maximization, hoping to reap effi  ciency benefi ts.39 Yet 
these same incentives may elicit perverse eff ects: opportunistic behaviour such 
as adverse selection or shirking. Such eff ects not only harm public values but will 
erode support for the system as a whole as well.
Yet a regulatory approach has its own drawbacks. An abundance of literature 
covers criticisms ranging from ‘agency capture’ to lack of eff ectiveness and 
perverse eff ects such as stifl ing innovation.40 General reactions to such criticism 
have been discussed in a previous section. As for the regulatory welfare state: it 
being a recent development, there is still little documented experience about its 
eff ectiveness in guarding public values. Th ere is no reason to assume however, 
that welfare regulators can easily avoid the pitfalls that regulators in other policy 
areas have been wrestling with.
7. SAFEGUARDING AT THE OUTPUT SIDE
Lastly, public values are at stake at the output side of a welfare system. Solidarity, 
the kind of social capital that is indispensable for maintaining a welfare system, 
will quickly wear down if the system proves inadequate: unable to produce 
administrative justice, or inept at effi  cient and eff ective service delivery. It is in 
the management of social welfare that public values are preserved or endangered 
at the output side of the system. And it is in the management of social welfare, 
that experiments in re-balancing the three forms of social order are taking place 
in their most concrete and visible form: marketization of public administration, 
primarily by way of outsourcing.41
One important argument underlying the use of market type mechanisms in 
general and outsourcing of social security services in particular concerns the 
attitudes of the public servants. Traditionally the professional public servant is 
thought to have public value motivations: his aim is to discharge of his duties in 
the best interests of citizens and clients. Th e administration of justice is 
37 Osborne & Gaebler 1992.
38 Mertens 2006.
39 Van den Hauten 2003.
40 Moran 2002.
41 Van Berkel & Van der Aa 2005.
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considered to be his primary motivation. Empirical scrutiny made cracks in 
these assumptions as early as the late 1970s: it turned out that the sheer pressure 
of case overload forced street level workers in public service bureaucracies to 
develop coping strategies that diverged from the ideal of the administrative 
justice.42 Still, in these public administration studies, not the attitude of the civil 
servant but the circumstances under which the street level bureaucrat had to 
function were considered to be the heart of the problem. Twenty years later, NPM 
thinking started questioning the very idea that public bureaucrats would have a 
diff erent approach to their job than for instance workers in the private sector. It 
was wrong, Le Grand (2003) held, to portray civil servants as ‘knights’ – and 
giving them all the discretion to act as they please. Th e starting point for 
managing public service delivery should be to regard street level bureaucrats as 
much as ‘knaves’ as any other employee. A proper set of incentives and des-
incentives would be needed to discipline the doctor and the social welfare worker. 
In this view it was required that public service delivery would operate under the 
same market type incentives as those for profi t providers. Giving citizens 
diff erent options concerning the service and the provider (‘choice’) would be an 
eff ective way to break public monopolies.
Th e prime example of the application of such ideas in social welfare systems is 
the outsourcing of employment reintegration activities. In many cases this has 
meant the emergence of a quasi market of reintegration services in which public 
agencies buy such services from private providers on behalf of their clients.43 
Sometimes this arrangement is accompanied by a voucher system or another way 
of giving clients a choice. Over the last ten years, a host of studies has been 
conducted to evaluate these market type arrangements and to test their 
underlying assumptions. Many were done in the USA,44 but also in Australia,45 
the UK,46 the Netherlands,47 Germany,48 Denmark49 and Switzerland.50 Most 
studies show that so far outsourcing does not seem to be very eff ective: the record 
of private entrepreneurs in reintegrating the unemployed is, on the whole, not 
better than that of public agencies. Th e same is true for effi  ciency. Contracting 
out comes with a lot of transaction costs to counter opportunistic behaviour of 
contractors. It seems that such costs off set any gains made by lower rates of the 
service delivery itself. Beyond that, managing reintegration contracts in such a 
42 Prottas 1979; Lipsky 1980.
43 Le Grand & Bartlett 1993.
44 Domberger & Jensen 1997; Brown & Potoski 2003; Heinrich & Choi 2007.
45 Grub 2006.
46 Finn 2005.
47 Van Berkel & Van der Aa 2005; Sol & Westerveld 2005.
48 Jahn & Ochel 2007.
49 Bredgaard & Larsen 2008.
50 Bonvin & Moachon 2007.
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way that other public values are adhered to, is a complicated task. For Dutch 
municipalities, this was a reason to reduce their outsourcing and embark on a 
strategy of ‘modular buying’. Th e public account manager controls and merges 
the contributions of private contractors into one reintegration plan for individual 
clients.51
All together, management at the output site of social welfare systems – the 
implementation of welfare policies – is still moving back and forth between neo-
weberian hierarchy and contract management of marketized service delivery. 
Th e state of the art in guarding public values in this area is hardly a fi xed state.
8. CONCLUSION
Safeguarding public values is, from the point of view of administrative sciences, 
a matter of institutional balancing of the three basic forms of social order in such 
a way that an optimal mix of administrative justice, eff ective social security and 
effi  cient use of public means is achieved. It is a continuous quest that has a lot in 
common with aiming for a moving target. ‘Muddling through’ while learning on 
the way seems, in most cases, the best available option.52
Safeguarding public values in welfare systems has some specifi c features that 
have to do with the feedback mechanisms that are intrinsic to welfare institutions. 
Safeguarding in this area is not only a matter of harnessing adequate control 
mechanisms from the three areas of social order or of devising the most fi tting 
management for welfare service provision. Beyond that, the preservations of the 
value of solidarity in a society, fundamental to any welfare system, requires the 
expression of solidarity in the make up of that welfare system.
51 Corrà, Plantinga & De Ridder 2009.
52 Lindblom 1959; Bendor 1995.
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INSTRUMENTALISATION OF PUBLIC 
INTERESTS: A LEGAL PERSPECTIVE
Albertjan Tollenaar
1. INTRODUCTION
1.1. THE LEGAL CHARACTER OF INSTRUMENTS
Public interests can be safeguarded in many ways using diff erent instruments. 
Th is chapter limits itself to the legal instruments for safeguarding these interests. 
Th e question addressed is: what instruments can be derived from law for 
safeguarding public interests and how are these instruments applied to safeguard 
public interests in social security?
Th is question needs to be clarifi ed with respect to two elements, which also 
explains the position of this chapter between the other chapters. First and 
foremost, with respect to the meaning of the term law. In the earlier chapter law 
is used as a source on the basis of which public interests can be defi ned. Law is 
then a collection of condensed norms which gives shelter to higher values. 
Together these norms and values can be seen as expressions of the public 
interest.1 Th is is the approach adopted by Vonk & Katrougalos in part A of this 
volume in which they formulated a number of leading principles of social 
security. In this chapter law has another meaning: law is not a source of public 
interests, but an instrument with which these interests can be protected. In this 
respect law is a policy instrument alongside other instruments.2
Th is leads to the second clarifi cation, the boundary between legal instruments 
and other instruments that can be used to safeguard public interests. Th e feature 
that distinguishes legal instruments from other instruments is the shift  of 
individual rights and obligations caused by legal instruments. Legal consequences 
can be realised and enforced by the courts. Other, non-legal instruments do not 
have this specifi c legal consequence. Th is chapter examines only the instruments 
1 See the chapter of Vonk & Katrougalos in this book.
2 Fenger & Klok 2008, p. 224–225.
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that do have a legal consequence. Th erefore contracts do count as legal 
instruments and are relevant as legal safeguarding instruments, while covenants 
are not. Aft er all, a contract involves reciprocal rights and obligations that can 
also be enforced by law. In contrast to this a covenant is much more of a 
gentlemen’s agreement with no legal shift  of rights and obligations taking 
place.3
1.2. APPROACH
Th e objective of this chapter is to characterize legal safeguarding instruments 
and examine how these instruments are deployed in safeguarding the public 
interests in the specifi c policy fi eld of social security. To this end paragraph 2 
starts with a general description of the form and varieties of the legal 
safeguarding instruments. Th e question of how these legal instruments are given 
substance in the specifi c legal fi eld of social security is then addressed in 
paragraph 3. Paragraph 4 concludes with a brief elucidation of the signifi cance of 
legal instruments in the safeguarding of public interests in social security.
2. LAW AS A SAFEGUARDING INSTRUMENT
2.1. IDENTIFYING LEGAL INSTRUMENTS
Th e legal safeguarding mechanism in a national context
Th e function of the law as an instrument for safeguarding public interests is 
largely dependent on the national legal system. In continental systems based on 
the Rechtsstaat the emphasis on safeguarding public interests is found in 
legislation, while in common law systems case law is a more important source of 
law-making.4 Th e consequence of this is that in continental systems we can 
expect to fi nd the safeguarding of public interests embedded in legislation, 
whereas in common law systems we can expect to fi nd the safeguarding of the 
public interest more in the abstract principles that are interpreted by the 
judiciary.
Th is diff erence, however, is not as great as it fi rst appears. Aft er all, when the 
state takes control and uses the law as an instrument, the result can always be 
traced back to legislation.5 Th e legislation provides general rights or general 
3 Pröpper & Herweijer 2004.
4 Th e literal translation would be ‘rule of law’. But as there are more than one meanings of the 
‘rule of law’ I prefer to use the term Rechtsstaat, with all its elements.
5 According to Verdeyen 2009, p. 25.
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obligations and lays down how these rights and obligations can be realised, who 
is empowered to perform the legal acts under public law to make such rights and 
obligations concrete and who is liable under civil law. Legislation forms a 
regulatory framework within which the independent judiciary can judge these 
acts. Legislation has this function in all legal systems, despite whether the system 
belongs to the tradition of the rechtsstaat, like in Germany and France, or 
whether it is based on common law, as in the United Kingdom.6 Th e specifi c fi eld 
of social security in particular is dominated by this instrumental legislation, 
making the nature of the legal system of less importance.
Th erefore: this chapter describes the legal safeguarding instruments without 
reference to a specifi c national legal context. Where needed illustrations are used 
from several legal systems. As a consequence full justice cannot be done to the 
peculiarities of all national legal systems. Th e chapter suffi  ces with a rough 
explanation of the instruments.
Th ree types of legal instruments
Th e ambition is to provide a full description of the range of legal instruments. 
Th is is, however, an impossible ambition insofar as the collection of legal 
instruments seems unlimited. Despite this, in an eff ort to give a comprehensive 
analysis of the legal instruments, the instruments are categorised into a more 
abstract group or type. Th e fi rst type is the legislative power, being the source of 
all legal safeguarding instruments. If the legislator wishes to safeguard a public 
interest the fi rst option would be creating an administrative competence under 
public law and empowering an administrative agency or public bodies to perform 
legal acts. Th e authorisation of public bodies and the degree in which the courts 
can regulate this authority form the second type of legal instruments. An 
alternative approach would be an intervention in existing private relationships. 
Th e legislator can redistribute responsibility between two private parties, such as 
the employee and the employer, or can create procedural safeguards. Th ese 
instruments form the third group of legal instruments.
2.2. LEGISLATIVE POWERS
Legislative power in a legal system
Legislation is based on a legislative power. In many systems the adoption of 
general binding rules can be traced back to the constitution. In non-
6 For France see: Auby & Cluzel-Métayer 2007, p. 77. For Germany: Schröder 2007, p. 120. For 
the United Kingdom: Partington 2004, p. 142.
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constitutional states, such as the United Kingdom, this power can be traced back 
to the principle of the sovereignty of parliament: all legislative power is based in 
parliament.7
Quite oft en a number of entities can be distinguished that are each individually 
authorised to legislate. Th e legislative power is related to a territorially or 
functionally defi ned jurisdiction. Where the legislative power is divided and 
distributed among more legislators the relationship between these legislative 
powers becomes interesting. In a federal relationship the legislating entities are 
on an equal footing, whereas in a decentralised relationship a hierarchy can be 
distinguished between an ‘upper’ legislative level and a ‘lower’ legislative level.8 
Th is hierarchy implies that the legislation of the upper level can restrict the 
legislation of the lower level. However this does not detract from the fact that the 
decentralised legislative levels have free regulatory powers within the hierarchical 
framework.
Th e European and international legal order
Apart from the allocation of legislative powers within a state, general binding 
rules can also be derived from supranational entities, such as international and 
European bodies. European law forms an independent, autonomous legal order, 
from which citizens and member states can derive rights and obligations.9 
Th ese rights and obligations can be enforced through the national institutions: 
aft er all, European law is ultimately implemented by national administrations 
and national courts.
In addition to the European legal order there is the international legal order that 
lays down preconditions that must be complied with by national systems.10 Th e 
exact meaning of these legal norms under international law and whether or not a 
citizen can invoke a provision from international law depends on the national 
legal system. In some systems these norms only become binding once they have 
been transposed into national legislation.11 In other systems the binding eff ect 
depends on the substance of the provision. Th us in the Netherlands norms 
7 Partington 2004, p. 31, Heringa & Kiiver 2007, p. 21.
8 Heringa & Kiiver 2007, p. 29. Examples of a federal relationship: United States, Switzerland, 
Germany, Belgium. With respect to some aspects the Kingdom of the Netherlands is also a 
federation, namely in the relationship to the components of the Kingdom. Th is does not 
detract from the fact that the Netherlands is usually considered to be a decentralised state, as 
is the United Kingdom and France.
9 European Court of Justice Case 26/62 Van Gend & Loos (1963) ECR 1 and Case 6/64 Costa v. 
ENEL (1964) ECR 585.
10 See Vonk 1999 for the signifi cance of international law for national social security law.
11 Th is, for example, is the case in Great Britain.
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contained in international conventions become binding aft er they have been 
announced and insofar as the substance of them is generally binding.12
Safeguarding public interests through the allocation of legislative power
Th e decision as to which forum is competent to legislate is important for a 
number of public interests. In the fi rst place the legislating level has consequences 
for the legitimacy of the rules. Legitimacy is considered to be part of good 
governance.13 Legislation is adopted in a legislative procedure. Th is procedure 
provides for endorsement by those whom the decision addresses. Moreover, the 
legislative procedure is public and accessible, allowing room for consultation and 
recommendations before legislation is adopted.14 Both are mechanisms aimed 
at increasing (democratic) legitimacy.
European legislation illustrates a second public interest that is safeguarded by 
the choice of legislative level: by placing legislative power at a higher level, 
inequalities can be reduced. Indeed one characteristic of legislation is that it 
addresses a general group of citizens. Th e fewer jurisdictions there are, the fewer 
diff erences there will be between the diff erent jurisdictions.
2.3. DIVISION OF POWERS BETWEEN THE 
ADMINISTRATION AND THE JUDICIARY
Oft en legislation provides powers for administrative bodies. Th e law may 
empower an administrative body to grant permits, to enforce prohibitions or to 
pay benefi ts. Th e other side of the coin is the settlement of disputes by an 
independent judiciary. Th e judiciary has the task to settle disputes between the 
citizen and the administration arising from the application of legislation. In 
other words: legislation results in a division of competencies between the 
administration on the one hand and the judiciary on the other hand.
Discretionary powers for the public authorities
Th e judicial review is limited in line with the extent in which the legislator allows 
the public bodies discretion. Allowing the public bodies discretion is sometimes 
12 Art. 93 of the Dutch Constitution.
13 See chapter by Vonk & Katrougalos in this book, which defi nes this interest. Th e connection 
between ‘good governance’ and legitimacy is explained in literature on ‘good governance’. See 
for example: Van Montfort 2004.
14 Perhaps the best example is the Administrative Procedure Act in the United States, in which 




the result of a well-considered decision, when the legislator grants the public 
authorities freedom with respect to the choice it makes when deciding whether a 
subsidy or permit shall be granted.15 Discretionary administrative powers 
facilitate tailor-made solutions that would be impossible if the public body has to 
apply general rules.
Alongside this well-considered discretionary power aimed at facilitating tailor-
made solutions, discretionary power can also be created unintentionally. For 
example because it is impossible to encompass the complex reality in general 
rules. Th e legislator then uses vague terms that require further interpretation. 
Regardless of the origin of discretionary power, it is always the public body that 
has to make a decision in the fi rst place. Only when a dispute arises does the 
court, in second instance, pronounce judgement regarding the administrative 
decision.
Judicial review
When the dispute arises the judge has to answer the question how far he can 
impose his opinion on that of the administrative agency. Where does the 
discretion of the public body end and judicial review start? In German law the 
beginnings of an answer to this question can be found in §20 Grundgesetz:
Die Gesetzgebung ist an die verfassungsmäßige Ordnung, die vollziehende Gewalt 
und die Rechtsprechung sind an Gesetz und Recht gebunden.
Th e use of administrative power by the administrative agency is thus defi ned by 
acts (Gesetzsmäßigkeit) and the law. In fi rst instance the court has to investigate 
whether the administration has violated a written legal rule and in second 
instance the court will answer the question of whether another, unwritten, 
principle has been violated.
Th is distinction between written and unwritten law (legal principles) can be 
found in all legal systems. For example in English law this test is laid down in 
Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corporation, where the court 
tested the exercise of administrative discretion against the requirement that this 
should be ‘reasonable’:
It is true the discretion must be exercised reasonably. Now what does that mean? 
Lawyers familiar with the phraseology commonly used in relation to exercise of 
statutory discretions oft en use the word ‘unreasonable’ in a rather comprehensive 
15 Compare de pouvoir discretionnaire in French law (Auby & Cluzel-Métayer 2007, p. 77) and 
the doctrines with respect to Ermessen and the unbestimmte Rechtsbegriff e in German law 
(Schröder 2007, p. 130).
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sense. It has frequently been used and is frequently used as a general description of 
the things that must not be done. For instance, a person entrusted with a discretion 
must, so to speak, direct himself properly in law. He must call his own attention to 
the matters which he is bound to consider. He must exclude from his consideration 
matters which are irrelevant to what he has to consider. If he does not obey those 
rules, he may truly be said, and oft en is said, to be acting ‘unreasonably’. Similarly, 
there may be something so absurd that no sensible person could ever dream that it lay 
within the powers of the authority. Warrington L.J. in Short v. Poole Corporation 
gave the example of the red-haired teacher, dismissed because she had red hair. Th at 
is unreasonable in one sense. In another sense it is taking into consideration 
extraneous matters. It is so unreasonable that it might almost be described as being 
done in bad faith; and, in fact, all these things run into one another.16
In the United States the Supreme Court defi ned a similar test in Chevron U.S.A., 
Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. (467 U.S. 837 in 1984). In the 
Netherlands the same test is included in the case Doetinchemse 
woonruimtevordering (HR 25 February 1949, ABKlassiek 2003, 8).
Although the judicial review in the legal systems is comparable, there are 
diff erences in emphasis. In continental systems, such as Germany and France, 
much weight is attached to the legality principle. As a result the statutory 
boundaries create very narrow frameworks for review: if the public body acted 
without an authority provided by the legislator, this in itself can be suffi  cient 
grounds for nullifying the legal act.17 In the United Kingdom, where less weight 
is attached to the legality principle, the public body is competent unless it can be 
derived from the legislation that this is not the intention. Th us even if the public 
body did act without legislative authority, this does not necessarily have to mean 
that this is contrary to the legislation. Th e judiciary reviews ultra vires and 
addresses the question of whether the public body acted in the spirit of the 
legislator.18
Additional norm setting by the public authorities
Administrative powers are quite oft en limited to the individualising of the law: 
public authorities can perform individual legal acts. In addition public bodies 
sometimes also have regulatory powers, with which it is able to lay down further 
rules. Th ese regulatory powers actually shift  partly from the legislator to the 
administrative body.
16 Associated Provincial Picture Houses v. Wednesbury Corporation [1948] 1 KB 223.
17 Th is is primarily the case if the act of the agency is qualifi ed as negative state conduct, which 
restricts the citizen in his freedom or rights.
18 Principally in British law: Anisminic v. Foreign Compensation Board [1969] 2 WLR 163.
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Th e choices made by the public bodies in adopting these rules are left  to the 
discretion of the public bodies themselves. In other words: the discretionary 
power is very wide-ranging. Th is forces the court to apply more restraint. As a 
result of this the statutory setting of norms with respect to administrative 
legislation focuses primarily on the procedure according to which these rules are 
created in stead of the content of these rules. It is interesting to realize that in 
many legal systems the legislation that sets norms for administrative acts oft en 
contains procedural norms relating to the way in which norms are developed. 
Th e American Administrative Procedure Act is an example of this: this act sets 
norms relating to the way in which administrative agencies make use of their 
regulatory powers. German law also provides a number of formal requirements 
with regard to administrative regulation. What is interesting in both examples is 
that violations of these standards may lead to nullifi cation of the statutory rules 
by the court.19
In addition to the external binding rules adopted by the public authorities these 
bodies might also adopt rules with only an internal eff ect. Especially when public 
bodies have been granted a discretionary freedom one could expect additional 
norms being set within the administrative agencies on how to use this 
discretionary power. In bureaucratic practice these internal rules or guidelines 
are unavoidable.20 As a result we see Verwaltungsvorschrift en (German law), 
beleidsregels (Dutch law), directives (French law) or guidelines (American law).21 
Th ese administrative rules are legally relevant as they predict the use of 
discretionary powers by administrative bodies.
Self-regulation
Another form of regulation is the (imposed) self-regulation by the addressees 
themselves. Self-regulation oft en takes place within the framework of a power to 
be exercised under public law. Th us complying with the norms created by self-
regulation becomes a condition for exercising a power under public law. Th ere 
are various examples of self-regulation. Th e decision of whether or not to grant 
an environmental permit, for example, is based on the ‘best available techniques’. 
Th e draft ing of these requirements is realised in consultation with the industrial 
sectors to be regulated.22
Another example concerns norm setting with regard to the acts of professionals. 
In the Netherlands the practicing of a medical profession depends on registration 
19 Schröder 2007, p. 112–113.
20 Davis 1980; Hood et al. 1999.
21 Schröder 2007, p. 113–114; Auby & Cluzel-Métayer 2007, p. 78; Harter 2007, p. 370.
22 See art. 17 lid 2 IPPC-regulation (2008/1/EG).
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in a medical register. Registration in the register depends on compliance with 
the requirements formulated by the professional group representing that medical 
specialism.23 Th e same goes for professional legal groups, such as lawyers and 
civil-law notaries.24
Safeguarding public interests through administrative powers
Th e granting of administrative powers is relevant for diff erent public interests. 
Th e traditional unilateral ‘command and control’ legal relationship, in which the 
administrative agency can imposed one-sided obligations on the citizen is more 
and more – also – a modern horizontal legal relationship, in which the norm 
addressee is given space to create its own standards.
In literature this horizontal legal relationship is referred to as ‘new governance’.25 
In new governance the assumption is that the more closely the norm addressee is 
involved in the setting of the norms, the more likely he is to support these norms. 
Legitimacy, eff ectiveness and effi  ciency are thus important public interests for 
the advocates of new governance.26
2.4. PRIVATE LAW AS A SAFEGUARDING INSTRUMENT
Th e development towards ‘new governance’ implies a certain preference for 
private law mechanisms over public law instruments. If the state wishes to 
safeguard a public interest using a legal instrument, it is not necessary to create 
an administrative authority. Th e legislator might also change the existing 
(private) relationships between citizens. Public interests are then safeguarded 
by reallocating liabilities under private law, or by formulating procedural 
requirements to which actions undertaken under private law must comply. 
Th ese are legal instruments, because these instruments ultimately have legal 
consequences.
Liability as an instrument
Civil relationships are entered into between two equal parties. It is this principle 
that distinguishes legal relationships under private law from legal relationships 
under public law, whereby, per defi nition, the two parties are unequal. However, 
the assumed equality between the parties in the private sphere is uncertain 
23 See the Dutch Individual Healthcare Professions Act.
24 Zeegers & Bröring 2008.
25 Solomon 2008, p. 822.
26 Hoekema et al. 1998, p. 327.
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because of social status and the inequality of knowledge. Th e manufacturer of a 
product knows for example more about the quality of that product than the 
consumer. Th erefore it is impossible for the consumer to make a well-reasoned 
choice. He thus runs the risk that the product purchased will not fulfi l his 
expectations.
In this example the inequality between the parties is balanced by the law by 
making the manufacturer liable for the product. Th is product liability is vested 
in all (European) legal systems.27 Th e purpose is always to protect the weaker 
party against the stronger party. Whether this is about the protection of the 
consumer from the manufacturer, the weaker road user from motorised traffi  c 
or the employee from the employer: in all cases private law gives the weaker party 
the opportunity to hold the stronger party liable in the event of damage.
Th e reallocation is based on the assumption that the liable party will make more 
eff ort to prevent damage occurring. Manufacturers will invest more in the 
quality of their products and will provide information about these products for 
the consumer, drivers of motorised vehicles will drive more carefully, fi nancial 
providers will inform their customers better about possible risks and the 
employer will improve working conditions to prevent illness or invalidity 
occurring.
Institutional safeguards
Th e legislator can also compensate inequalities by formulating procedural 
requirements for specifi c legal acts. Procedural requirements are institutional 
safeguards: the legislator makes for example the establishment of a ‘supervisory 
committee’ or ‘works council’ in a fi rm obligatory. Failure to consult the works 
council on certain matters, or non-acceptance of a proposed decision by the 
supervisory committee or by the meeting of shareholders, for instance with 
respect to investment decisions, opens the way for the legal act to be nullifi ed by 
the court. A fairly recent example of the meaning of this obligation is the decision 
taken by the board of Fortis Bank, without consulting the shareholders, which 
was annulled by the Belgian Court of Appeal.28
Creating institutional arrangements to safeguard public interests is an oft en used 
instrument. In the Netherlands there are educational committees, in which 
students participate, to supervise the quality of the teaching that have to be 
27 With regard to product liability this arises from the European Directive on Product Liability 
(85/374/EEC).
28 Brussels Court of Appeal, 12 December 2008, 2008/KR/350. Later this court ruling was 
quashed by the higher Court of Cassation by its decision on 19 February 2010, C.09.0118 with 
the main argument that the court did not take into account the ‘public interest’.
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consulted with respect to decisions to make changes in education.29 Other 
examples are the clients’ participation councils that have to be set up by care 
providers.30 In all these cases the legislator creates a procedural safeguard with 
the objective of removing inequalities.
Safeguarding public interests by private law
Th e legal instruments examined in this paragraph focus on strengthening the 
legal position of a weaker party. Th ese instruments make private parties 
primarily responsible for realising their interests. Sometimes there is a normative 
justifi cation for these kinds of instruments: the state must leave space for the 
private sphere. But there is also a more practical or economic justifi cation: 
intervention by the state in the form of general rules or in the form of providing 
facilities, leads to market failure and therefore aff ects welfare.31 Empowering 
private parties is oft en deemed to be more effi  cient.
However, the use of this type of instruments has its drawbacks. Most importantly, 
it depends on the question of whether the citizen really wants and is able to make 
use of his powers. Indeed, practice has taught us that there is a diff erence between 
having a right and realising that right.32 Th e gap is fi lled by a new type of state 
intervention, quite oft en in the form of supervisory bodies. In the Netherlands 
for example the Consumer Authority supervises the way in which companies 
treat their consumers.33 Th is authority can impose penalties if the supplier 
violates rules regarding consumer information. Th ese facilities under public law 
exist alongside the possibility for the aggrieved consumer to hold a company 
liable under private law.
3. LEGAL SAFEGUARDING INSTRUMENTS IN 
SOCIAL SECURITY
Th e objective of this chapter is to examine the working of the legal instruments 
to safeguard public interests in social security. Th e history of social security 
shows that the public interests are safeguarded by both public and private 
29 See art. 9.18 of the Dutch Higer Education and Research Act.
30 Care providers are charged with the provision of care within the meaning of the Dutch Act 
on Exceptional Medical Expenses and the Dutch Health Care Act (art. 1 Dutch Act on Clients’ 
Right to Participation) the obligation to establish these committees is laid down in article 2 of 
this act.
31 See the chapter by Nentjes & Woerdman on the public interest in social security in this book.
32 Galanter 1994.
33 More countries have a comparable institution. In the United Kingdom the Offi  ce for Fair 
Trading has a similar task.
Albertjan Tollenaar
164 Intersentia
instruments. Social security is private whereas employees and employers or 
charitable institutions organize income security or poor relief. Social security is 
nevertheless public where the state intervenes and supplies, regulates or facilitates 
security. Every system of social security has elements of the safeguarding 
mechanisms distinguished in the previous section. Th e following is based on the 
study and analysis of the social security systems in a number of countries.34
3.1. LEGISLATIVE POWERS IN SOCIAL SECURITY
Social security is primarily a matter for national law and is centrally organised. 
Th is does not only apply to unitary states, such as the Netherlands, where one 
would expect legislative power to be centralised. In federal states too, such as 
Belgium and Germany social security is largely a federal matter.35 Only within 
the federal framework do the gemeenschappen or the Länder have the power to 
decide how these rights will be eff ected and to confer supplementary or additional 
rights.36
Th e central bias of social security legislation that is to be found in every legal system 
is mitigated in two ways. In the fi rst place there is the European and international 
legal order which creates norms. In the second place the setting of norms in 
legislation is bounded by private social security.
Th e European and international legal order
European intervention in national social security relates fi rst of all to the 
coordination of social security between member states. European social security 
comes into play when an employee and his family migrate between member 
states. Th e coordination of national social security in such cases is regulated in 
Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004.37 Th is nature of coordination does not mean to 
say that this regulation is not capable of interfering directly in the powers of the 
national legislator. For example, article 4 Regulation (EC) No. 883/2004 
34 Th e social security systems in Belgium, Germany, the United Kingdom and the Netherlands 
have been chosen. Th is choice is based on the one hand on the relative accessibility of the 
sources to be studied and on the other hand on the expectation that the systems in these 
countries demonstrate suffi  cient variation.
35 For Belgium see art. 5, § 1, II, 2 sub a of the Exceptional Act (Bijzondere wet) of 8 August 1980 
reforming the institutions and for Germany: § 74, Abs 7 and 12 Grundgesetz. In the meantime, 
in Belgium the devolutionary process has moved on; only the Flemish government introduced 
an insurance scheme for care dependency.
36 For Belgium see art. 5, § 1, II, 2 sub b of the Exceptional Act (Bijzondere wet) of 8 August 1980 
reforming the institutions and for Germany: § 15 Sozialgezetsbuch VII. See further: 
Vansteenkiste 1995, p. 115.
37 With regard to the predecessor (Regulation (EC) 1408/71), see Pennings 2001, p. 6.
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prescribes that persons falling within the scope of the provisions of the regulation 
have, in principle, the same rights and obligations pursuant to the legislation of 
each member state as the nationals of that member state. In other words: social 
security law of the Member States is not allowed to make any distinction on 
grounds of nationality, be it directly or indirectly.38 Also harmonisation 
measures, for example in the fi eld of the equality of treatment between men and 
women realised, amongst others, in Directive 79/7/EEC, have the capacity 
interventing directly into the freedom of the national legislator. Other EU 
initiatives, for example the ‘method of open coordination’, have a more indirect 
eff ect on the process of national norm setting.
Apart from the European legal order, there are international norms which have a 
bearing on social security laid, including a number of ILO conventions.39 Th ese 
conventions impose minimum standards which must be adhered to by the 
national legislator, for instance with respect to the level of protection provided.40 
Even if such conventions cannot be successfully invoked by individuals in court, 
they can still aff ect the political debate and can act as guidelines for interpreting 
legal concepts.
Private social security
On the other hand legislating power is bounded by the social security that arises 
in the private sector. Th e principle of subsidiarity is especially in the fi eld of 
social security very important. Th e state has to leave room for private initiatives. 
Where work related risks are concerned the fi rst responsibility lies with 
(representatives of) the employers and employees.41 For example, work related 
risks can be regulated in the context of the labour relationship, on the basis of 
collective agreements on a corporate or sectorial level. Th e freedom of the 
social partners to organise and bargain collectively constitutes the foundation of 
the International Labour Organisation and is recognized in the two core 
conventions No. 87 and No. 98.42
Th e infl uence of private interests may also aff ect the administration of social 
security. In many countries the social security systems are not directly 
administered by government agencies, but indirectly by quasi public institutions 
38 Th e discrimination prohibition is another material rule in European law that aff ects the 
national social security systems, see Vonk 1999, p. 12.
39 More specifi cally ILO Convention 121 containing the general standards.
40 Pennings 2006, p. 112.
41 In the (distant) past the capacity of society to self-regulate was also an important reason not 
to intervene in societal arrangements through legislation as far as this concerned the security 
of subsistence. With regard to the charity and the meaning thereof for the safeguarding of 
public interests: Plantinga & Tollenaar 2007.
42 Verdeyen 2009, p. 59.
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or otherwise by private organisations regulated by law. Th ese alternative forms of 
administration are oft en rooted in a long tradition of corporatism between 
employers and employee organisation and of self government. For example 
German law operates on the basis of the Prinzip der Selbstverwaltung:43 citizens 
must in principle be able to solve, arrange and manage their own problems.44 As 
far as social security is concerned this leads to the explicit observance of a self-
regulatory power for Selbstverwaltungs agencies within the framework of the 
Sozialgesetzbuch under public law. Th ese Selbstverwaltungs agencies may have 
legal personality under public law and have powers under public law, but they 
are compiled by the citizens involved, and the legislation allows them some room 
for supplementary norm setting under public law.45
Similar forms can also be found in other legal systems. In Belgium, autonomous 
public agencies, referred to as parastatalen, are responsible for the administration 
of a number of social insurance schemes, but in their turn these agencies are 
supported by private, non-profi t organisations. Th ese oft en are the heirs of the 
fi rst free social insurance associations. Th ey require recognition as social security 
institutions and are thus subject to supervision based on the legislation.46 In the 
Dutch social security system private administration is particularly developed in 
the area of supplementary pensions set up by employers and employees on the 
basis of collective labour agreements. Th e administration of these pension funds 
is oft en outsourced to private insurance companies, the activities of which are 
regulated by law and supervised by public authorities, most importantly the 
Central Bank. Th e insurance of health costs is another example of a private 
arrangement within a public framework: it is mandatory for citizens to take out 
insurance to cover health costs, but they are free to decide which health cost 
insurer they want to conclude this insurance with. Th e activities of the health care 
insurance companies are strictly supervised by a governmental agency. 
By imposing requirements with regard to the organisational form or by 
subjecting the organisations to supervision, the state makes room for the social 
security provisions created in the private sector. Th e social security legislator 
may withdraw at times, but new legal arrangements then come into play under 
which the state is the regulator. And although the state may not formulate 
material rights, it does create procedural safeguards, or it is the facilitator that 
(also) applies other, fi nancial, instruments.47
43 Becker 2003, p. 226.
44 Maurer 2009, p. 570.
45 Becker 2003, p. 226, see further § 44 SGB IV.
46 Verdeyen 2009, p. 49.
47 According to Klosse & Vonk 2000, p. 191 and Plagemann 2003, p. 438–439.
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3.2. THE DIVISION OF POWERS BETWEEN THE 
ADMINISTRATION AND THE JUDICIARY
Th e division of powers between the public authorities and the judiciary has 
special features in the fi eld of social security. On the one hand the legislator 
occasionally explicitly refrains from granting discretion and opts for a 
penetrating judicial review – even though one might assume that statutory 
discretion would be granted to the public bodies. On the other hand, discretion 
is sometimes unavoidable when the public body exercises its administrative 
powers on the basis of facts that can only be established by an expert. Th is 
applies, for example, when an assessment involves a medical claim.
Tailoring and administrative discretion
In §8 the German Bundessozialhilfegesetz contains the explicit obligation to 
make tailor-made decisions:
Form und Maß der Sozialhilfe … nach pfl ichtmäßigem Ermessen zu entscheiden.
In almost all systems of social security especially social assistance requires 
tailoring: the individual circumstances have to be taken into account. Th erefore 
the public body must consider the individual interests.
Th ere are, however, risks accompanying this discretion. Discretionary powers 
are a ‘two-edged sword for benefi t recipients’: on the one hand wide-ranging 
discretionary powers facilitate tailoring, on the other hand inconsistencies and 
arbitrariness lie in wait.48 During the reform of the ‘income support’ in the 1980s 
in the United Kingdom the scales tipped in favour of codifi ed rights for citizens 
and less room for discretion for the administration, at least where assistance 
payments for regular expences were concerned.49 A similar tendency can be 
observed in Germany and the Netherlands.50 Th e result is: less room for the 
administration, and more room for the judicial review.51
48 McKay & Rowlingson 1999, p. 134.
49 Wikeley & Ogus 2002, p. 275.
50 For Germany see: Schellhorn & Schellhorn 2002, p. 97–98. For the Netherlands: CRvB (Dutch 
highest court for social security decisions) 8 November 2005, USZ 2006, 13.
51 Th e little discretion that is left  for public bodies is to calculate the fi nancial resources of the 
citizen, or in fi nding a solution to the question of whether the exceptional costs can be met 
from the resources and the assistance provided.See for Germany: Schellhorn & Schellhorn 
2002, p. 98 and for the Netherlands: art. 35 lid 1 Work and Social Assistance Act.
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Establishing facts when assessing a claim: the defi nition of medical concepts
In other areas of social security the public body does have room for some 
discretion, making it diffi  cult for the judiciary to fully assess the decisions being 
made. Determining the incapacity for work of the employee who applies for an 
invalidity benefi t, requires a medical assessment by a doctor. It is interesting that 
every system of social security copes with the standardization of the fact fi nding 
by these experts. In the United Kingdom the doctors’ reports are regulated in 
regulations, which focus on the method of assessment and do not provide 
substantive qualifi cation with regard to established facts.52 In Germany even 
the defi nition of Arbeitsunfähigkeit is left  to the guidelines that are formulated by 
the profession itself.53 Th is is comparable to Dutch law, whereby appointed 
protocols set the norms for the company doctors’ reporting.54
Th e role of the experts’ opinions in the fi eld of social security law has 
consequences for the judicial review. Th e court is more or less forced to show 
deference with regard to the facts that are established by a (medical) expert. Th is 
is unavoidable because the court itself lacks the medical knowledge to impose its 
opinion on the medical opinion of a doctor. As a result the judgement by the 
court focuses on procedural leverage points, which reveal something about the 
quality of the opinion. Relevant facts here include who has carried out the 
medical examination (is this doctor suffi  ciently qualifi ed?) and the method by 
which the examination was carried out (were the relevant protocols applied?). 
With regard to substance the medical examination can only be invalidated if 
another expert’s report is produced to contradict it.55
Where the latter is concerned, the United Kingdom off ers an interesting 
in-between variant, whereby in the phase preceding the safeguarding of the legal 
rights disputes are heard by an external Tribunal. Th is Tribunal consists of three 
independent members, including a medical professional. Th e Tribunal can 
impose its ruling in the place of the administrative agency’s decision (in this 
case: the Department for Work and Pensions’ Benefi ts).56 In this way more room 
is created for a penetrating assessment of the medical facts during the legal 
proceedings.
52 See Borghouts-Van de Pas & Pennings 2008, p. 42.
53 Th ese guidelines are based on § 92 SGB V.
54 See Regulation of protocols for insurance physicians with regard to incapacity for work acts.
55 De Graaf, Schuurmans & Tollenaar 2007, p. 3–15.
56 Th e protection provided by the Tribunal bears some similarities to the objection stage in 
Dutch law, whereby a medical insurance expert re-examines the facts established in the 
primary phase.
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3.3. PRIVATE LAW AS A SAFEGUARDING INSTRUMENT 
IN SOCIAL SECURITY
Public safeguards in private disputes
With regard to the work related risks, social security is entangled with labour 
law. Th e legislator sometimes makes explicit use of the existence of a private legal 
relationship to safeguard public interests. Employer’s liability for sickness and 
invalidity is an example of this. Th is liability is given substance, amongst others, 
by the obligation laid down by law to continue to pay wages if the employee is 
unable to perform his or her work as a result of illness. In the United Kingdom 
this obligation arises from the obligation for the employer to pay a Statutory Sick 
Pay (SSP) to the employee who is ill for longer than four days. Th e SSP consists of 
a fi xed sum per week and is paid for a maximum period of 28 weeks. In this way 
the employer himself experiences the disadvantages of his employee being absent 
due to illness.57 In the German system there is an obligation to continue to pay 
wages (Entgeltfortzahlung), albeit that this is limited to six weeks and many 
companies are partly compensated under public law.58 In the Netherlands the 
employer bears the risk of his employee falling ill and in the event of his employee 
falling ill the employer must continue to pay wages equivalent to at least 70% of 
the wage for a period of two years.59
Th e defi nition of this liability under private law expresses the fact that the 
relationship between employer and employee extends beyond the performance 
of work in return for the agreed wage.60 Furthermore, it is assumed that the 
employer shall avoid the situation in which his employee calls in sick by, for 
example, investing in good employment conditions. On the other hand it is 
assumed that the employee shall call in sick less oft en given that he or she is not 
supported by an anonymous government agency but by a visible opposite party, 
namely the employee’s employer.61
A consequence of this re-defi nition of the liability is that simple disputes will arise 
regarding the question of whether or not the employee is indeed ill. Th is is 
primarily a matter for private law: the employee calls in sick and is required to 
submit some sort of proof in order to realise his or her right to continued wage 
payment. Th e employer can invalidate this proof. In every legal system in which 
the legislator includes the risk related to illness in the labour relationship, 
57 Wikeley & Ogus 2002, p. 530.
58 Based on § 617 BGB (German Civil Code) and the Entgeltfortzahlungsgesetz. See also: 
Hoogendijk 1998, p. 226.





arrangements are made under public law to settle this type of disputes. In the 
German system the employer can report to the benefi ts agency, which must then 
investigate whether the absence due to illness is justifi ed.62 In the Netherlands this 
type of disputes leads to civil law actions to claim wages, during which the 
employee is required to request a second opinion from the public body’s doctor.63 
Th ese examples illustrate that although the legislator may opt to use liability under 
private law as an instrument to safeguard public interests, arrangements under 
public law are necessary to balance the undesirable eff ects of the private power 
game.
Public safeguards in private institutions
Th e empowerment of the employee, benefi t recipient or client forms an argument 
for ordering the establishment of works councils or clients’ participation 
councils. Th ese institutions are another type of legal instrument meant to 
safeguard public interests. Examples can be found in every legal system. In 
Germany there is the Betriebsrat on grounds of the Betriebsverfassungsgesetz, in 
the United Kingdom the Works Council on grounds of the Information and 
Consultation of Employees Regulations 2004 and in the Netherlands there is the 
ondernemingsraad on grounds of the Works Councils Act. Th e function and 
authority of these councils varies from country to country. In many cases these 
councils are able to infl uence the way in which social policy is given substance 
within the company through the right to consultation and recommendations. 
For example, with respect to the way in which the employer gives substance to 
preventive measures with regard to absence due to illness.
Other institutional safeguards are the clients’ participation councils, established 
by agencies under public law charged with the provision of social security. In the 
Netherlands persons entitled to national assistance, an unemployment benefi t or 
an invalidity benefi t are able to exert infl uence through so called cliëntenraden 
set up by the administrative institutions.64
Finally, complaint procedures also represent an institutional safeguard. In 
particular when services are provided by public institutions, the law oft en 
arranges for a complaint procedure. In the Netherlands this procedure is laid 
down in the Dutch General Administrative Law Act. In the United Kingdom 
62 On grounds of § 275 SGB V the medical service of the Krankenkas must start an investigation 
in the case of ‘begründeten Zweifeln an der Arbeitsunfähigkeit, insobesondere auf Verlangen 
des Arbeitsgebers’.
63 Th e employee submitting a wage claim must also submit an expert’s opinion on grounds of 
art. 7:658b BW (Dutch Civil Code).
64 See art. 7 Work and Income (implementation structure) Act and art. 47 Work and Social 
Assistance Act.
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these procedures are regulated by the public authorities charged with the 
administration of the diff erent facilities. Th is applies for example to the Jobcentre, 
which exercises the most authority.65 Th e most important characteristic of a 
complaint is that it seldom results directly in legal consequences. A grounded 
complaint does not lead directly to the invalidation of a legal act, or to the 
creation of a new legal right. On the other hand, complaint procedures are pre-
eminently suited to protect a public interest as ‘good governance’: aft er all in the 
ideal situation the quality of the service provision is thereby enhanced.
4. HOW DO LEGAL INSTRUMENTS WORK?
Th e above refl ections on how legal instruments work in general and in social 
security in particular bring us to three conclusions. In the fi rst place, the legal 
instruments off er a number of choices between what at fi rst sight are contradictory 
public interests. For example, at the level of the legislative authority, a uniform 
and equal social security system is an argument for granting legislative power at 
a high legislative level. Legitimacy, eff ectiveness and tailoring are, however, 
reasons for granting regulatory powers at a level closer to the norm addressee.
With regard to the substance of the legislation we are faced with similar 
dilemmas. Th e legislator can choose between open norms, which make more 
tailoring and eff ective decision making possible or closed norms, whereby 
equality and legal certainty are safeguarded. Th e degree of penetration of the 
judicial review is also dependent on this choice. Th e more discretion the legislator 
leaves to the administration to seek tailor-made solutions or to qualify facts, the 
less the courts are able to judge the substance of the administration’s opinion.
Th ese tensions are also revealed in the use of instruments under private law. On 
the one hand, these instruments steer by creating incentives and thus contribute to 
an awareness of responsibility and an effi  cient distribution of social security. On 
the other hand, it is exactly this type of incentives that can lead to external eff ects, 
which make new public interventions necessary. Th e employer who is liable for the 
illness of his employee can, for example, rather than investing in better employment 
conditions decide to take this risk more into account when selecting new employees 
with the result that some groups, especially elderly people and handicapped 
persons, fall overboard. Th e legislator will have to act to reduce these threats of 





Th e second conclusion relates to the range of legal instruments. Legal instruments 
have particular consequences for individual legal relationships, which can only 
be realised at that individual level. Ultimately the employee or benefi t recipient 
has to enforce his or her rights. Th e law is tailored to this individual 
administrative justice and cannot claim that it is able to safeguard public 
interests at a more general level.66 If the employee or the benefi t recipient refrains, 
for whatever reason, from enforcing his or her right, the public interest in respect 
of which the right is granted will never be realised. For this reason alone, non-
legal instruments are indispensable.
Th is latter observation brings us to the third conclusion: in an extended system 
of privatisation it is unavoidable that new instruments under public law will turn 
up to compensate the economically and socially weaker party. Th e working of 
private instruments depends on an equal playing fi eld. If parties are unequal 
there is reason for the state to intervene with supplementary instruments. 
Supervisors and institutional safeguards are the result. Hence, the privatisation 
of social security, does not result in less state intervention, but to state 
intervention of a diff erent sort. Th is is exactly what the regulatory welfare state is 
all about.
66 Leaving aside the systems with a Constitutional Court, where the Court can interfere on a 
more abstract level. Nevertheless: even these courts are limited to the legal arguments and 
will have to respect the political decision-making.
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In 1972, the Indian government issued a law which specifi ed the minimum wage 
farmers should pay to their servants. In his fascinating book ‘Th e Poverty Regime 
in Village India’, the Dutch sociologist Jan Breman described its eff ects.1 
Nothing seemed to change for the landless workers, who remained underpaid 
and never received more than half of the prescribed amount of rupees. It did, 
however, positively aff ect the income of the inspectors. From that time on ‘they 
travelled around the countryside, not to ensure that landowners were complying 
with the law, but to threaten them with prosecution unless they paid them a 
bribe’.2 Th e poverty-stricken caste of the Halpati was not helped at all by 
governmental regulation.
Had the Halpati been able to read this volume, they would probably not have 
understood its eff orts in pointing at the state as the ultimate safeguard for social 
security. Virtually all policies and programs issued by the democratically elected 
government seemed to founder on the incapacity of the system to provide a 
minimum of security and justice. Apparently, state regulation is not suffi  cient to 
safeguard their socio-economic rights, not even in those cases in which the state 
is democratically accountable.
Th e sad story seems to capture precisely the problems that are central to this 
volume. It makes clear that by declaring social security a ‘public interest’ nothing 
is yet said about the question who is the best candidate for safeguarding such a 
public interest or, more interestingly, how such a public interest should be dealt 
with. Pointing to the state as the ultimate protector of socio-economic rights 
does not solve the interesting question under which conditions the state can 
1 Breman 2007.
2 Breman 2007, p. 90.
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execute its public tasks in a satisfactory way and how it should execute these 
tasks.
In order to answer these questions we should avoid the temptation to identify too 
easily the public sphere with the offi  cial sphere. Th ese are separate domains.3 
Although public law indeed refers to the organisation of the state and its relation 
with the citizens, the same does not apply to other things called ‘public’. A public 
house does not belong to the state. All we intend to say by declaring houses, 
gardens, restaurants and even Hyves pages ‘public’ is that they are open and 
accessible to all.4 In this sense, the market is a public place, even though it is 
regulated by private law. What is more: its public nature (openness and 
accessibility) is safeguarded by private (anti-trust) law.
In this contribution I will argue that in order for states to safeguard diff erent 
interests – including socio-economic ones – in a reliable and eff ective way, there 
needs to be a strong public sphere, to be diff erentiated from both the private and 
the offi  cial domain. Th e features of such a public sphere will be sketched, in fairly 
simple terms, as the result of a process of representation and abstraction. On the 
basis of this rough sketch, I will develop three normative requirements by means 
of which strong public spheres can be distinguished from weak ones. On the 
basis of these requirements the question can be addressed to what extent and 
under which conditions the nation-state is able to maintain a strong public 
sphere in which not only liberty-rights but also socio-economic rights are 
safeguarded. Aft er having outlined the weaknesses of the welfare state in 
preserving a public sphere, two alternative candidates are examined: lower level 
institutions and the judiciary. It is argued that all three have diffi  culties in 
optimising the three requirements. Th e article concludes by proposing some 
possible remedies.
2. MAKING ONESELF UNDERSTOOD
Th e boundary that distinguishes the private sphere from the public domain is an 
essentially contested one. Frontiers shift  incessantly. Th e mediaeval custom of 
the nobility to receive important guests in their bedroom may suggest to us that 
at that time a private life as such had yet to be invented. But the mediaeval noble 
might draw the same conclusion if he could have witnessed our ease in talking 
3 In the words of Eisenstadt: ‘Th e concept of a public sphere entails that there are at least two 
other spheres – the ‘offi  cial’ sphere of rulership and the private sphere – from which the public 
sphere is more or less institutionally and culturally diff erentiated. It is, there fore, a sphere 
located between the offi  cial and the private spheres.’ See Eisenstadt 2006, p. 143–166.
4 Habermas 1962, p.13.
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about emotions or sexual problems on the television. Th ese examples may alert 
us to the fact that the dividing line between public and private is mainly 
determined by how we act. Th e nobles may have received people in their bedroom 
but they did not act in a very private way. Th ey may have worn night-gowns but 
their conduct was a very formal one. On the other hand, what strikes us in 
witnessing people on TV, is that they speak to us as if we are close friends instead 
of an anonymous audience. What we call private and public is therefore closely 
connected with a certain way of doing things.
Th is diff erence in attitude can rather easily be explained. If we start with the 
simple notion of the public sphere as a sphere which is ‘open and accessible to 
all’, it is clear that it is nothing more – nor less – than the world where we have to 
deal with people who might not be familiar to us and who may even be strangers. 
Th is implies that in the public domain a diff erent form of behaviour is called for, 
which enables us to deal with such people. We can no longer rely on the many 
implicit rules, conventions and customs that regulate our lives with family 
members and intimate friends. We have to fi nd ways in which we can be 
understood by others, who may not share these tacit assumptions.
Th is can be done by conducting aff airs in a particular way; namely by adopting 
roles and rules. Both rules and roles generate a stock supply of meanings that are 
shared and therefore accessible to all involved. Th e simplest example of someone 
who adopts a role is the ritual dancer who bears a mask.5 In doing so, he does 
not act out his ‘true and authentic self ’ but represents himself on a diff erent level, 
by playing a role that is recognizable to others. Th is role can be a very concrete 
one, e.g. where a particular ancestor is represented, or an abstract one (‘evil 
forces’). What is important, however, is that the represented item can be 
identifi ed, and recognized by others.6 In adopting a role, I represent myself as 
someone who is accessible and understandable to others, even strangers. I make 
myself public, so to speak.
We engage in this form of communicative behaviour daily. In choosing a special 
type of clothes, or a special trendy type of iPod, I indicate that I want to be 
regarded as a certain person. In order to succeed in this, I have to make sure that 
that role is understood by the others. In some contexts, for instance in academic 
circles, the proudly displayed Vuitton bag would probably not even be noticed. 
Th e bag then fails to help me represent myself, just as the masks of the ritual 
dancers fail to represent the ancestors in the eyes of an audience that mainly 





Roles also rely on shared understandings of the proper context. Th e black dress 
at a funeral has a diff erent meaning from the black dresses worn by gothic girls. 
Th ese shared understandings can be expressed by rules. Th ese rules can be said 
to constitute the role. Th ey are of the form:
If conditions a, b, c obtain > X counts as Y in context C.
Th ey stipulate in advance that under condition a, b, and c, and in a specifi ed 
context C, a particular mask counts as ‘ancestor’, a particular dress counts as the 
expression of ‘grief ’, and a particular utterance counts as ‘promise’.7 Every role 
and representation presupposes such a rule.
In relatively small and simple communities these underlying rules are barely 
noticed, because their content is well-known and does not need to be made 
explicit. Implicit rules are hardly perceived as rules. We only become aware of 
their existence if they are violated or simply ignored. So if we have to deal with 
newcomers or relative strangers, it will be necessary to make these underlying 
rules explicit. In such a context, it is no longer possible to rely on tacit background 
knowledge and unquestioned moral distinctions. Th e rules that are supposed to 
guide the representations we make, but also the rules that guide our behaviour 
and the way we relate to others should be made ‘public’, in the sense that they 
should be made explicit and clear; they should be ‘published’ in the sense of 
accessible to all involved, and – preferably – it should be possible to question the 
rules in a ‘public’ debate, which is equally open and accessible to all.
Instead of the dichotomous division of a space into a private and a public sphere 
that are mutually exclusive, it seems therefore more appropriate to keep the 
picture in mind of the wider and narrower circles that surface by throwing a 
stone in the water. What counts as ‘public’ depends on one’s point of view. 
Viewed from the confi nes of my family home, the inhabitants of my village 
belong to the public realm. Viewed from the perspective of the village-dweller, 
the public realm begins outside the village. Th e wider the circle, the more 
strangers are included. Th e more strangers are included, the more need there is 
to make the rules that guide our relations, roles, and representations explicit.
If we adopt the metaphor of these widening circles, we may allow for the 
possibility of diff erentiating between what I would call ‘stronger’ and ‘weaker’ 
public spheres: a stronger public sphere encompasses a greater diversity of people, 
and abides by more explicit rules and roles than a weaker public sphere.
7 Humphrey & Laidlaw 2004. For a philosophical analysis of ‘count-as’- norms, see Searle 1995.
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3. DEGREES OF ABSTRACTION
To the dimensions of inclusiveness and explicitness a third element should be 
added in determining the strength of a public sphere and that is the level of 
abstraction.
In order for ritual masks, bags and iPods to function as bearers of shared 
meanings, they have to be impersonal. Th e mask represents someone else (the 
ancestor), not the bearer himself. Th e representation is more ‘objective’ than the 
actual living person who represents himself, which means that the representation 
abstracts from the particulars that distinguishes Peter from Jim. One may object 
that although this may apply to the masks of primitive man, it does not apply to 
modern man who, on the contrary, wants to distinguish himself by his trendy 
iPod. But this is a mistake. Th e proud owner of the iPod represents himself not 
as a particular person but as someone belonging to a class of people, a class of 
people which is fortunate, rich, modern etc. By showing off  his iPod he 
distinguishes himself, it is true, but only by abstracting from particular and 
individual features and by representing himself as belonging to the desired 
category of people. In the public sphere, people represent themselves in categories 
that are more abstract than the particular individual they are in private life.
Th e level of abstractness of the categories can vary and is, I believe, directly 
linked to the inclusiveness of the public sphere in which one moves. If I am 
travelling in Africa there is no sense in representing myself as someone who is 
born in Rotterdam, not even as an inhabitant of the Netherlands. It is no 
exaggeration to say that only in Africa I represented myself as a European. Th e 
wider the public circle is drawn, the more diverse its members, the more the need 
to make one self understood in terms that are accessible to the other members, 
the higher the level of abstraction required. A very high level of abstraction is 
reached in the representation of individuals as citizens. Th is representation not 
only abstracts from the particularities of Jim, it also abstracts from more abstract 
roles as employee, consumer or city-dweller and turns him into a member of the 
abstract category of the citizenry.
It is important to note that where the roles and categories are abstract, the rules 
that govern these categories are equally abstract. In order to grasp the relation 
between categories and rules, we should distinguish between the rules that turn 
Jim into a citizen and the rules that are applicable to Jim once he is regarded as a 
citizen. Th e rules that turn Jim into a citizen may be general in the sense that 
they all equally apply to a member of a particular class, but these rules can be 
quite concrete. E.g. the rule that all immigrants from a specifi c province in Iraq 
who succeeded in acquiring a work permit before June 10, 2005, and who have 
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been employed for more than 6 months by a certifi ed employer, are entitled to 
Dutch citizenship. Th is is no doubt a general rule in the sense that it applies to all 
those who belong to the designated category, but the category itself (immigrants 
from this particular province) is extremely concrete. However, once Jim is 
entitled to Dutch citizenship he enjoys a set of rights and duties that are not only 
generally applicable to all citizens, but which are also fairly abstract since they 
fl ow from the abstract category of citizenship. Abstractness of roles matches 
abstractness of rules.
What we see here is that the category of citizenship acts as an intermediary 
between on the one hand a set of conditions that should be met and on the other 
hand legal consequences.8
If conditions [Iraqi province, 2005, certifi ed employer] obtain > Ahmed counts as citizen
If condition [Ahmed = citizen] obtains > Ahmed is entitled to rights a – z
If we keep this intermediary function of concepts such as ‘citizen’ in mind, it is 
clear at once that the choice of representing oneself as either ‘consumer’, ‘Halpati’ 
or ‘citizen’ is not entirely free. Such a choice is to a large extent informed and 
necessitated by the rights and duties that are attached to such a concept. In a 
society where rights and duties are usually accorded to castes, there is obviously 
hardly any need to invoke the general notion of citizen. It does not serve, in those 
contexts, as a viable intermediary notion connecting conditions to legal 
consequences.
I noted above that strong public spheres can be distinguished from weak ones by 
the extent to which they include diversity and the degree in which they make 
rules and roles explicit. To this, the third criterion of abstractness can be added. 
I assume that in a strong public sphere, categories and rules are of a fairly abstract 
nature. Abstractness is directly linked to the criterion of inclusiveness. Th e more 
a certain category abstracts from the particular properties of individuals and 
their specifi c interests, the more we arrive at the ideal of formulating rules that 
are generally applicable to members of the abstract category, without exceptions, 
privileges or favours due to some particular properties.9
Th inking back to the Indian inspector I introduced above, one of the things that 
went wrong in his enforcement of the minimum wage legislation is probably the 
8 Th ese so-called placeholder concepts are analysed in Ross 1957, p. 812–815. For a good Dutch 
overview, see, Hage 2008.
9 Th at is why lawyers tend to refer to abstract rules as ‘general’ rules. Logically speaking, this is 
a mistake. Any rule is ipso general in the sense that it refers to general categories (‘all 
immigrants who…’) What lawyers mean when they talk about the virtues of ‘general rules’ is 
that the categories of such rules are abstract enough to cover a wide range of individuals.
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lack of abstraction of roles and corresponding rights and duties. Th e inspector 
does not take on the role of the government offi  cial at all. He therefore presumably 
does not feel bound by the abstract rights and duties that are attached to that 
role. He rather sees his job as his personal belonging; a source of personal, private 
income.10 Decisions on prosecution are therefore felt to be subject to personal 
discretion rather than to general and explicit rules pertaining to the abstract 
categories designated by the law.
4. PUBLIC INTERESTS
I have described several ways of making oneself understood in a sphere that is 
marked by diversity. In such a sphere there will not only be a diversity of 
opinions, values, and rules, but also of interests. I don’t think, therefore, that 
‘public interests’ should be seen as interests that belong to the ‘public’ in just the 
same way as we talk about ‘consumer interests’ as the interests of ‘consumers’. 
Such a manner of speech presupposes a unity (the ‘public’) which does not exist. 
Rather, we call something public the more a certain space includes diff erent 
people and interests. To talk about ‘the’ public interest is therefore oft en no more 
than a rhetorical device in order to conceal these diff erences and to elevate one 
particular interest above the others under the guise of its so-called public 
nature.11
Such an a priori defi nition of ‘public interest’ overlooks the fact that a defi nition 
of the public interest is precisely what is at stake in those debates which revolve 
around the question what exactly we should make ‘public’ (open and freely 
accessible). Th ese debates are all about the demarcations of the public sphere: e.g. 
what should we prefer: an open and accessible (public) market in which there is 
free competition between diff erent transport businesses? Or do we prefer to turn 
transport itself into a public commodity, i.e. freely accessible to all?
An advantage of my analysis of ‘public’ as denoting a particular way of dealing with 
relative strangers is that it does justice to that debate. Th e public interest is then not 
an interest of the public but consists in a way of handling confl icting interests. In 
line with the dimensions discerned above (inclusiveness, explicitness and 
abstraction) we may say that it is in the public interest to include as many interests 
as possible, to weigh and to balance them, to abide by explicit rules in regulating 
and resolving confl icting interests, and, if possible, to abstract from particulars by 
assigning rights and duties to more abstract and impersonal categories. In such a 
10 Th e conditions required in order to take the role of the offi  cial bound by abstract rules, are 
analysed, as is well-known, by Max Weber 1980, p. 551–579. See also Eisenstadt 1959.
11 Rousseau’s concept of the volonté générale is an example of such a strategy.
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way, interests are made public instead of being presupposed to ‘exist’ prior to how 
we deal with them. In a strong public sphere, there is an open (inclusive, explicit) 
discussion about which commodities should be publicly available.
I would like to defend the view that these tasks should for a large part be 
entrusted to the offi  cial domain. By ‘the offi  cial domain’ I do not refer to a specifi c 
form of government, but simply to the idea of a third party, which has enough 
power to enforce its decisions, and which is hierarchically superior to the parties 
that entertain more or less horizontal relations with each other.12 Such a third 
party is needed, since only such a party can develop the bird’s eye view necessary 
to include, weigh, balance, explicate and abstract the various competing interests. 
Th e reasons for this all have to do with the importance of impartiality.13
To a large extent it is possible for the parties themselves to draft  rules (contracts) 
which are explicit enough to coordinate their mutual actions but these rules 
cannot be used as standards for arbitration if we do not allow a third party to 
intervene and to arbitrate in case of confl ict. Th e same applies to the requirement 
of inclusiveness of interests. In order to safeguard such inclusiveness, it should be 
entrusted to an institution which –although it may have its own interests – does 
not have any directly competing interests which interfere with the other interests. 
And fi nally, rights and duties which are suffi  ciently impersonal and attached to 
abstract categories rather than to particular persons with their particular 
interests can only be allocated by the proverbial impartial judge who is blind to 
individual particularities.
In other words: in order to turn the public sphere into a strong public sphere, 
which is suffi  ciently inclusive and impersonal as well as guided by explicit and 
abstract rules, an offi  cial sphere is needed, which is superimposed upon the 
horizontal relations that are entertained by the parties themselves. By drawing 
attention to the importance of these functions, I am, however, not necessarily 
committed to a view about who is best equipped to exercise these functions. 
Several options are conceivable. Not only the nation-state but also professional 
organisations, all kinds of supervisory boards as well as the judiciary may all 
come forward and present themselves as suitable candidates. I only claim here 
that these candidates should be assessed and evaluated according to the three 
above-mentioned criteria of impartiality (reached by inclusiveness, explicitness 
and abstraction) in order to ensure that a diversity of interests is taken into 
account and coordinated. If a certain institution lacks the required impartiality, 
that institution is unfi t as defender of the public realm.
12 See Simmel for a fascinating analysis of the diff erences between dyadic and triadic 
relationships, in: Wolff  1964, p.122–125.
13 Habermas 1988, p. 79.
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5. THE WELFARE STATE AND THE PUBLIC SPHERE
So far, I have assumed and argued that the three requirements listed above all 
point in the same direction. It seems a plausible argument: in order to include as 
many interests as possible, one has to be impartial and abide by explicit and 
abstract rules.
However, precisely this assumption has been questioned. Th e debate concerning 
the vices and virtues of the welfare state revolves around the inclusion of socio-
economic interests. It has been argued that the inclusion of such interests is not 
benefi cial to a strong public sphere, but rather risks jeopardizing the neutrality 
and impartiality of the nation-state. Th is view has been put forward forcefully by 
Ernst Forsthoff , when in post-war Germany the very fi rst contours of a welfare 
state became visible.14 According to Forsthoff , the nation-state can only retain 
its impartiality by confi ning itself to classical liberty rights. As soon as the state 
adopts the role of distributor of socio-economic burdens and benefi ts, it forfeits 
its role as neutral arbitrator.
Th is may sound quite paradoxical. Why would a state, (or for that matter, any 
third party) jeopardize its impartiality by including more rights and interests? 
Th e opposite seems much more plausible. Forsthoff ’s argument is mainly based 
on the diff erence between safeguarding and creating rights. According to 
Forsthoff , a classical ‘Rechtsstaat’ mainly safeguards existing (liberty) rights. A 
Sozialstaat, on the other hand, does more than that. It carries out a program in 
order to establish new rights, to create welfare, and to achieve a just distribution 
of burdens and benefi ts.15 Th e welfare state is ‘ein Staat der Leistung und der 
Verteilung’.16 Whereas the classical rights are negative limitations of the power 
of the state, rights, ‘vor denen die Staatsgewalt halt macht’,17 socio-economic 
rights act as positive demands on the state to perform. Th ereby, the task of the 
state is fundamentally altered. It can no longer act as arbitrator but turns into a 
regulator with interests of its own that enter in direct competition with those of 
(groups of) citizens.
Th e diff erence between negative and positive rights has been the subject of an 
extended debate,18 which – although interesting – I will not repeat here. I only 
want to draw attention to the fact that the distinction between positive and 
negative rights to a large extent depends on the assumption that negative liberty-
14 See Forsthoff  1968, p. 145–164. A more recent overview of the literature around the welfare 
state dilemma is given by Scheuerman 1994, p. 195–213.
15 Forsthoff  1968. p. 177.
16 Forsthoff  1968, p. 149.
17 Forsthoff  1968, p. 177.
18 See e.g. Borowski 2007.
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rights should be considered as ‘Vorstaatlich’, existing before the state comes into 
being, whereas socio-economic rights are considered to be the product of state 
intervention. In the contribution by Brinkman to this volume, the various 
attempts to argue in favour of such rights have been dealt with.
Th is distinction between pre-existing rights and rights that result from state-
intervention can be attacked from both ends. On the one hand we may argue 
that both kinds of rights should enjoy a ‘pre-state’ status. One may then argue 
that Locke’s natural rights to life, liberty and property should be extended to 
encompass the rights to income, housing, education etc. Or we may argue the 
other way round by saying that since no relevant distinction can be made 
between the two bundles of rights, none of these rights should be seen as existing 
prior to the state. In that case we should consider property rights as well as the 
right to free speech etc. as just interests that ought to be balanced against other 
interests. Both strategies discard the somewhat disingenuous move to elevate 
some rights over others by just declaring them to be ‘natural rights’, prior to the 
state.19
Forsthoff ’s fears can therefore be dispelled by adopting either of these strategies. 
Only then can we hope to break through the dichotomy between a state which 
has to safeguard negative rights and a state which adopts the more positive role 
of creation and distribution; a dichotomy which – empirically speaking – is 
already considerably undermined in view of the massive amount of planning and 
intervention both at the national and the European level that is required in order 
to establish and maintain a free market and a healthy fi nancial climate.
However, even if we succeed in attenuating the distinction between Sozialstaat 
and Rechtsstaat by claiming that a considerable amount of intervention is needed 
for the preservation of both sets of rights, three of the issues raised by Forsthoff  
remain worth noting and they all three have to do with exactly those dimensions 
I indicated to be vital for a public sphere.
In the fi rst place, we should be aware of the risk that a state which is allocating 
and distributing socio-economic burdens and benefi ts can turn into a very 
manipulative one.20 Th is risk is all the more real in those cases where the state 
attaches extra conditions to the benefi ts (pensions, subsidies, allowances) it 
distributes. Th e additional requirements that should be met by unemployed 
people in order to ‘enjoy’ their social security allowance may be defended by 
saying that rights should match duties, but it is rather easy to arrive at the 
19 Westerman 1998.
20 ‘Kein Staat ist mehr in Gefahr, im Dienste der jeweils Mächtigen instrumentalisiert zu werden 
wie der Sozialstaat.’ Forsthoff  1968, p. 163.
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situation in which civil obedience turns into a service for payment. Th e welfare 
state, by handing out benefi ts and distributing assets, has infi nitely more power 
to enforce its own aims and interests than the classical guardian-state. Th e recent 
tendency of states to turn into bank-owners does nothing to dispel these fears. 
On the contrary, by becoming a player in the fi eld, and a very powerful player at 
that, its interests tend to compete with those of the other players involved. Th e 
state risks losing the bird’s eye view that is needed in order to meet the 
requirement of inclusiveness, which I indicated to be necessary for a strong 
public sphere.
In the second place, the required abstraction of categories and rules seems to be 
endangered as well. Forsthoff  observes that in a welfare state, the citizen no 
longer identifi es himself as a citizen, but mainly as an interest-holder.21 Th is 
contrast may be drawn too strongly. Aft er all, one’s choice to become a socialist 
or a conservative cannot be seen as entirely separated from one’s perceived 
interests. However, there is a grain of truth in Forsthoff ’s observation that the 
more a state regulates the particular interests of particular groups, the more the 
law has to bend itself to the particularities of particular groups and particular 
circumstances.
Th e development that is discernible in the principle of equality testifi es to this 
tendency of particularization.22 It used to be customary to stress the fi rst part of 
that principle, which requires that like cases are to be treated alike. Nowadays, 
however, the second part of the principle, which requires diff erent cases to be 
treated diff erently, is emphasized and leads to increasing refi nement of 
distinctions, categories and corresponding rights and duties.23 Th e principle of 
equality can only be maintained at the cost of an endless proliferation of rules, 
all covering the specifi c needs of specifi c groups of citizens.24 Th e call for tailor-
made legislation is another symptom of the same phenomenon and can very well 
be understood as a refl ection of the fact that those who distribute burdens and 
benefi ts need to take into account a wealth of particular requirements and 
circumstances, which inevitably leads to concretisation rather than abstraction.
Th is concretisation may be needed in order to arrive at fair outcomes. No one 
would deny that the father who distributes his heritage justly between the 
handicapped talented son and a champagne-drinking debauchee has to take into 
21 ‘Er is nicht mehr primär Konservativer, Liberaler oder Sozialist, sondern Landwirt, 
Importeur, Sozialrentempfänger, Grossist, Arbeiter, Hausbesitzer, Ostvertriebener usw.’ 
Forsthoff  1968, p. 153.
22 Gerards 2005.
23 Minow 1990.
24 For an interesting analysis of how such diff erential treatment works in the Indian case, see De 
Zwart, 2005 and De Zwart 2000, p. 4–7.
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account the diff erences in needs and circumstances.25 But it should be realized 
that the fi ne distinctions required here are at odds with the ideal of blind 
Justice.26 Th is means that in a welfare state it will be increasingly diffi  cult to 
arrive at impersonal and abstract categories and corresponding rights and 
duties.27
Th e third dimension I discerned by means of which the strength of a public 
sphere can be gauged is the extent to which the standards for decision making 
are open and accessible to all, which entails the need to make them explicit. Rules 
need to be explicit, clear and precise, in order to serve as a shared frame of 
reference, by means of which decisions can be justifi ed as well as criticised. If 
this requirement is to be taken seriously in a welfare state which has to have an 
open eye for the diff erent needs and circumstances of its citizens, it is clear that it 
cannot fail to result in excessive overregulation, in the sense that for each and 
every circumstance, explicit and highly detailed rules should be draft ed. And the 
more concretely such rules and categories are formulated, the more vulnerable 
they are to change. Since such concrete rules are quickly outdated and cannot 
catch up with social or technical developments, the infl exibility of explicit rules 
will increasingly be seen as a major obstacle.28
Th is problem is not only anticipated on logical grounds, but is indeed conceived 
as one of the major problems of contemporary legislation and has led to all kinds 
of programs in order to reduce the burdens of overregulation. What all these 
programs in order to arrive at ‘better regulation’ have in common is the attempt 
to overcome these problems by reverting to open, fl exible but vague standards.29 
Th ese open standards may either invite the judge to bend the law to specifi c cases 
or they may be meant to be tailored to concrete contexts by groups of norm-
addressees and stakeholders. In both cases the degree of explicitness arrived at 
the central level is considerably decreased.
Th e conclusion seems to be justifi ed that although there is no reason to exclude 
socio-economic rights and interests from public consideration, we should be 
aware that the welfare state risks to lose the very properties needed for preserving 
a strong public sphere. Its distributive role may increase its power and may 
undermine its impartiality. Th e need to meet particular needs aff ects its power 
25 Dworkin 1981.
26 According to Forsthoff  (1968, p. 179): ‘Im Unterschied zu den Freiheitsrechten haben 
Teilhaberrechte keinen im vorhinein normierbaren, konstanten Umfang. Sie bedürfen der 
Graduierung und Diff erenzierung, denn sie haben einen vernünft igen Sinn nur im Rahmen 
des in Einzelfall Angemessenen, Notwendigen und Möglichen’,.
27 Cf. Habermas 1988, p. 52 ff .
28 An abundance of offi  cial reports comment on the inadequacy of rules in this respect.
29 E.g. Ruimte voor Zorgplichten, Netherlands Ministry of Justice, July 2004.
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to transcend concreteness by formulating impersonal and abstract rules and 
fi nally, it will no longer be possible to meet the requirement of explicitness 
without suff ering from overregulation and infl exibility, which will lead to the 
formulation of vague standards; thereby increasing the discretionary powers of 
decision makers.
We should add here, that if this analysis holds, it equally applies to the level of 
the European Union. Th e vast terrains covered by European regulation, together 
with the ambition to steer, shape and harmonize the diff erent member-states by 
means of enormous amounts of subsidies and other such regulatory mechanisms, 
force the EC into a position that is comparable to that of the national 
legislatures.30 Th e tendencies and the shortcomings listed above all equally 
apply to the European level as well.31 We should arrive at the somewhat 
uncomfortable conclusion that the more interests are included and taken care of 
by the offi  cial domain, the more it risks to lose the virtues required of a neutral 
third party, which will inevitably weaken the public sphere.
6. ALTERNATIVES: THE NORMADDRESSEES
As I noted above, we should be careful not to indentify the public sphere with 
the offi  cial sphere too easily. Th e legislatures of nation-states and the European 
Union are not the only possible defenders of the public sphere. Th ere any other 
candidates. In the fi rst place the norm-addressees themselves, in the second place 
the judiciary. I will fi rst examine the qualifi cations of the former; in the next 
section I will deal with the judiciary. Th ey are both investigated by means of the 
above-mentioned criteria of inclusiveness, explicitness and abstraction.
Th e attempts to arrive at better regulation or deregulation led to a practice in 
which rulemaking was outsourced to the norm-addressees themselves, who are 
required to concretise the vague standards issued by the formal legislator. By 
delegating concrete rule-making to norm-addressees, mostly organised in 
branch-organisations and professional associations, or to supervisory boards 
and the inspectorate, it is generally hoped that at the central level the rules will 
remain abstract enough to avoid excessive detail and to withstand time and 
change. As I noted elsewhere32 the rules that are issued at the central level and 
with which the lower echelons are confronted, may exhibit a certain amount of 
30 Th is is refl ected in European governance: a white paper, Brussels 2001, Commission of the EC, 
which diagnoses the problems with rules in much the same way as Dutch reports, and off ers 
roughly the same therapy.
31 Westerman 2007a, p. 51–72.
32 Westerman 2007b, p. 117–133.
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abstraction, but cannot be understood as ordinary rules. Th ey do not prescribe 
the means in order to achieve a certain aim, but mainly prescribe the goals that 
should be reached. Th ey leave it to the norm-addressees to devise the rules (i.e. 
rules prescribing means) by themselves. Th e only genuine rule here is the rule 
that admonishes the norm-addressee to report on the progress that was made.33
Th is strategy is oft en mirrored by lower echelons, which, in a similar vein, 
imposes a more concrete version of the desired aim, and likewise obliges an even 
lower echelon to fi ll in the necessary detail, i.e. to take measures or to draft  rules 
in order to achieve the intended aim, and to report on the progress made. A 
chain of regulations can be discerned here. At each level, goals and aims are 
prescribed, whereas the actual task of rule-making is imposed on others. Th is 
chain hardly leads to any rule-making but mainly consists of an ongoing process 
of concretisation. At each successive step, the aims are translated into more 
concrete goals and targets.
Th is solution is beset by many problems, which I pointed out in detail in other 
places. Th e deregulation reached at the central level is outweighed by an 
enormous amount of excessively detailed regulation at lower echelons, the loss of 
legal certainty (due to the fact that the rules are tailor-made), and the growing 
importance of intermediate bodies of managers and self-professed rule-makers 
of diff erent varieties are all just as inevitable as problematical. I will not repeat 
these disadvantages but confi ne myself to the question which is at stake here: can 
we expect these lower bodies of rule-makers to meet the requirements necessary 
for a strong public space?
Th e answer is, I think, a mixed one. As for inclusiveness, it cannot be denied that 
the practice of outsourcing rulemaking to lower echelons, increases the 
likelihood that more interests are included. As long as these tasks are entrusted 
to groups marked by strong internal social cohesion, the chances that they can 
shape the rules to their specifi c needs are increased. It is diff erent in those cases 
where regulating committees and bodies are established by the central legislator 
for the very purpose of such rulemaking. In those cases, inclusion may not 
always be warranted.34 In cases where regulation is entrusted to supervisory 
boards, the picture is a mixed one, depending on the fi eld at hand.
As for explicitness, the picture is less equivocal. Rules made by lower echelons 
are not only much more detailed but also much more explicit than those 
33 For the full argument the reader is referred to my publications, listed in the preceding 
footnotes.
34 Th e Dutch Tabaksblat committee is an example: the trade unions were not included. See 
Stamhuis 2006.
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formulated at more central levels. Th e reason for this is simply that the lower 
bodies are usually confronted with the obligation to report on the rules they 
draft ed and the measures they took. Since it is clearly not suffi  cient to state in 
vague terms that the goals are reached, standards need to be developed which 
enable the assessment and evaluation of such progress and documents need to be 
drawn up, stating in the most explicit terms the performance indicators, rules, 
codes and protocols that have been developed and instituted. Th e eff ects of such 
explicitness may be perverse, especially where the production of documents is 
seen as a substitute for a real performance or service.35 In those cases where the 
rules are only drawn up in order to justify one’s dealings and to account to the 
external world, the value of explicitness should not be exaggerated. But to the 
extent they are taken seriously internally as well, the process of making these 
rules and standards explicit may pave the way for criticism and change.36
Th e virtue that seems to suff er most from the delegation of rulemaking to lower 
echelons is abstraction. Rules are no longer made by (representatives of) citizens, 
but by people in their capacity of teachers (or more properly speaking: 
educational managers and experts) or in their capacity of health-specialists, or of 
consumers, or of employers, etc. etc. Th e picture sketched by Forsthoff  of the 
welfare state mainly consisting of ‘Interessenten’ is nowhere better embodied 
than in the regulatory landscape of today, where these Interessenten are precisely 
the ones who make the rules. In such a landscape more people may be included, 
but we should keep in mind that they are included not in their capacity of being 
an abstract member of society but as bearers of more concrete and particular 
roles.
One may be tempted to think that it is better to be included qua teacher or 
consumer than qua citizen, represented in a distant central body by equally 
abstract representatives. And indeed, as far as one’s own interests are furthered 
by such direct forms of participation, there may be some truth in this. Th e 
disadvantage is, however, that there is no longer a locus deliberandi where the 
various interests come together. Outsourcing areas of legislation means 
outsourcing to specifi c agencies or institutions, organised around the aim that is 
imposed by the central level. Rules concerning ‘health and safety at work’ are 
drawn up by committees, boards and institutions that all somehow have to do 
with ‘health and safety at work’. Th ey do not take into account other issues, such 
as environmental concerns, since they are simply not instituted to that end. 
Rulemaking is conducted in various functional regimes, which rarely interact 
with each other. Th is means that a bird’s eye view encompassing diff erent 
interests is lacking. Coordination between these functional regimes is highly 




problematical. If rulemaking is delegated and passed on to below, parliament is 
no longer the public space where the relationship and priority of the diff erent 
aims and goals can be discussed and assessed.
We should conclude then that a strong public space can only partially be 
safeguarded in a type of regulation in which rulemaking is outsourced to lower 
echelons. Only explicitness is served, whereas inclusion is doubtful and 
abstraction is downright problematic. It should be noted, however, that in such a 
regulatory landscape, the boundaries between public and private are also drawn 
in a diff erent way. Th e process of what is commonly called ‘privatization’ did not 
make things more ‘private’. On the contrary: fi gures and data concerning the 
performance of schools and hospitals are now publicly available on the Internet, 
and standards have become explicit which make them liable to change and 
criticism by outsiders. At the same time, however, aff airs are conducted in a less 
public way at the more central level. Debates that used to be conducted in 
parliament are negotiated in the corridors, decisions as to the composition of 
important (rulemaking) bodies are taken in ways and quarters that are not 
accessible to the public at large (comitology).
7. THE JUDICIARY
Th e judge is probably the most plausible candidate to act as a third party, who by 
his impartiality can act as a defender of a public space. Judges include, weigh and 
balance the various interests involved, they do so by reference to a body of 
explicit rules that are used as justifi cation for their decisions, and in judging they 
make use of impersonal, sometimes even highly abstract roles. Th e judge is about 
the only fi gure still surviving who is almost generally acknowledged to be the 
embodiment of the public sphere, infi nitely less ‘personal’ than the ‘ordinary’ 
and all too human fi gure of the queen.
It is no wonder then that at the sight of the crumbling public authority of the 
nation-state, which in the form of a welfare state,, as we have seen, increasingly 
takes on the role of a stakeholder with interests of its own, the judiciary has been 
invoked not only as a rival defender of the public sphere, but also as an infi nitely 
better one. According to several writers37 it is to the judge we should turn for 
the protection of our rights and interests. It is maintained that a more active role 
of the judge does not fl out the principles of a state based on the rule of law, but 
instead can quite easily be fi tted in the constitutional make-up. And indeed, 
37 In the Dutch literature examples are Brenninkmeijer 1996; Rijpkema 2001, but also the offi  cial 
report to the government by the Netherlands Scientifi c Council for Government Policy: WRR 
2002.
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since in a welfare state it is not the judge who distributes burdens and benefi ts he 
is better equipped to see to it that no vital interests are excluded or harmed than 
the legislator with its programs, projects and aims.
However, there are problems here too which surface if we examine once more 
the three virtues required of any defender of the public space. Th e main problem 
is the law itself. As Habermas remarked, the law is the connection between two 
kinds of procedural legitimacy.38 Th e legitimacy of the judicial procedure is to a 
large extent dependent on the question whether the law was administered 
properly. But the law can play this role on the basis of the assumption that it 
refl ects the will of the majority of the (representatives of) the citizens. So the 
legitimacy of the judge depends for a large part on the legitimacy of the law and 
that legitimacy in turn depends on the legitimacy of parliamentary procedures 
of decision making. Th e law is therefore the connective tissue, linking democratic 
and judicial procedures.
Th is connective issue, however, is losing fi rmness if the central legislator contends 
itself with vague standards prescribing just some values (fairness and equity) or 
abstract aims to be pursued. If the judge has to cope with such vague standards, 
the degree of inclusiveness will be diminished. Inclusiveness of interests is for a 
large part guaranteed by the assumption that the law embodies a balance 
between interests since it is the outcome reached in a democratic procedure that 
is designed to include as many interests as possible. If the law is too uninformative 
to act as such a living compromise or balance, this would entail that from now 
on the judge can only hope to include the interests of the parties before him; the 
concrete parties of the case at hand. But obviously, this limits the degree of 
inclusiveness considerably.
Th e same applies to the virtue of explicitness. Having no recourse to explicit 
standards, the judge has no other option than to formulate them himself or to 
rely on the rules and standards formulated by others (supervisors, organisations). 
It is clear that the judge is oft en reluctant to execute the job himself. He will 
remain on the safe side, referring to fairness and equity, and will not take the 
risk that his decision be repealed by courts of higher instance.39 If, on the other 
hand, he takes the virtue of explicitness seriously, the judge has no other option 
than to rely on the rules and norms that have been developed by the lower 
echelons.
However, if he chooses the latter option, he is confronted with the problem that 
he cannot act as the judge who is blind to the peculiarities and contingencies of 
38 Habermas 1988, p. 73.
39 Th is risk-avoidance was criticised by Barendrecht 1992.
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the concrete persons in front of him, which are relevant to the case at hand. He 
has to rely on norms for instance, which inform him that this particular branch 
of industry, of this particular size, can commonly be expected to achieve this 
particular level of performance in, say, health and safety precautions or 
environmental measures. He has to get into detail, and to take into consideration 
the particular make-up of the parties before him. In other words: he loses the 
virtue of abstraction. Although he himself may still represent the disembodied 
public realm, the parties before him will turn more and more into the concrete 
entities or living individuals they are, and whose circumstances should be taken 
into account. Of course, this problem is not new. It is inherent in any form of 
judicial decision making. What is new, however, is the extent to which particular 
characteristics should be considered. If norms are made by lower echelons, 
tailored to their specifi c needs and capabilities, these particular characteristics 
determine the norms that are applicable.
We may conclude that even if we are justifi ed in our belief that the judge is 
genuinely disinterested and impartial, he cannot attain suffi  cient inclusiveness, 
explicitness and abstraction to uphold a strong public sphere on his own. He is 
bound by the law and the shortcomings of the law directly aff ect the judge as 
well. Vague laws will compel him to either use his own discretion, which limits 
the inclusiveness of interests, or to rely on standards of other bodies, which limits 
the degree of abstraction. Needless to say that this applies to both the national 
courts and to the ECJ.
8. POSSIBLE DIRECTIONS
Not one of the players in the fi eld seems eminently suitable as a defender of the 
public sphere. Th is has nothing to do with the shortcomings of the players, but 
with the enormous complexity of the tasks that are undertaken. To create and 
sustain a society where socio-economic rights are safeguarded, where the 
fi nancial climate is wholesome and a thriving market is ensured, where safety is 
guaranteed and the environment is protected, where sciences and arts are 
fl ourishing (but fl ora and fauna as well) and where a great diversity of interests, 
opinions and values are taken into account is something that cannot be brought 
about by the nation-state or by any supra-national entity. Such a task probably 
calls for an entirely diff erent ordering of aff airs.
It is probable that the current system of goal-regulation and outsourcing of 
regulation is a beginning of such a new ordering. If that is right, we should try to 
repair its shortcomings. Th e loss of abstraction is probably not to be remedied. 
Th e more regulation takes place at lower levels, the less room there is for abstract 
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concepts such as ‘ the citizen’. Probably, the functional regimes will increase in 
importance. Already now this is how a major part of European legislation is 
draft ed.40 Th is might imply a supranational ordering along functionalist lines. 
Whether such an ordering might overcome fragmentation and concretisation is 
yet to be seen.
As for explicitness, we have seen that rules are made extremely explicit by the 
lower echelons which are required to report on the progress made. Elsewhere I 
describe the perverting eff ects of such an excessive degree of explicitness more 
fully.41 But its eff ects can be benefi cial as well (enabling change and criticism). 
Further analysis of the conditions under which detrimental and benefi cial eff ects 
can be expected seems to be necessary.
Inclusiveness should be ensured by institutionalising the way committees and 
boards, professional bodies and associations should be constituted. It should no 
longer be possible that ‘self-regulating bodies’ are created in a haphazard way, on 
the spur of the moment. Also the procedures of decision making and rulemaking 
should be subjected to explicit rules, safeguarding at least a moderate degree of 
transparency in these corners. Not only the outcomes (rules and codes) should 
be published, but also the procedures by which they were devised should be 
accessible to the public at large. Defi ciencies in inclusiveness are then noticed 
more easily.
Th e lack of coordination that is felt so clearly in this style of legislation should be 
addressed by thinking of ways to manage potential confl icts between functional 
regimes. National authorities should probably spend less time on controlling 
post hoc what each sector has done and not done, and devote more time to the 
organisation of the traffi  c between the various sectors.
Finally, the nation-state should try to regain some of its impartiality by thinking 
of new ways to separate powers. Legislative powers should be strictly separated 
from the competences to allocate funding, subsidies and benefi ts. It should be 
constitutionally prohibited to use subsidies as an instrument to enforce policies. 
Safeguarding socio-economic rights should not be dependent on the performance 
of civil duties. Above all, it should no longer be possible to turn socio-economic 






On the basis of a broad notion of the public sphere as a space where one acts in a 
particular way in order to be understood by relative strangers, I have tried to 
formulate a few normative criteria that should be met in order to maintain that 
sphere. Th e public space should be inclusive, in the sense that diff erent opinions, 
rules, values and interests are taken into account. It should coordinate these 
diff erences on the basis of rules that are explicit, clear and precise and which can 
therefore serve as criteria for justifi cation as well as criticism. Finally, the 
categories used as well as the rights and duties attached to them should be fairly 
abstract. Th ey should abstract from the particularities of the individual persons 
and circumstances in order to arrive at shared meanings.
Explicitness, abstraction and inclusiveness do not arise and grow spontaneously. 
Th ese virtues ought to be preserved and maintained and that should be done by 
a neutral third party which is powerful but also impartial enough to include, 
weigh and balance interests by using explicit rules that cover abstract categories 
and attach equally abstract rights and duties to them. Several candidates present 
themselves as such defenders of the public sphere. Th e most plausible candidate 
is the nation-state. However, its impartiality can be said to be jeopardized by the 
essentially distributive tasks that are entrusted to a regulatory welfare state. Th e 
distribution of socio-economic burdens and benefi ts turns the state into an 
interested stake-holder, and, consequently, the distinction between rights and 
favours tends to be blurred. Th e subjects of such a regulatory state risk losing 
their abstract title of citizenship to the extent they are addressed and regulated 
as people with particular needs and interests. Finally, the need to draw fi ne 
distinctions according to diff erent needs and interests, leads to an ever-growing 
body of excessively detailed rules.
Th e current tendency to overcome this fragmentation by issuing goals to be 
concretized by the norm-addressees themselves, shift s the defence of the public 
sphere to a multitude of more or less ‘self-regulating’ bodies, boards and 
committees. Although this leads to increasing explicitness of rules and standards, 
the requirement of inclusiveness can only partly be met. Some of these bodies 
are more inclusive than others and matters may vary from case to case. Clear 
rules concerning the degree of inclusiveness are lacking. Finally, the virtue of 
abstraction cannot be attained at all in this fragmented landscape. Each of the 
institutions and bodies are organised around a single aim. Th ese functional 
regimes hardly interact and there is little room for coordination.
Th e increasing partiality of the nation-state together with the fragmentation that 
ensues where legislation is outsourced to norm-addressees have led some people 
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to emphasize the role of the judiciary as an important candidate for preserving 
the public space. However, since the legitimacy of the judge is ultimately based 
on the law as the product of democratic procedures, he cannot hope to escape 
from the increasing particularization of categories, the vagueness of the general 
clauses that are issued at the central level and the lack of inclusiveness resulting 
from defi cient democratic procedures.
Wherever we turn, we are compelled to conclude that the three virtues of 
explicitness, inclusiveness and abstraction cannot all three be realized to the 
same extent. Th e complexity of the matters regulated by the welfare state led to a 
situation in which explicitness can only be attained at the cost of abstraction, 
and inclusiveness can only be attained at the cost of explicitness, whereas all 
three are aff ected by the apparent inability of the offi  cial domain to retain its 
impartiality.
We are still a long way from the situation in Gujarat, with which this article 
began. But we should not take that distance for granted. Where discretion comes 
in place of explicit rules, and where impersonal roles are particularized, rights 










Th e chapters in this book were the subject of a scientifi c conference in November 
2009. At this conference several specialized scholars were invited to refl ect on 
the content of these chapters. Th is chapter contains a summary of the discussants’ 
contributions, presented in the same order as the chapters. Th e summaries were 
written by the editors.
2. DEFINING PUBLIC INTERESTS
2.1. FINDING THE EQUILIBRIUM
Prof. Oscar Couwenberg, University of Groningen
Chapter:  Th e public interest in social security: an economic perspective (Nentjes 
& Woerdman)
If one considers social security from an economic point of view it is interesting 
to realize that public interference with social security legislation apparently 
cannot be explained by economic theory. Aft er all, it is not in the self-interest of 
the individual to contribute to a system of social security. Individual rationality 
will in the end give rise to free rider behaviour and risk aversion, which will both 
hamper the existence of the collective social security benefi ts. And even if there 
are economic arguments to justify some aspects of social security, for example 
social assistance for the poor, it is still impossible to economically justify social 
security as a whole. Th ere is simply too much of it. In other words, more 
arguments are needed to explain or justify the existence of social security.
Th e diffi  culty lies in fi nding the ‘equilibrium’ of social security regulation within 
society. Th is equilibrium is the optimum mix of both private schemes and public 
regulation that minimizes the total institutional or organizational costs in a society. 
Th e total costs consist of the cost of both public regulation and private schemes to 
secure income. If there is no government intervention at all, total costs of private 
schemes will be high. For example, in the absence of government regulation private 
insurance companies would select and fi x contributions on the basis of whether or 
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not an individual is a ‘good risk’, leaving ‘bad risks’ uninsured. Th ese bad risks 
(people at a risk of becoming unemployed) will either not fi nd coverage for their 
risk or only on prohibitive conditions. In the case that only government regulation 
is allowed, all risks are covered by a public scheme, resulting in effi  ciency losses 
due to bureaucratic infl exibility and high agency costs.
An equilibrium must thus be found. A mix of both public and market 
mechanisms is almost inevitable. Th e arguments for more government 
intervention are, among others, that sometimes a market solution is impossible 
to attain. In the Netherlands, full privatization is quite oft en not feasible because 
of the size of the market. In the fi eld of health care and social security in 
particular, these markets will easily transform into oligopolies or even 
monopolies, meaning that there are only a few suppliers that dominate the 
market, threatening the effi  cient allocation of resources. Social markets are 
especially vulnerable to oligopolies and monopolies. It is interesting that this is 
also the result of government interference. Aft er all, administrative requirements 
to safeguard sustainable and safe service delivery for all citizens, demand high 
investments. A side eff ect of these requirements is that access for new suppliers 
will be blocked. It then becomes more attractive for competitors to work together. 
If this argument holds, the savings aimed for by introducing more market type 
mechanisms should not be exaggerated.
Another economic problem is the endemic problem of agency costs. Both public 
and private organizations face agency costs: the internal costs related to the 
organization caused by imperfect monitoring and systemic risks. Th e problem is 
that the interest of the organization will not always coincide with the interests of 
the agents working within these organizations and that the interest of the 
organization not always coincides with the interests of the insured. Th e bank 
crisis can serve as an illustration. Th e individual brokers ran huge risks as their 
own bonuses depended on it. Aft erwards it appeared that the risks became 
unbearable causing problems for the organization as a whole. No one seemed to 
be able to judge the risk and to question whether or not the risk was worth 
taking. Organizations have to incur costs to correct these mechanisms. Th is 
illustration shows that agency costs are inevitable: both in private solutions with 
private companies and in the public sphere were the provision of services 
depends on governmental organizations. In both situations the agency costs 
involved have to be taken into account. Th ese costs diminish the supposedly 




2.2. THE SOCIAL CONTEXT OF THE WELFARE STATE
Dr. Rob Schwitters, University of Amsterdam
Chapters:  Th e public interests of social security: a social science perspective 
(Plantinga)
  Th e public interest and the welfare state: contemporary philosophy 
(Brinkman)
In the Netherlands the Workman’s Compensation Act (Ongevallenwet) can be 
regarded as the fi rst regulation of social security. Before this act the risk of loss of 
income caused by an accident due to the working circumstances was the subject 
of tort law. Th e employee had to sue his employer to receive compensation. Th e 
Ongevallenwet marked a change in perspective: the legislator realized that the 
private system had its failures. Th e fault based liability made it almost impossible 
for injured workers to win a procedure. Moreover it was recognized that fault 
liability could not be upheld in cases where the industry forced its personnel to 
expose itself to danger for the sake of productivity.
Th e Ongevallenwet can be seen as a fi rst example of the tendency of a fault-based 
to a risk-based compensation of damage, which refl ected a tendency to consider 
the injury caused by the production process increasingly as a matter of public 
concern. What is interesting is that already those days there were lawyers and 
politicians who were advocating –instead of a public regulation – a more generous 
standard of liability to be able to compensate the victims of modern industry. In 
the 20th century this tendency towards risk liability transformed many domains 
within tort law. Private law is seen as a tool to realize public interests for example 
as an instrument to compensate victims, as an instrument to redistribute means 
or as an instrument to enhance prevention. One could even say that modern tort 
law is in fact public law in disguise. Th is is exactly the topic of the research 
conducted in the fi rst part of this volume: the idea that both private and public 
regulations are alternative options to realize public interests.
Th e social science approach has to distinguish the identifi cation of public values 
from the manner they are realized. Public values may be realized by state 
intervention but also by the market or by civil law. A problem concerning the 
identifi cation of public values is that these cannot be naively derived from what 
people say they consider public values. Aft er all, what people appreciate is to a 
large extend determined by the institutional settings. Th e support for a value as 
solidarity may be the outcome of a prevalent system of social security, as for 
example the Swedish universalistic system is supposed to create solidarity, 




Th e implication of the last issue is that if we want to identify public values we 
cannot rely on the quick responses of individuals in an interview-setting. We 
have to address the respondents as participants in a democratic decision-making 
process, who refl ect as well on their values as on their social institutions. An 
alternative approach might be to rely on more functional sociological 
explanations instead of the support indicated in surveys. Some structural 
transformations are not within the reach of deliberate human interventions, such 
as the level of industrialisation, globalisation of trade and expanding networks of 
interdependency. Th ese are variables that will inevitably aff ect the public values 
within the society. For example, industrialization and rising mobilization erode 
informal networks of assistance and transform the compensation of victims into 
a public value. A more recent example is the urgency which the threat of 
terrorism creates to integrate immigrants and to reduce poverty on a global 
scale.
With this in mind one could add a second remark following Bozemans line of 
argumentation on public value failure. Public values are also aff ected by the 
previous policy choices regarding the organizational structure. One may for 
example assume that market solutions reduce the value of the willingness to pay 
for the (public) good. Th ey may have perverting eff ects on incentive structures in 
that sense that values are reduced to what people are willing to pay for a good. 
Th at does not imply that a state provision is always contributing to more 
solidarity. A strong state provision destroys informal bonds of solidarity, making 
people more dependent on state bureaucracies. Th ese bureaucracies have the 
tendency to grow and to provide social security ineffi  ciently. An increase in 
anonymous state provisions may give rise to calculative behaviour and abuse by 
the benefi ciaries of social security, making the public system even more 
expensive. Society’s response in terms of public values might be that people value 
solidarity less. Two conclusions can be drawn from this. One conclusion is that 
one has to reduce state intervention given the diminishing priority of solidarity. 
Th e other conclusion is quite the opposite: more state intervention is required, 
aimed at combating the abuse of the public system, for example by tightening the 
control mechanisms (more unannounced home visits etcetera).
Th erefore: one could question whether or not it is possible in a social science 
approach to distinct the issue of defi ning public values and the issue of 
safeguarding them. Aft er all: the question how the public values are realized, will 
in the real world inevitably aff ect the support for these values.
Philosophical approach
Ultimately the defi nition of public values is infl uenced by the dominant political 
ideologies. Adding a philosophical dimension therefore contributes to the 
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understanding of the normative background of social security systems. Aft er all, 
in the end social security has to provide justice. To assess whether or not a system 
of social security can provide justice one could use the method of refl exive 
equilibrium presented by Rawls: the application of general philosophical 
principles on concrete issues of social security, does not only provide a solid 
ideological basis of institutions and decisions, but facilitates also a refl ection on 
the appropriateness of those principles. Th is method has two possible outcomes. 
One could use this method as a basis for arguing that current institutions should 
be improved, or, if the application of the abstract principle produces undesirable 
outcomes, that the abstract principle should be amended.
Th e philosophical approach used in this book states ‘communitarianism’ and 
‘liberalism’ as two major philosophical ideologies justifying social security. 
Communitarianists appeal for a community oriented society in which every 
individual contributes his share. Liberals take the individual freedom as a 
starting point. From this perspective social security tends to resemble an 
instrument for ensuring individual interests.
It is important to note that both ideologies have several shades of grey. Although 
the core principles of both approaches are clear and unbridgeable there are forms 
of liberalism that have many characteristics in common with some forms of 
communitarianism. Within the fi eld of liberalism one could distinguish the 
‘hard core’ neo-conservative liberals who have a strong belief in the free-market 
and the liberals who advocate the most radical standard of redistribution. Th e 
latter will address the problem of free rider behaviour and will therefore advocate 
state institutions that enforce individual contributions. In this respect they do 
not diff er substantially from the communitarianists. Th e only diff erence is the 
aim of the institutions: individual freedom versus solidarity.
In our globalizing societies in which individuals are connected to others in 
widening networks of interdependency, it becomes more opportune to justify 
state intervention in terms of a liberal position. Issues as international order, 
terrorism and environmental issues have created many new collective goods 
which demand coordinated intervention. Recent migration patterns have created 
more urgent problems of social integration. Th e shift  in Dutch social security for 
a system of income compensation to a system at reintegration on the labour 
market has not necessarily solely communitaristic underpinnings; it may also be 
seen as a liberal response to safeguard a collective good.
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2.3. THE ORIGIN OF THE WELFARE STATE
Dr. George Katrougalos, University of Trace
Chapter:  Th e public interest and the welfare state: a legal approach (Vonk & 
Katrougalos)
In his article on the privatisation of poverty programs, Matthew Diller (2001, p. 
1765) states that ‘privatisation has proven attractive in the fi eld of welfare because 
the problem of welfare has been rethought in a way that makes it more amenable 
to privatization’. Privatisation is therefore not only a phenomenon that aff ects 
the techniques of public management, but has inevitable consequences for the 
substantive part of welfare in general and social security in particular. Looking 
back the rise of social security would seem to be not only an institutional 
response to market failures. Social security is the answer to the social question 
that captured the 19th century: how could political rights be increased and social 
rights granted to the working class without opening the door to socialism?
If one interprets current norms and rights and tries to deduct public values with 
regard to social security, it is important to bear in mind the historical context in 
which these norms and rights came into being. Th e dilemmas lawyers faced in 
the past are quite similar to those we face now: the main questions were to what 
extent should the state interfere in private relationships and what would be the 
consequences with regard to state control for those using state aid? Th ese 
dilemmas are still relevant. Th e only diff erence is the context in which these 
questions are raised. Nowadays state-interference is quite oft en the starting 
point, while in the very beginning the starting point was the private sphere. And 
nowadays human rights provide the beginning to the answer to what extent the 
state has a right to intervene when granting social security, while in the past 
these human rights were still to be developed.
To fi nd the public values of social security one has to answer the question 
whether social security is a charity or a right. Th ere are diff erent answers to this 
question. In the English liberal-utilitarian approach the provision of social 
assistance under the Poor Law was incompatible with citizens’ rights. Th ose in 
need of social assistance more or less abandoned their freedom. ‘Whenever it 
happens that a man can claim nothing according to the rules of commerce and 
the principles of justice, he passes out of that department and comes within the 
jurisdiction of mercy.’ Traces of this approach can be found especially with 
regard to the poor relief until the fi rst decades of the 20th century. In many 
countries strict controls accompanied the social assistance provided to paupers, 
with in some cases paupers being virtually detained and re-educated. Based on 
this reasoning, the legal perspective is enriched. For an elaboration of this 
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contribution: see the chapter on the legal approach to public interests of social 
security.
3. INSTRUMENTS TO SAFEGUARD PUBLIC 
INTERESTS
3.1. THE NECESSITY OF A STRONG PUBLIC SPHERE
Prof. Cor van Montfort, Tilburg University
Chapters: Instrumentalisation of the public interest in social security: 
an economic perspective (Nentjes & Woerdman)
  Instrumentalisation of the public sphere: 
a philosophical perspective (Westerman)
From an economic point of view the mechanisms to protect the public interest 
are focussed on maximizing the net benefi ts in society. With this in mind 
economists will search for situations in which transactions occur, giving both 
parties the opportunity to maximize their self-interest. As a consequence, this 
kind of interest has a rather restricted scope. In this respect the economic 
perspective on safeguarding public values betrays a certain opinion regarding 
the content of these values. Communitarian values are, for example, not easily 
compatible with these economic mechanisms. Aft er all, social security is a 
phenomenon that is not easily explained by economic theory and relies therefore 
on other approaches, such as those proclaimed by communitarians such as 
Etzioni and Walzer.
Th e communitarianist approach argues that people are social beings, that they 
are what they are because they live in communities. Within these communities 
each individual has its own personal responsibility and autonomy. Th e society 
functions because of the shared understandings about core values. From this 
communitarianist approach there are certain roles the state has to fulfi l. First of 
all: the state has to maintain a maximum of social integration as everybody 
should participate or be enabled to participate in society. Secondly: the state has 
to facilitate the proper moral debate as Etzioni calls it. Th e shared norms and 
values should be contested in, for example, social security. And fi nally, the state 
has to make it possible for every individual to be responsible for achieving his 
own goals.
Th e latter fi ts in with the economic perspective. Economic mechanisms such as 
transactions function because individuals agree on the transactions. Th ey will 
do so because they benefi t personally from these transactions. But it is important 
Conference proceedings
204 Intersentia
to note that the communitarianist approach demands that these private 
transactions occur within a public sphere and a set shared values. Th e proper 
moral debate on shared values will not start in a market sphere.
A strong public sphere is necessary to safeguard public values. Th e problem with 
this public sphere is that it frequently malfunctions. Th e public sphere seems unable 
to organize the moral dialogue about the future of social security. In many Western 
European countries, not only the Netherlands, but also France and Germany, we 
see that the question as to what the common grounds of social security are and 
which measures are necessary to safeguard these values is full of taboos. Th e debate 
takes place within the capitalist elite, where the vested interests of employers are 
dominant and the voice of the ‘common citizen’ is simply underdeveloped. Th e 
interests of employees are only institutionalized in unions, although many 
employees do not belong to these unions and the social security measures – for 
instance care for the handicapped or social assistance – are not really in the interest 
of employees. Th erefore the public debate lacks a serious exchange of arguments. 
Th e result is an arena of package deals clouding the true objectives.
If one recognizes the public sphere as a true safeguarding mechanism to protect 
public interests, it is therefore important not only to appoint a strong judge who 
could protect the public sphere, but also to organize a real moral dialogue about 
the shared values and true interests of social security. Th is calls for a critical 
press, a well organized civil society with an active intellectual elite and above all: 
a critical, responsive parliament.
3.2. MUDDLING THROUGH OR THE PURSUIT OF VALUES
Prof Michiel Heldeweg, Twente University
Chapter:  Instrumentalisation public values in social security: a public 
administration perspective (De Ridder)
Th e scientifi c endeavour in this book is based on two questions: ‘is social security 
considered to be a public interest, and how does the answer to this question 
refl ect on the role of the state in social security?’. Th e public interest at hand is 
social security. Th e backdrop of community and market failure in delivering 
social security, as a societal interest, is a given fact. In the social science 
perspective the related public values that defi ne the public social security interest 
are: compensation for unequal distribution, solidarity, effi  ciency and social and 
economic participation.
From the social science point of view the search for adequate safeguarding 
mechanisms seems to be a continuous quest, strongly akin to aiming at a moving 
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target. Th e problem that arises is that the instrument itself is not entirely neutral. 
It is quite oft en a matter of ‘muddling through’. Introducing new mechanisms in 
response to old mechanisms’ inadequacies. Generally, these ‘old’ mechanisms 
are nested in three spheres of social order: communities, markets and hierarchy. 
In turn, the ‘new’ mechanisms may be regarded as an attempt to re-balance these 
spheres. Hence the New Public Management (NPM) perspective seems relevant, 
since safeguarding social security has become a contingent puzzle, in which the 
proper mix of public and private law tools must be found, while accepting 
necessary trade-off s between the public values involved.
Th e NPM image of the regulatory state as a shift  from rowing to steering must, 
in the context of public interests, be understood substantively. Steering isn’t 
merely about setting the rules of the game; it is about the results which society 
has failed to bring about spontaneously. We are not concerned here, with the 
basic arrangements of a free market, where government merely seeks to ensure 
fair competition and basic consumer protection and does not take an interest in 
the delivery of any specifi c goods or services and thus limits itself to ensure 
system integrity through systemic supervision.
Government responsibility for social security, however, whether founded in a 
fundamental human right or otherwise, carries with it intrinsic public value. It 
may involve quasi-markets which provide an arena for reciprocal value exchanges 
but still government responsibility extends beyond ensuring system integrity 
and must ensure proper results, expressed in – amongst others, the principles of 
solidarity, compensation and participation.
So, while opening up input-legitimacy to reciprocal transactions, as ‘exit’ 
alongside ‘voice’, when public interests are involved, the regulatory state should 
meanwhile ensure output-legitimacy by insisting on a substantive government 
responsibility for the outcomes of the whole system of social security governance. 
Th is responsibility must be accompanied by strong public controls and a clear 
public expression also in terms of standards for service organisations and for 
service interactions with clients (and their empowerment). So yes, there is a clear 
connection between defi ning some societal interests as public, and the role that 
the state must play in the safeguarding of these interests.
Furthermore, one could propose that there is room for a ‘regulatory bias’, as a 
particular view on the ‘defi nition-safeguard’ connection. Where public interests 
are involved, the regulatory stance towards involving community or market 
mechanisms should be one of scepticism, simply as it is societal ‘failure’ that gave 
way to government involvement in the fi rst place. Th at would be an argument in 
favour of ‘No (markets), unless…’, instead of ‘Yes, if…’.
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By now we can be fairly confi dent in assuming that research has presented us 
with abundant evidence-based knowledge containing some serious warning 
signs to governments endeavouring to outsource vital social security services, 
such as for instance the ineff ectiveness and ineffi  ciency of quasi-market 
arrangements for reintegration services.
Th is position is not in keeping with the general argument that the liberal democracy 
presupposes, that private and societal interests are best left  to society and if possible 
should also be used to render public services. Perhaps then the choice between the 
‘No, unless…’ and ‘Yes, if…’ approach should be linked to ‘trust’. ‘No, unless…’ 
may then be exchanged for a ‘Yes, if…’ if government fi nds that it can trust 
private operators and their transactions as a matter of natural alignment between 
private and public incentives; in keeping with the free market mechanisms, 
where property and contract regimes ensure mutually appreciated legal certainty 
between private parties.
However, if regulation and supervision merely function as a straightjacket for 
private transactions, and trust merely hinges on supervision, this should be 
considered counter-indicative for privatisation – leading to high transaction 
costs and low performance, which seems especially painful when it leads to a 
failure in solidarity. No trust, no privatisation!
Of course these sketchy remarks are still a far cry from a true legal governance 
design methodology, linking governance to management and systematically 
addressing the dilemmas that De Ridder has skilfully analysed in terms of 
diff erent types of feedbacks and applying the input-throughput-output model. 
With respect to this, this contribution is highly relevant in that it creates a 
multidisciplinary methodology, applicable to social security.
3.3. THE NEED FOR A CAREFUL ANALYSIS, IN THE LIGHT 
OF INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS, OF PRIVATE 
SOCIAL SECURITY ARRANGEMENTS
Prof. Frans Pennings, Utrecht University
Chapter:  Instrumentalisation of public interests: a legal perspective (Tollenaar)
Th e study of the regulatory welfare state, in particular in view of privatization of 
social security, is an important one and very relevant to the continuing discussion 
on the need for the modernisation of social security. Legal instruments can have 
many shapes, ranging from the function of decentralized and deconcentrated 
bodies as a way to increase the legitimacy of the system as these may be closer to 
the citizen to the European and international legal order which create standards 
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by which national states have to abide. And within the national system one could 
distinguish the use of discretionary powers and the judicial review of the use of 
these powers and the mechanisms in private law, including the liability of the 
party if the weaker party incurs damage.
Th e legal literature seems more interested in the public mechanisms to safeguard 
public interests, despite the fact that in many cases private legal relationships 
seems to cover social risks as well. For example, social security arrangements can 
also follow from or be regulated by the contract between employer and employee. 
Th ere appears to be a lack of knowledge in the way these private mechanisms 
work and the ‘safeguarding value’ of these mechanisms. Further research might 
focus especially on these aspects of social security. Aft er all, private law 
safeguarding public values gives rise to new legal questions.
Th e example of the Dutch privatized sickness benefi ts can be seen as an 
illustration. Th e act itself is clear with regard to the public interests: there is a 
level of wage to be paid by the employer, if his employee falls ill. It is impossible 
for both parties to contract out of this duty. Th e act furthermore consists of 
norms with regard to the duration of payment, the limited grounds for refusal of 
payment and the obligations for the employer to help the ill person back into 
work. To this extent there is a strong public interference in the private relationship 
between employee and employer. But on the other hand: the public sphere has its 
boundaries. Th e law leaves room to both employee and employer with regard to 
the policy used to check whether the employee who claims to be ill is really ill. 
And both parties do also have some room to decide how they will undertake the 
reintegration process. Without a certain leeway both parties would not be able to 
fully aim for their own interests. But it is exactly this leeway that might endanger 
the public values. Aft er all, the employee is the weaker party and his position is 
not fully protected. For the employer it is rather easy to exert pressure and force 
the employee to continue working under the threat of not paying the wages. 
Th ere are of course procedures, for example that for obtaining a second opinion 
but these procedures come nowhere near to guaranteeing full protection.
Th ere is always some form of dependency between two private parties, which 
public law has to solve. Sometimes this dependency leads to the misuse of 
positions or to a failure to comply with legal standards. Even though employers 
are not allowed to select employees on the basis of how likely they are to fall ill or 
to dismiss employees who are frequently ill, in practice it is not that diffi  cult to 
hire only those persons who are believed to be healthy and to get rid of those 
who oft en call in sick. In both cases the law provides some protection to the 
weaker party, but these procedures do not really compensate the unequal 




Th is question calls for an objective by which we can measure current failures. 
Th e Sickness Act is based on the activation and reintegration of persons who are 
sick but objectives are also available at an international level. For example the 
ILO provides standards with respect to public social security. Another question 
that has to be addressed is what role these standards should have in the domain 
of private social security. Th e ILO is currently somewhat critical of the 
‘privatization’ of the Dutch Sickness Act. Are the arguments used by the ILO 
valid?
Once the failures have been defi ned the next step would be to search for adequate 
safeguards. One could think of many, from a complete ban on dismissing ill 
employees to a shift  in the burden of proof. But new problems may arise from 
such solutions. Legal mechanisms such as these can easily be questioned from 
other perspectives, for example from the economic perspective. Aft er all, a 
general ban on dismissing ill employees will create high costs for employers.
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PROSPECTS FOR 
THE REGULATORY WELFARE STATE: 
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FURTHER 
RESEARCH INTO SOCIAL MARKETS
Gijsbert Vonk and Albertjan Tollenaar
1. THE OUTCOME OF THE EXPERIMENT
In the introduction to this book, we referred to this study as an experiment. Th e 
goal of the experiment was to confront four diff erent disciplines with the same 
two questions: is social security considered to be a public interest and how is the 
instrumentalisation of the public interest in social security perceived? Was the 
experiment successful? In our eyes it was, but only to a certain degree and not 
always for the reasons we anticipated. We had secretly hoped to be able to develop 
a common set of denominators according to which public interests can be 
identifi ed. We learned a lot from the various contributions but, this aspiration 
proved to be too optimistic. Not only did the object and the approach of each of 
the informants lie too far apart to come to such understanding, but also the 
concept of the public interest itself remained too illusive.
Th e book has however, revealed another interesting element, namely that each of 
the disciplines appears to be heavily infected by the public private divide. As if 
this is some primeval truth out upon which all our knowledge is based. It is 
probably because of this instruments which mix public and private elements 
meet so much dogmatic opposition, also in this book. As we concluded in the 
fi rst chapter, this opposition does not mean that there are alternatives for the 
regulatory state model. Neither do the dogmatic problems necessarily relate to 
the success of mixed governance structures. Th is leads us to an overwhelming 
question: does the problem lie with the regulatory welfare state itself or with the 
way in which we look at it? Whatever the answer to this question may be, this 
study has led us to believe that a too strict dogmatic distinction between public 
and private hinders us in gaining an understanding of how mixed governance 
structures operate.
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For this reason we propose that a new theoretical framework should be developed 
which is capable of transcending the distinction between the public and private 
sphere. Such a framework is necessary if we want to study the empirical question 
of whether or not the regulatory welfare state is successful. Th e result is what we 
call research into the phenomenon of social markets.
2. ARTICULATING THE PUBLIC INTEREST
Th e fi rst step in developing the theoretical framework of the social markets is to 
gain a better understanding of the normative point of departure. Aft er all in 
order to monitor the success of the regulatory welfare state in social security, we 
must be able to measure the extent to which new forms of governance do 
contribute to realising social security as a public interest. In order to do so, we 
need, fi rst of all, to gain a deeper understanding of the core principles of social 
security. Th ese principles should be seen as objectives which should be adhered 
to whatever choices have been made as to the division of responsibilities between 
the state and private actors. A proposal for an articulation of such principles was 
included in the legal contribution of Part A of this study. Th e principles came 
under the headings of protection, inclusion, universality, reliability, solidarity, 
equality, and good governance. Two things need to be done to give further 
credence to such a proposal. First of all, research must be undertaken into the 
validity of these principles. A legal approach alone is not suffi  cient since, as has 
been pointed out, the core principles have extra-legal characteristics. We propose 
a mixed study based on economics, social sciences and the law. Secondly, it is 
important to break down the meaning of the various principles into smaller 
parts, so as to better understand and communicate exactly what we are talking 
about. Th is could ultimately produce a full catalogue of principles and 
standards.
3. GOVERNANCE INSTRUMENTS
Th is second layer of research would focus on the operation of the various 
governance instruments. Th e classical mechanism is legislation. But there are 
many alternative instruments to support the legislative framework: many forms 
of supervision, fi scal steering instruments, contract management, policy 
coordination, benchmarking, evaluation studies, comparing best practices, etc. 
We should gain better understanding of these ‘alternative mechanisms’ and in 
particular the ways in which they interact. What is needed to ensure that the 
market is regulated in such a way that all the objectives of social security are 
met? How do we obtain a balanced overview of the advantages and disadvantages, 
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and how can the success of alternative regulatory instruments be measured? 
Very oft en, these questions are not systematically addressed when governments 
decide to allow market forces to enter the social security system. Political 
preferences dominate the debate. A systematic overview of the consequences of 
mixed forms of governance helps to establish the right mix of instruments. Such 
an analysis should not only have an eye for the positive eff ects of alternative 
governance. Th e negative eff ects must also be taken into account. Are mixed 
governance structures really more effi  cient or will they only lead to more 
regulation? What is the democratic legitimacy of new forms of governance? Can 
these structures themselves be properly governed or are they too complicated 
and obtuse for both politicians and the general public to be understood?
4. CONCEPTUALISING SOCIAL MARKETS
Finally, more research needs to be done into the special characteristics of the 
markets that are created in the fi eld of social security and social welfare at large: 
the social markets. Th e term ‘social markets’ is used here to denote a particular 
mode of governance whereby states organise social services (social insurance, 
assistance, care, pensions, housing, etc.) through third parties which compete for 
government contracts. Th ese third parties can be private enterprises, non-profi t 
organisations or even specialised government agencies. Profi t is not the only 
relevant factor in this competition. What matters is that the actors manage to 
win government contracts on a structural basis. For this they have to build up 
co-operative networks, not only with the government but also amongst each 
other. Social markets are the quasi markets created in the social sector.1
What are the special characteristics of such markets and how can the functioning 
of these markets be protected and improved? Research in the area of social 
markets should challenge the public/private divide that still exists in many of 
our disciplines, including economics, law and political philosophy. Th e purpose 
is to transcend this divide and come up with proposals which take into account 
the characteristics of the social markets themselves. In fact, the proposals made 
by Pauline Westerman in Part B of this study for strengthening the regulatory 
welfare model are perfect examples of this approach.
‘Social market research’ must not take diff erences between public and private 
governance for granted just for dogmatic reasons. An example: within the public 
sector the attribution of new tasks to government agencies tends to be a rather 
1 Identifi ed as such as early as in the beginning of the 1990s by Le Grand 1991. See also Le 
Grand 2000.
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secretive aff air, but when contracts are awarded to private parties, public 
procurement rules apply leading to full transparency. Is this diff erence justifi ed? 
From the point of view of institutional competition it would be much better to 
allow public agencies to compete with private ones. However, competition rules 
currently still prohibit this. Perhaps we should therefore try to develop a new 
procurement regime that explicitly caters for the fact that private and public 
parties compete on an equal footing.
A common governance regime for social markets is also relevant from the point 
of view of EU law. EU law traditionally employs a strict dichotomy between the 
free market and the public sector. Social markets do not fi t in to this dichotomy: 
without further regulation (of exemptions granted in EU case law) social hybrids 
will be broken up. Either they have to behave as commercial enterprises or they 
should be absorbed into the classical public domain. Th e European Commission 
is aware of this problem and has taken the initiative to draw up special norms for 
‘social services of general economic interest’.2 Th e purpose of the initiative was 
to create more clarity about the character of these services and their relation to 
EU law. For political reasons this initiative has ground to a halt, but academic 
research can carry on. How should social markets be defi ned (with reference to 
the key principles of social security?) and how can they be protected by EU law?
2 26 April 2006, COM (2006) 117 def.
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